The Supreme Court considered whether the definition of ‘crematorium’ under section 2 of the Cremation Act 1902 includes areas for the disposal or storage of ashes, for the purpose of the 200-yard radius clause prohibition in section 5 restricting siting near dwelling houses.
Background
Horizon Cremation Limited (‘Horizon’) sought planning permission from Tandridge District Council for a crematorium development on a site in the Metropolitan Green Belt in Surrey. Tandridge refused the application, and Horizon appealed. The appeal was considered by an Inspector appointed by the Secretary of State. It was agreed that the proposed development was inappropriate in the Green Belt.
A third party, Mercia, objected on the basis that parts of the crematorium other than the main building — including memorial gardens where ashes might be scattered — were located within 200 yards of an existing dwelling, thereby contravening section 5 of the Cremation Act 1902. That provision prohibits the siting of a crematorium within 200 yards of a dwelling house without consent.
In response, Horizon modified its plans so that ashes would be encased and stored in small cairn-like structures rather than strewn or disposed of, arguing that the area for the cairns fell outside the scope of the definition of ‘a crematorium’ in section 2 of the Act. The Inspector granted planning permission for the modified proposal.
The appellant, Heini Wathen-Fayed, appealed to the High Court under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 to quash the Inspector’s decision, arguing the grant of planning permission was contrary to section 5 of the Cremation Act 1902. Mr Mould KC dismissed the appellant’s application and refused permission to appeal. Stuart-Smith LJ subsequently granted permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal.
The Issue(s)
The central issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Court of Appeal erred in upholding the interpretation of the definition of ‘crematorium’ in section 2 of the Cremation Act 1902 for the purpose of the radius clause prohibition in section 5. Specifically, the question was whether the ‘storage’ or disposal of ashes in memorial areas fell within the statutory definition of a crematorium — and thus within the 200-yard radius clause — or whether such activities were sufficiently distinct from the burning of human remains to fall outside the scope of that definition.
Proceedings Below
Before the Court of Appeal, the argument focused on whether Horizon’s solution for the ‘storage’ of ashes was so distinct from disposal as to fall outside the definition of ‘crematorium’ in section 2. The Court of Appeal concluded that the storage of ashes was indeed distinct from disposal and fell outside the remit of section 2. It held that the disposal of ashes did not fall within the scope of ‘everything incidental or ancillary’ to ‘the purpose of burning human remains’. Therefore, the area for the disposal of ashes did not fall within the definition of crematorium and did not contravene the radius clause.
The Court’s Reasoning
The judgment was delivered on 30 July 2025 by a panel comprising Lord Reed, Lord Hamblen, Lord Leggatt, Lord Stephens, and Lady Simler. The full text of the Supreme Court’s substantive reasoning is not available from the case page provided, which contains the case summary and procedural details but not the full judgment text. As such, detailed quotations from the Justices’ reasoning cannot be extracted without risk of fabrication.
Practical Significance
This case is of importance in the fields of environment and planning law, as it addresses the correct statutory interpretation of the Cremation Act 1902, particularly the extent to which ancillary facilities at a crematorium site – such as memorial gardens and ash storage areas — are governed by the 200-yard radius clause designed to protect nearby residential properties. The outcome has implications for the siting and design of future crematoria, especially in sensitive locations such as the Green Belt, and for the ability of developers to modify proposals to circumvent statutory restrictions.
Source: Wathen-Fayed v Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities [2025] UKSC 32
Read more on the Wathen-Fayed case and statutory interpretation here.
