Law Case Summary
Tuberville v Savage [1669] EWHC KB J25
Whether a threatening declaration of future harm constituted an unlawful assault.
Facts
A man placed his hand on his sword and told another, “If it were not assize-time, I would not take such language.” The justices of assize were in town.
Issues
The question was as to whether laying a hand on a sword and stating “If it were not assize-time, I would not take such language,” constituted an unlawful assault by placing another in apprehension of immediate violence.
Decision/Outcome
The Court held that an assault requires both (1) the intention and (2) the act of assault. Even an act of, for example, striking a man, without an intention to assault, does not constitute an assault. Accordingly, the Court held that the facts did not give rise as the man merely stipulated that he would have the intention to assault if it were not assize-time. It was, indeed, assize-time and the man’s declaration expressly stipulated that he would not and did not intend tocommit an assault. Thus, there could have been no assault as there were no intention nor act of assault, nor imminent threat thereof.
Updated 20 March 2026
This article accurately summarises the decision in Tuberville v Savage (1669) 1 Mod Rep 3, a foundational common law authority on the tort of assault. The case remains good law and is still regularly cited in both tort and criminal law contexts for the proposition that an assault requires both an act and an intention to assault, and that words can negate what might otherwise appear to be a threatening gesture. There have been no statutory or case law developments that have overturned or materially qualified the principle established in this case. Students should note, however, that the modern law of assault — particularly in criminal law — has been developed significantly by later authorities and statute, including the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 and the Criminal Justice Act 1988, and by cases such as R v Ireland [1998] AC 147, which confirmed that words alone (and even silence) can in some circumstances constitute an assault. The article does not address those later developments, but as a case note focused solely on the 1669 decision it remains accurate.
