Stovin v Wise [1996] UKHL 15 concerned a highway authority’s failure to improve visibility at a dangerous road junction. By a majority of three to two, the House of Lords held that Norfolk County Council owed no common law duty of care in the circumstances. Its statutory powers to improve road safety did not, by themselves, make it liable in damages for leaving the junction unchanged.
Facts
In December 1988, Mr Stovin was seriously injured when his motorcycle collided with a car driven by Mrs Wise in Wymondham, Norfolk. Mrs Wise was turning right from a minor road into Station Road. A bank of earth topped by a fence, on adjoining land belonging to British Rail, obstructed her view of approaching traffic.
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There had been three earlier accidents at the junction over twelve years. Council officers had considered removing the bank and had approached British Rail about carrying out the work at the council’s expense. British Rail’s representatives were to obtain internal approval, but the matter was not followed up. One of the council officers moved to other duties and the work had not been done when Mr Stovin was injured.
Proceedings and issue
Mrs Wise joined the council as a third party. The trial judge held her 70 per cent responsible for the accident and the council 30 per cent responsible. The Court of Appeal upheld that decision.
A claim based on the statutory duty to maintain highways under section 41 of the Highways Act 1980 had failed because the obstructing bank was beside the highway, rather than part of it. That conclusion was not challenged in the House of Lords.
The appeal concerned whether the council owed a common law duty to take positive action to remove the hazard. Section 79 gave a highway authority power to require an adjoining landowner to alter a bank, wall or fence obstructing road users’ views. The question was whether the council’s statutory powers and knowledge of the danger supported a duty of care sounding in damages.
The majority’s decision
The House of Lords allowed the council’s appeal and dismissed Mrs Wise’s claim against it. Lord Hoffmann gave the majority reasoning, with Lord Goff and Lord Jauncey agreeing.
The council had not created the dangerous junction or made it worse. The complaint was that it had failed to make an existing hazard safer. Lord Hoffmann distinguished that omission from careless conduct which itself causes injury. Merely beginning discussions with British Rail did not turn the failure to improve the junction into a positive act causing Mr Stovin’s accident.
A public authority’s statutory power also had to be distinguished from a duty owed to an individual in private law. Even where public law required an authority to consider using a power, it did not automatically follow that an injured person could claim compensation because the power had not been used.
Lord Hoffmann left open whether a statutory power could ever provide the basis for such a duty. He identified two minimum requirements, if it could: it must have been irrational not to exercise the power in the circumstances, and there must have been exceptional grounds for concluding that the policy of the statute required compensation for failure to exercise it. These were possible necessary conditions, not a statement that every case satisfying them would succeed.
Why the council was not liable
The first requirement was not satisfied. The trial judge had not found that declining to undertake the work would have been irrational. The council officers’ willingness to carry it out did not establish that no reasonable authority could decide otherwise. Timing, cost and competing road-safety priorities remained relevant. The junction’s accident record did not give it priority over the many sites with worse records.
The second requirement would also have failed. There was no relevant reliance on an improvement having been made: the junction visibly remained unchanged. Nor was this a routine, uniform service withheld from Mr Stovin while being supplied to others. Improvements to different hazardous junctions required individual decisions.
Lord Hoffmann also considered the statutory context and the effect of imposing compensation liability on spending priorities. Requiring highway authorities to answer for failures to improve existing layouts could divert resources from other public services. Drivers remained responsible for taking care on the road network as it stood, with compulsory insurance protecting victims of negligent driving. In this case, there was no sufficient basis for making the council an additional defendant liable for the injuries.
The dissent
Lord Nicholls, with Lord Slynn agreeing, would have dismissed the appeal. He emphasised the council’s knowledge of a serious danger, road users’ vulnerability, the protective purpose of its powers and its failure to pursue the proposed work. He considered that these circumstances justified a common law duty corresponding to the council’s public law obligations. That view did not command a majority.
Significance
The decision distinguishes an authority’s power to prevent harm from a private law obligation to compensate someone when it fails to do so. It also shows why foreseeability of injury, knowledge of danger and a proposed remedy do not alone resolve liability for an omission. The majority’s conclusion concerned this failure to improve a junction; it was not a general exemption of public authorities from ordinary negligence liability.