Sharp v Harrison [1922] 1 Ch. 502
Property law – Houses – Restrictive covenants
Facts
The plaintiff and defendant lived next door to one another and were separated by a passageway which belonged to the plaintiff. The defendant bought her house from the plaintiff and the sale included a covenant which prevented her from converting the property into flats and opening the two window which overlooked the passageway between the houses and was directly opposite the lavatory in the plaintiff’s property. The defendant ignored this and converted the house. The plaintiff claimed for an injunction and for damages. Five months later, the defendant leased the flat out on a five-year lease. The plaintiff failed in an action which stated his house would depreciate in value. The plaintiff appealed and re-applied for an injunction.
Issue
The issue for the court to consider, in this instance, was whether the court could issue an injunction to prevent the actions of the defendant and whether such actions breached the covenant agreed between the plaintiff and defendant at the original sale of the properties. If an injunction was not appropriate in the circumstances, the court would also have to consider the extent of the damages that could be paid.
Decision/Outcome
The court dismissed the plaintiff’s action for an injunction on the basis that it was not right to prevent the defendant as there was no damage caused and only a five-year tenancy with the tenant in the flat. However, the court did grant nominal damages as the opening of the window was a breach of the covenant as agreed by the parties.
Updated 20 March 2026
This case summary describes Sharp v Harrison [1922] 1 Ch 502, a foundational case in the law of restrictive covenants and equitable remedies. The principles illustrated by the case — namely the court’s discretion to award damages in lieu of an injunction where granting injunctive relief would be disproportionate, and the availability of nominal damages for breach of a restrictive covenant even absent substantial loss — remain good law. The discretionary approach to injunctions in such circumstances continues to be governed by the principles derived from Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Co [1895] 1 Ch 287, as more recently considered and refined by the Supreme Court in Coventry v Lawrence [2014] UKSC 13, which confirmed that the Shelfer criteria should not be applied mechanically and that damages in lieu remain available where an injunction would be oppressive or disproportionate. This does not affect the accuracy of the summary as it relates to the specific facts and outcome of Sharp v Harrison itself. The article is broadly accurate as a case note on the 1922 decision, though readers should be aware that the broader law on injunctions and restrictive covenants has been developed significantly by subsequent case law, and the Coventry v Lawrence decision is the leading modern authority on the exercise of the court’s discretion in this area.