Does the Law of Defamation Protect the Media’s Role as a Public Watchdog?

An exploration, critical analysis and evaluation of the “Reynolds” defence established in Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Defamation
is defined as, ‘… the publication of a statement which tends to lower a person
in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally, or which
tends to make them shun or avoid that person’.[1]
In light of the recent increase in usage of social media, claims of defamation
have never been more prevalent in society.[2]
Claimants are challenging the law and turning to alternative causes of action,
such as misuse of private information, breach of data protection or harassment.[3]
Due to the tremendous amount of claims over the years and as the law developed it
was stated under the Defamation Act 2013,
that claimants will have to show they suffered “serious harm” before suing.[4]

This study will critically analyse and evaluate the types of defamation and then move on to explain the elements involved in defamation. The defences in defamation will be address, in particular the Reynolds defence which came about after the key case known as Reynolds v The Times Newspaper[5]. Furthermore, it will also aim to show post-Reynolds test as affirmed in Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe.[6] This then brings upon a change with the introduction of the Defamation Act 2013. This study will then analyse upon how to strike a balance between the need to protect reputation and the general right to freedom of speech. Finally, the law of defamation in the United States (US) will be compared to the law of defamation in United Kingdom (UK).

2.0 TYPES OF DEFAMATION

The history of defamation brings us to the early 1300s whereby the actions for defamation were purely within the jurisdiction of the Church courts. It was stated that the common law action for defamation came about in 1500s.[7] It was not until 1660 that the common law drew a distinction between the two types of defamation, libel and slander.[8] The permanent and often written statement is known as libel where else the impermanent and often spoken about is known as slander.[9] In 1975, the Faulkes Committee recommended that they should abolish the distinction between libel and slander in English law  but the distinction still remains the same despite the Defamation Act 1996.[10] Although the distinction between libel and slander are based on oral and written statements, the development of modern methods of communication further complicated the matter.[11]

One
test for distinguishing between the two turns upon permanence versus
transience.[12]
In Monson v Tussauds Ltd[13],
Lopes LJ states that ‘Libels are
generally in writing or printing, but this is not necessary; the defamatory
matter may be conveyed in some other permanent form.[14]
For instance, a statute, a caricature, an effigy, chalk marks on a wall, signs
or pictures may constitute a libel.[15]
Defamatory words, pictures, visual images and gestures on radio or television
or any other ‘programme service’ are to be treated as libels[16].[17]
Furthermore, ‘the publication of defamatory words in the course of a performance
of a play’ is also treated as libel[18].[19]

A
later case, Youssopoff v
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures Ltd[20]
suggests a modified version of this test, by which it is necessary to show not
only that the communication is permanent but also that it is visible.[21]
Slesser LJ held in this case that
the film pictures being ‘a permanent matter to be seen by the eye’ could be
deemed as libels.[22]

A
libellous statement retains its status as a libel even when it is read aloud.[23]
This was decided in the case of Forrester
v Tyrrell[24], whereby a person
reading aloud from a defamatory letter was held to be liable in libel rather
than slander; it was immaterial whether or not he had handed the letter around.[25]
Libel statements are said to be actionable per se, however slander generally
required proof of actual injury.[26]
This means the claimant has to show some loss of harm of monetary value or
damage assessable in monetary terms.[27]

3.0 ELEMENTS OF DEFAMATION

There
are a few essential elements of the cause of action that has to be satisfied
before it can be said to be a defamatory statement. In all cases, it is the
duty of the claimant to prove that the statement is defamatory.  In the case of Cassell & Co Ltd v Broome[28],
Lord Reid said that it was not in
the judge’s position to ‘frame definitions or to lay down hard and fast
rules.  It is their function to enunciate
principles and much that they say is intended to be illustrative or explanatory
and not to be definitive.’[29]
In Sim v Stretch[30],
Lord Atkin suggested that the test
should be whether ‘would the words tend to lower the claimant in the estimation
of right-thinking members of society generally?’ This in turn raises the
question of who are ‘right-thinking members of society’.[31]
In some circles of society behaviour is admired which in other circles would be
condemned.[32]

In
Berkoff v Burchill[33],
the claimant was an actor that was described by the defendant as ‘hideously
ugly’.[34]
He alleged that this comment held him up to ridicule or meant that other people
would shun or avoid him. The majority in the Court of Appeal held that the
words were capable of being defamatory. However, Lord Millett dissenting said that
it was merely a joke and was not capable of being defamatory.[35]
The difference in the view of the judges in this case of Berkoff v Burchill only come to show how difficult it is to decide
how words may be seen by ordinary people.[36]
In conclusion, the only certainty appears to be that the decision as to whether
or not words are capable of being defamatory depends on what the judges in the
particular case believe would be the reaction of those they believe to be
ordinary citizens.[37]

