Wilson v Lombank [1963] 1 WLR 1294
Torts – Trespass – possession of vehicle – effect of lien over goods
Facts:
Wilson bought a car off Lombank. The representative of Lombank had no right to sell the vehicle. Wilson took the vehicle to the garage for repairs, where he had a line of credit with the garage, having used them in the past. The car was mistakenly taken by another Lombank representative, thinking it was one of theirs. Lombank later returned it to Wilson after realising their mistake. Wilson sued for damages for trespass of the car.
Issue:
Whether Wilson’s line of credit to the garage affected his possession over the vehicle and whether he was entitled to damages for trespass.
Held:
Upon consideration of the past dealings between the garage and Wilson, there was found to be an implied term between Wilson and the garage but no lien. Wilson had possession of the car, never lost possession of the car at any stage and had rights to immediate possession. As Wilson could have demanded to have access to the car at any time, he had possession of the vehicle as and when he chose. It was also relevant that the garage had waived any responsibility when the representative collected the vehicle, which went towards demonstrating that the line of credit did not affect ownership. As a result of the vehicle having been mistakenly taken, Wilson was entitled to damages for the total sum of the repairs and the value of the vehicle. Lombank’s mistaken occupancy of the vehicle amounted to trespass of Wilson’s property.
Updated 20 March 2026
This case summary describes Wilson v Lombank [1963] 1 WLR 1294, a first-instance decision concerning trespass to goods and the effect of a garage lien on possession. The legal principles discussed — that a person may retain possession of goods left with a bailee and may sue in trespass where that possession is interfered with, and that a lien must be established rather than assumed from a course of dealing — remain good law and have not been displaced by subsequent legislation or case law. The Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977 is worth noting for readers: it reformed and consolidated the law of torts relating to goods, abolishing the old forms of action such as detinue, but it preserved the tort of trespass to goods and did not disturb the underlying principles about possession on which this case turns. The summary is therefore still broadly accurate as a statement of the common law principles it addresses, though students should be aware that any modern analysis of interference with goods must be read alongside the 1977 Act.
