Speight v Gosnay [1891] 60 LJQB 231
Slander; cause of action; original utterer; repetition
(213 words)
Facts
The defendant uttered certain words creating a false (unfavourable) impression regarding the claimant’s virginity when the claimant’s mother was present. The claimant was unmarried at the time. The claimant’s mother repeated the allegation to her and she then repeated it again to her fiancé. The fiancé consequently called off his engagement to the claimant.
Issue
There was no evidence that the defendant intended for the slanderous words/allegation to be repeated or that he even authorised its repetition. In fact, it could not even be proven that he knew of the claimant’s engagement.
Held
The Court of Appeal held that the action for slander against the defendant could not be upheld. It stated that where the damage arises from the repetition of the slanderous allegation, the action can only be maintained if the maker of the slanderous allegation authorised or intended its repetition. Alternatively, the action for slander could be upheld if the repetition occurred as a natural consequence of the slander – i.e. if the person in whose presence the slanderous allegation was made was morally obliged to repeat it. The Court considered the case of Parkins v Scott (1862) 1 H&C 153, which states that in a case of unauthorised repetition of slander, it is in fact the repetitor who is liable.
Updated 20 March 2026
This case summary remains legally accurate. Speight v Gosnay (1891) is a well-established authority in the law of defamation concerning the liability of the original utterer where damage flows from a third party’s repetition of a slanderous statement. The principles described — that the original defendant is only liable if repetition was authorised, intended, or was the natural and probable consequence of the original utterance, and that otherwise the repeater bears liability — continue to be recognised in English defamation law.
It should be noted that the broader law of defamation has been substantially reformed by the Defamation Act 2013, which introduced changes including a serious harm threshold (s.1), new defences, and reforms to the treatment of publication. However, the 2013 Act does not alter the foundational common law principles on republication liability illustrated by this case, which remain relevant. The companion case of Parkins v Scott (1862) likewise remains good law on the point noted. Students should be aware that modern defamation cases are now also considered against the backdrop of the 2013 Act more broadly.