The
second element of defamation is that the statement made must refer to the
claimant.[38]

In
the case of Knuppfer v London Express[39],
Viscount Simon LC stated that ‘it is
an essential element of the cause of action in defamation that the words
complained of should be published “of the plaintiff”.[40]
The forthright way would be to name and provide other information so that the
identity of the person referred to is clear.[41]  However, it is not always clear as problems
will arise where the defendant either did not know of the claimant’s existence.[42]
Lord Shaw quotes a passage from Bourke v Warren[43]
for the judgement of E Hulton & Co v
Jones[44]
which states ‘it is not necessary that all the world should understand the
libel; it is sufficient if those who knew the claimant can make out that he is
the person meant’.[45]
In Newstead v London Express Newspaper
Ltd[46],
the claimant shared the same name as the person mentioned in the statement.[47]
The matter then went to the Court of Appeal, Sir Wilfred Greene MR dismissed the appeal by saying that ‘if there
is a risk of coincidence, it ought I think, in reason to be borne, not by the
innocent party to whom the words are held to refer, but by the party who puts
them into circulation’.[48]

The
third element is that the statement made must be published.[49]
‘Publication’ here means no more than ‘communication’ even to a single person,
and a publisher is any person who communicates a defamatory meaning to a third
party.[50]  At least one other person must hear or read
the statement and understand it for it to be considered a defamatory statement.[51]
Newspapers and books are published so that any defamatory material they contain
is published to the readers.[52]
In the case of Huth v Huth[53],
Lord Reading CJ stated that ‘it is
no part of a butler’s duty to open letters that come to the house of his master
or mistress… no one can help a man’s curiosity being excited, but it does not
justify him in opening a letter, and it could not make the defendant liable for
the publication to the butler of the contents of the envelope…’.[54]
An exception however is made to the rule concerning publications between
spouses, a husband cannot make a publication to his wife or a wife to her
husband as per the case of Wennhak v
Morgan[55]
because this would otherwise lead to a disastrous results of social life.[56]

Once
defamatory material has been put into circulation by the original publisher,
there can be liability for repeated publications by others unless the
repetition is unauthorised and/ or is not a natural and probable consequence
which can reasonably be foreseen.[57]
In Slipper v BBC[58],
the claimant claimed that the film was defamatory and alleged that BBC knew and
would foresee that the preview tapes were likely to be reviewed in the national
press; alternatively, that it was the natural and probable consequence that such
reviews would be published.[59]

4.0 DEFENCES

Moving
on, due to the increase in the number of claims of defamation, a defendant now would
have numerous opportunities to assert an affirmative defence against such
claims.[60]

There
are general defences for liability in tort applied in relation to actions in
defamation such as the defence of consent which was seen in the case of Monson v Tussauds Ltd[61].
The focus, however, is upon those defences which are distinctive to a
particular cause of action.  Amongst the many
defences a few of them are; the defence of truth, honest opinion, publication
on matter of public interest and privilege which comes in the form of absolute
privilege and qualified privilege. 

The
first defence is the defence of truth. Traditionally, these principles
were represented by the common law defence of ‘justification’ but this was
replaced in 2013 by a new statutory defence of ‘truth’.[62]
Under the current law, a defendant has a defence of ‘justification’ where he or
she can prove that the imputation in respect of which he is being sued is
substantially true.[63]
Even though, the fact that any rumour may be true, the defendant will still have
to prove that the facts alleged in the rumour are true as per the case of Shah v Standard Chartered Bank[64].
In contrast, it is possible for a defendant to succeed where the statement
makes it clear that the defamatory accusation is in fact false.

