Wollerton and Wilson Ltd v Richard Costain Ltd [1970] 1 WLR 411
The availability of an injunction for trespass in the absence of damage
Facts
The defendant was a building company involved in a construction project which required the use of a crane. When the crane was erected, in the only position available for it, the jib passed over the claimant’s property when the crane was in use and occasionally when it was not in use. The jib passed some 50 feet above the property and the claimant acknowledged that it caused no damage or risk thereof. The defendant admitted trespass and offered a significant sum of money to be allowed permission to operate the claim. The claimant refused the offer and began proceedings for an interim injunction preventing the trespass.
Issue
The issue on these facts was whether an injunction prohibiting trespass was available where no damage was caused by the defendant and there was no risk of any such damage occurring.
Held
It was held that in circumstances where no damage occurs, the only remedy available to a claimant is an injunction and that on the nature of the claim and the fact that trespass was occurring, an injunction ought to be granted. However, because of the nature of the claim and the surrounding circumstances, the court can exercise its discretion to suspend the injunction. The result on these facts was that the injunction was suspended for a period that allowed the defendant to complete the work that required the use of the crane. This issue of whether this discretion is exercised is necessarily a question of fact in the circumstances of the case.
Updated 20 March 2026
This case summary accurately reflects the decision in Wollerton and Wilson Ltd v Richard Costain Ltd [1970] 1 WLR 411. The core legal principle — that trespass to airspace is actionable without proof of damage and that an injunction is the appropriate remedy, though one which the court may suspend in the exercise of its discretion — remains good law. However, readers should be aware of two important subsequent developments. First, the airspace trespass principle was significantly refined by the Court of Appeal in Bernstein of Leigh v Skyviews and General Ltd [1978] QB 479 and, more relevantly, by Anchor Brewhouse Developments Ltd v Berkley House (Docklands Developments) Ltd [1987] 2 EGLR 173, which confirmed that a crane jib oversailing neighbouring land constitutes trespass, broadly consistent with the approach in Wollerton. Second, the general approach to the grant or refusal of injunctions in trespass and nuisance cases was re-examined by the House of Lords in Coventry v Lawrence [2014] UKSC 13, which revisited the principles in Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Co [1895] 1 Ch 287 governing when damages may be awarded in lieu of an injunction. The Supreme Court in Coventry v Lawrence made clear that the Shelfer criteria should not be applied rigidly and that courts retain a broad discretion. This does not undermine the outcome in Wollerton but is relevant context when considering the court’s discretion to suspend or refuse an injunction. The article’s description of the facts and holding is otherwise accurate.
