Warner Brothers Pictures Inc. v Nelson [1937] 1 KB 209
Contract law – Breach of contract – Damages
Facts
The defendant was a film artist, otherwise known as Bette Davis, who had entered into a contract with the plaintiffs, Warner Bros. Pictures, in the United States to provide her services exclusively to the company under a contract entered into in 1934 which, through the company’s renewal options, could continue until 1942. Under the contract, she could not, therefore, provide her services to another company, without the plaintiff’s express written consent. By her own admission, the defendant came to the United Kingdom to agree with a business to work to produce films for a third party and claimed that she was no longer bound by the original agreement with the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs brought an action and claimed an injunction to restrain her actions.
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Issue
The issue for the court was to understand and consider all of the options available with regards to remedying the breach of contract in this instance. Specific performance would be a strict requirement that would require Nelson to perform for the business, whereas damages would potentially be difficult to quantify in the circumstances. The court would also have to consider the length of time that such a restriction might run for.
Held
Branson J granted an injunction restraining Nelson from breaking her promise not to participate in films for another company during the contract. He did not order her to perform her acting services for Warner Brothers. The injunction enforced the negative restriction on competing work rather than the positive obligation to work for the plaintiffs.
The judge treated an injunction as more appropriate than damages. The parties’ express contractual recognition of that remedy was relevant evidence, but could not bind the court to grant it. The injunction was limited to the remaining duration of the contract or three years from the order, whichever was shorter.