The
next defence is the defence of honest opinion. This provides a defence,
in certain circumstances for statements of opinion as opposed to facts.[65]
In Spiller v Joseph[66],
Lord Philips of Worth Matravers
suggested that there should be a review of the law and stated that the common
law defence of ‘fair comment’ should in future be known as ‘honest comment’.[67]
According Scott LJ in Lyon v Daily Telegraph[68],
‘the right of “fair comment”…
is one of the fundamental rights of free speech and writing which are so dear
to the British nation.[69]

Additionally,
the defence of publication on a matter of public interest[70]
and builds on a previous defence, which was called the Reynolds defence after
the case of Reynolds v Times Newspaper.
It has the same purpose as the Reynolds defence, which is to protect the media
when they report matters of public interest in a responsible manner. In Flood v Times Newspaper Ltd[71],
Lord Phillips, with
whom Lord Mance agreed, expressed
support for Lady Hale’s formulation in Jameel’s
case that the Reynolds defence sprang from ‘the general obligation of the
press, media and other publishers to communicate important information on
matters of public interest and the general right of the public to receive such information.’[72]

Moving
on to the defence of privilege which are available in two forms; absolute
privilege and qualified privilege.[73]
It essentially allows people to speak without fear of defamation proceedings in
circumstances whereby freedom of speech is utmost important.[74]
An absolute privilege is a privilege that cannot be lost because of the bad
motives of the party asserting the privilege.[75]
In other words, an absolute privilege is effective no matter what the
defendant’s motive is.[76]
In Hamilton v Al Fayed[77],
it was held that absolute privilege is a stronger form of privilege because it
provides the defendant with an absolute defence where freedom of speech is of
the essence, such as is the case of the parliament.[78]
Section 13 of the Defamation Act 1996
also provides absolute privilege for reports and papers ordered to be published
by either house of Parliament, judicial proceedings, fair and accurate
contemporaneous reports of United Kingdom court proceedings[79]
and also for communication between the higher officials of the state as per the
case of Chatterton v Secretary of State
for India[80].[81]
A qualified privilege on the other hand arises where the need for such freedom
is not quite so great but nevertheless warrants some protection from the threat
of litigation that is not allowed on non-privileged occasions.[82]
It is a weaker form of privilege because it is only available as a defence
where it is felt that freedom of expression should be protected but not where
the writer is incited by malice. Horrocks
v Lowe[83]
provides an illustration of the approach to honesty and the effects of ‘malice’.[84]

5.0 REYNOLDS DEFENCE 

The
law regarding qualified privilege made a quantum leap with the decision in Reynolds v Times Newspaper. The case
involved allegedly defamatory statements contained in an article published in
Britain regarding the resignation of the Irish Prime Minister, Albert Reynolds,
following a political scandal.[85]

The
claimant was the Prime Minister of Ireland and a few days after he resigned the
Sunday Times published an article with the headline ‘Goodbye gombeen man’ with
the sub-heading ‘Why a fib too far proved fatal for the political career of
Ireland’s peacemaker and Mr Fixit’.[86]
It was held that the existing protection provided by the defences of privilege
and honest comment was adequate when dealing with matters of public interest
and it would be wrong to single out political debate from other matters of
public importance.[87]
The main issue in this case was whether or not the courts should recognise a
generic qualified privilege encompassing the publication by a newspaper of
political matters affecting the people of the United Kingdom.[88]

Lord Nicholls, upheld Lord Bingham’s judgement
in the Court of Appeal(COA), adding to it a list of ten criteria’s which
indicates how the defence of qualified privilege should be judged upon.[89]

1. The
   seriousness of the allegation; the more serious the charge, the more the public
   is misinformed and the individual is harmed, if the allegation is not true.[90]
2. Nature
   of the information and the extent to which the subject-matter is a matter of
   public concern.[91]
3. The
   source of information; as some informants have no direct knowledge of the
   events and some have their own axes to grind, or are being paid for their
   stories.[92]
4. The
   steps taken to verify the information.[93]
5. The
   status of the information; the allegation may have already been the subject of
   an investigation which commands respect.[94]
6. The
   urgency of the matter; news is often a perishable commodity.[95]
7. Whether
   comment was sought from the claimant, he may have information others do not
   possess or have not disclosed. However, an approach to the claimant will not
   always be necessary. [96]
8. Whether
   the article contained the gist of the plaintiff’s side of the story.[97]
9. The
   tone of the article is equally important. A newspaper can raise queries or call
   for an investigation. It need not adopt allegations as statements of fact.[98]
10. The circumstance of the
    publication which also includes the timing.

This
list is non exhaustive and may vary from case to case.[99]
In general, a newspaper’s unwillingness to disclose the identity of its sources
should not weigh against it.[100]
Above all, court should have particular regard to the importance of freedom of
expression. The press discharges vital functions as a bloodhound as well as a
watchdog.[101]

This
test established by Lord Nicholls
then became the ‘Reynolds test’. This test balances the public interest on the
freedom of speech against the public’s interest in not being misinformed by the
media on important factual issues. This test effectively directs the court to
focus on whether, in all circumstances, the publication of the defamatory
material was ‘responsible’, rather than simply whether the factual assertion
was accurate.

