Scott v Avery (1856) 5 HL Cas 811; 10 ER 1121
House of Lords, 10 July 1856 — arbitration as a condition precedent to a right of action.
Facts
Alexander Scott brought an action against George Avery on three marine insurance policies covering the ship Alexander, valued at £2,400. Both parties were members of the mutual insurance associations concerned.
The policies incorporated the associations’ rules. Under the rule examined in the report, the committee was initially to ascertain and settle the amount payable for a loss. If the insured member accepted that amount, he could sue for it. If a dispute arose about the loss or another matter relating to the insurance, the rule provided for arbitration.
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The arbitration procedure allowed the dissatisfied member and the committee to select arbitrators. It also provided a way for the member to proceed if the committee failed to make its selection. Most importantly, the rule expressly made obtaining the arbitrators’ decision a condition precedent to bringing an action. Any action would then be limited to the sum awarded.
Avery relied on that condition in defending Scott’s claim. His pleas alleged, in alternative forms, a dispute over the claim, willingness on the committee’s part to arbitrate, and Scott’s refusal to do so. Scott challenged the legal sufficiency of those defences. The dispute before the courts therefore concerned the effect of the contractual provisions, rather than a trial determining the amount of the insured loss.
Procedural history and issue
The Court of Exchequer initially gave judgment for Scott on the challenged pleas. The Exchequer Chamber reversed that decision in Avery’s favour. Scott brought the matter to the House of Lords.
The central issue was whether the arbitration condition was invalid because parties could not, by agreement, exclude the courts’ jurisdiction. Scott argued that the policy created a right to claim for the loss and that the arbitration provision unlawfully prevented him from enforcing it in court. Avery argued that, properly understood, the contract made an arbitral decision necessary before that right of action arose.
Decision
The House of Lords affirmed the Exchequer Chamber’s judgment and gave judgment for Avery, with costs. The arbitration condition was effective, and the absence of an award provided a defence to the action.
Lord Cranworth LC and Lord Campbell gave speeches supporting that result. Lord Cranworth also reported Lord Brougham’s concurrence; Brougham had heard the argument but was absent through illness. The judges summoned to advise the House had expressed differing views, which were considered in reaching the final decision.
Why the condition was valid
Lord Cranworth distinguished between an agreement preventing enforcement of an existing cause of action and a contract defining when the cause of action would arise. The established objection to ousting the courts’ jurisdiction applied to the former. It did not prevent parties from agreeing that liability would depend on an award first being made.
Reading the policy with the incorporated rules, the parties had agreed that the amount recoverable would be established through the specified procedure. Where there was a dispute, the arbitrators’ decision was a prerequisite to an action. Without that decision, Scott did not yet have the contractual right of action which he sought to enforce.
The reasoning was not confined to an arbitrator calculating a sum where liability had already been admitted. Lord Cranworth considered that the principle could also operate where the arbitrator had to determine other conditions affecting liability. Lord Campbell expressly read the agreement as covering disputes about the insurers’ liability as well as the amount payable.
Public policy and the scope of the decision
Lord Campbell saw no public-policy objection to the parties choosing a private tribunal to determine their dispute before litigation. He emphasised the potential benefits of resolving insurance disputes economically and promptly. His conclusion supported giving effect to the bargain the parties had made.
The decision turned on the contract making the award a condition precedent. It did not simply declare that every agreement mentioning arbitration automatically barred an action. The distinction drawn in the speeches was between a separate promise to arbitrate and a contractual right which, by its own terms, did not arise until arbitration had taken place.
Report: Scott v Avery, House of Lords Cases, volume 5, pages 811–856.