The
importance of the availability of the Reynolds privilege defence is of course
that the publication by a journalist of a statement that is false or turns out
to be false is nevertheless protected so long as he acted responsibly.[102]
 

However,
while the Reynolds defence intended to give greater protection to freedom of  speech, it has been construed strictly, thus
leading to criticism that in effect it was nothing more than a series of high
difficulties over which the media must clamber towards the distant defence of
privilege.[103] It
was criticised by Clayton and Tomlinson
in ‘The Law of Human Rights’ on two grounds; firstly, it was said to have not provided a full
recognition of the species of ‘qualified privilege’, developed by the
Convention jurisprudence described as a ‘safeguard to journalists’ when
‘matters of legitimate public concern’ are being discussed by the press.[104]
Secondly, they argued that it had left the law of defamation in a state of
uncertainty in relation to media discussion of matters of public interest.[105]

6.0 POST-REYNOLDS

 In addition, Reynolds v Times Newspaper caused quite a stir when it was handed
down. In 2001, the case of Loutchansky v
Times Newspaper Ltd[106]
the COA described the defence as a new legal doctrine, which was wholly
different from traditional qualified privilege based on the duty test.[107]
Lord Hoffmann in this case concluded
that it might more appropriately be called the Reynolds public interest defence
rather than privilege, and consequently that the traditional duty test would
not have to be rigorously satisfied in order for the Reynolds defence to apply.[108]

Moving on to the case of Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe[109],
where the Reynolds defence failed, it was which alleged that the United States
were monitoring the bank accounts of a Saudi Arabian businessman to ensure he
was not funding terrorists.[110] Lord Hoffmann in this casestated that Reynolds privilege was a
beneficial defence; that it should not be applied strictly; and that the
indicia of “responsible journalism” were not mandatory obstacles to be
overcome.[111]
 In this particular case the House of
Lords (HOL) sent a strong signal that the direction of travel post-Reynolds had
not been sufficiently in favour of press freedom.[112]  Lord
Hoffmann and Baroness Hale were
ready to drop the reference to a ‘privilege’ and admit that Reynolds really
created a new public interest defence, they were also critical of the way the
lower courts failed to recognize the revolutionary spirit of Reynolds.[113] Charman v Orion[114] is a
useful indication that the Reynolds defence does not only extend to newspapers
and similar highbrow publications.[115]

Reynolds defence was also considered in Flood v Times Newspaper Ltd[116] in
respect of an article headed: ‘Detective accused of taking bribes from Russian
exiles’ which named Detective Sergeant Flood as 
a senior officer whom police were investigating for accepting bribes in
exchanged for confidential police information.[117] When
Flood sued for libel, the high court found that the publication of the article
in Times and on its website was under Reynolds qualified privilege.[118]
However, the COA were of the view that because the steps taken to verify were
inadequate, the defendant had not acted responsibly and was not therefore
protected by Reynolds privilege.[119] In the
context of human rights, Lord Neuberger
MR said that the fair balancing of Article 8 and Article 10[120] would
normally require that such allegations should only be freely publishable if to
do so in the public interest and the journalist has taken reasonable steps to
check their accuracy.[121] This
indicates a step forward to protect the media.

7.0 DEFAMATION ACT 2013

In 2014, the Defamation Act 2013 came into force whereby it seeks to rebalance
the law of defamation[122] by ensuring
effective protection from freedom of speech, whilst preserving the defamed
individual’s right to protect his or her reputation.[123] In
addition, this Act also seeks to curb London being seen as the preferred
destination for libel tourism.[124]

The introduction of this new Act brought
about several changes to the way the law of defamation is handled in the UK. Initially,
it was observed that the burden of proof for defamation was to show that the
public’s estimation of the claimant would be lowered as a result of the statement.[125] Section
1 of the Act attempts to discourage trivial claims by introducing a new
threshold test[126] which
provides that claimants will have to show that they have suffered “serious
harm” to their reputation before suing.[127] In
case of a corporation, the corporation entities wishing to sue will need to
prove that the statement has caused, or is likely to cause, ‘serious financial
loss’.[128]

A major development in the defamation law in
the UK has been the change in defences available to those who are claimed
against. Section 2[129] creates
a new defence of “truth”, which replaces the defence of “justification”.[130] This
clause is intended broadly to reflect the current law while simplifying and
clarifying certain elements.[131] This
reflects the current law as established in the case of Chase v News Group Newspapers Ltd[132],
where the COA indicated that in order for the defence of justification to be
available the defendant does not have to prove that every word he or she
published was true; he or she has to establish the ‘essential’ or ‘substantial’
truth of the sing of libel’.[133]

In addition, section 3[134]
introduces the defence of honest opinion, which replaces the fair comment
defence.[135]
A defendant will have to satisfy the following three conditions in order to
rely on the defence of honest opinion; 
first is that the statement must be an expression of opinion and not an
assertion of fact.[136] This
is aimed to reflect the law as established in Cheng v Tse Wai Chun Paul[137]
that the statement must be recognisable as comment is distinct from an imputation
of fact.[138]
The statement must indicate the basis of the opinion.[139] This reflects
the test approved in Joseph v Spiller[140]
that “the comment must explicitly or implicitly indicate at least in general
terms the facts on which it is based”.[141] and
that the opinion must be one that an honest person could have held on the basis
of a fact which existed at the time the statement was published or before the a
privileged statement published before the statement in question.[142]
Section 4[143]
brings about a new defence in particular for publishers who reasonably believe
that it is in the public interest.[144]

ave regard  liges the court ‘o  of speech, which in turn obliges the corut to
‘. s of a fact which existed at the time the stat This defence brings
about a major change replacing the existing Reynolds defence.[145] It
also seeks to strengthen freedom of speech, which in turn obliges the court to
“have regard to all the circumstances of the case” and to “make such allowance
for editorial judgement as it considers appropriate” in deciding whether or not
a publication was made in the public interest.[146]

Besides, section 5[147]
creates a new defence whereby an action for defamation is brought against the
operator of a website in respect of a statement posted on the website.[148]  However, under section 5(3)[149], the
defence will be defeated if it was not possible for the claimant to identify
the poster of the statement, the claimant gave the operator notice of their
complaint in relation to the statement, and the operator failed to respond to
the notice in accordance with any provision contained in regulations. Besides,
the defence will also be defeated if the operator of the website had acted with
malice in relation to the posting of the statement concerned.[150] Section
6[151] creates
another new defence to protect scientists and academics publishing in
peer-reviewed journals and the publication of a statement in such a journal is
privileged, as long as certain conditions are met.[152] Simon Singh v British Chiropractic
Association[153]
brought to light the problems that arise when lone scientist contribute to
public interest debates.[154]

Section 7[155]
essentially extends the circumstances in which the existing defences of
absolute and qualified privilege can be used.[156] A
press conference was protected as it was considered under the common law as a
public meeting pursuant to the existing law set down in McCartan Turkington Breen v Times Newspapers Ltd[157].[158] Section
8[159]
introduces a single publication rule, this is aimed to reduce the number of
libel actions brought in respect of historic publications.[160] This new
Act establishes a rule preventing claimants from bringing an action in relation
to publication of the same material by the same publisher after the expiry of
the one-year limitation period, unless the manner of the publication is
materially different.[161]

Libel
tourism is address in section 9[162].[163]
There is a new test for acceptance of jurisdiction in defamation and it only
applies when a defamation action is brought against a person who is not
domiciled in the UK, and EU member state or a state which is a party to Lugano Convention.[164]
This Act states that a court does not have jurisdiction to hear and determine
and action unless the court is satisfied that of all the places in which the
statement complained of has been published, England and Wales is clearly the
most appropriate place in which to bring an action in respect of the statement.[165]

It
is submitted that the enactment of this Act is a step forward towards achieving a nation with the
ability to have freedom of speech. The positive impact to it is having claimants
prove that they have suffered serious harm as a result of the comment, this will
inevitably lead to fewer cases being brought to courts as it would be more
difficult to prove.[166]
Moreover, the new law regarding operators of websites is shows good progression
of the law as it updates the current state of the internet. This in turn allows
for increased protection of the website operator if they did not make a certain
comment in regard to the case.[167]
The defence of ‘matters of public interest’ is somewhat easier to use for
publishers as they only need to prove that they thought it was reasonable to
publish the comments in the matter of public interest and thus no additional
burden of proof is required unlike in the previous Reynolds defence.[168]
It was held that there was lack of certainty in the application of the Reynolds
defence outside the context of mainstream journalism thus creating a chilling
effect on the freedom of expression and reporting.[169]
Hence, the Defamation Act 2013 is said to be a very useful to create a fair
balance between freedom of expression and the right to a good reputation.[170]

Nonetheless,
Timothy Pinto criticised the Act by stating that companies are likely to find
it difficult to succeed if they have been defamed. Moreover, he wrote that the
act is ‘a boost for free speech’ because of the new requirement of proving harm
and the numerous statutory defences.[171] These
changes, in his view, will work against the claimant and against the right to a
good reputation.[172]
However, it is safe to say that the Defamation Act 2013 has modernised the law by
imposing statutory solutions but also by leaving the text open to
interpretation. The 2013 Act recognises the importance of the judiciary’s
discretion in the implementation of the law on a case-by-case basis. To
summarise, the Defamation Act 2013 is an important piece of legislation which
fills the gaps of the old law and provides a modern basis for further
developments. Whether the Act will work in favour of freedom of expression, or
in favour of a fair balance is yet to be seen within the case law.[173]

8.0 BALANCE BETWEEN FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PROTECTION OF REPUTATION

For decades, it has been argued that the
courts have failed to strike a balance between the human right to freedom of
speech and the right to protect one’s reputation. It is known that reputation
itself is not protected under the Convention, but is certainly protected under
English law[174]
and freedom of speech is a fundamental right[175].[176] The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) described freedom of speech as ‘the highest
aspiration of the common people’.[177]  Finkelstein in Report of the
Independent Inquiry into the Media and Media Regulation said that free
speech protects the right of all persons to participate in the democratic
process.[178]
It is submitted that freedom of speech is more if not just as equivalent as it
is to protect one’s reputation.

Consequently, the Human Rights Act (HRA) 1998
gives British citizens the right to freedom of speech as set out in Article 10
of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) which states that everyone
has the right to freedom of expression[179].[180] It is
generally believed that the courts tend to protect freedom of expression to a
greater degree than a person’s reputation.[181] For
example, in the case of O’Shea v Mirror
Group Newspapers Ltd[182]
, Morland J held that the conclusion
could not stand in the face of Article 10 ECHR as it would impose an impossible
burden on a publisher if he were required to check if the true picture
resembled someone else who because of the content of the picture was defamed.[183] Amongst
other articles that protect freedom of speech are contained in Article 19 of
the UDHR which states that everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and
expression[184].[185]

The UN Human Rights Committee heavily
criticised English libel law because it discourages “critical media reporting
on matters of serious public interest, adversely affecting the ability of
scholars and journalists to publish their work”.[186] It is
vital that a free and independent press performs the role of a “watchdog of
society which reports on issues of public interest and ensures accountability
of the state. Furthermore, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) elaborates on many rights included in the UDHR especially on
freedom of expression.[187]
Article 19 of the ICCPR guarantees the right to freedom of expression in terms
which are very similar to those found in Article 19 of the UDHR.[188] Over the years,
concerns have been expressed that the English law of defamation is too harsh in
its operation and that it costs too much to defend a claim even when a good
defence is available.[189]
As the result, it unduly interferes with the reporting of the news by the media
and act as a shield.[190]
Nevertheless, with the HRA 1998 which requires the courts in appropriate cases regard
the right to free speech in the ECHR serve to redress the balance as may the
specific reforms effected by the Defamation Act 2013.[191]

9.0 COMPARISON BETWEEN USA AND UK LIBEL LAWS

According to Robert Balin, libel laws in the US and England constitute a mirror
image of each other with the burden of proof placed on the claimant in the US
but on the media defendant in the UK.[192]
However, their different approaches stem from the basis of how they balance the
right of freedom of speech against the right to protection of reputation. America
favours protecting free speech whilst England favour protecting reputation.[193] The
American approach is basically governed by the First Amendment of the United
States which dictates that ‘Congress shall make no law…. abridging the freedom
of speech or of the press’.[194] Nonetheless,
the American approach to libel went through a change with the decision in the
landmark case of New York Times v
Sullivan[195]
which Justice Brennan determined that ‘libel can claim no talismanic immunity
from constitutional limitations’.[196]

American
libel law by placing the burden of proof on the claimant, rather than presuming
defamation, like the English system does, means that free speech will not be
overly ‘chilled’. Moreover, the single publication rule the American Courts
have imposed upon internet libel is much fairer than the English multiple
publication rule, as it is unreasonable to make someone account for every
so-called publication of their article on the internet, when the propagation of
information via this medium is virtually impossible to control. This difficulty
in controlling information on the internet is also one reason it is best to
again follow the American approach. This higher threshold demanded in American
libel actions may seem excessively protective of free speech at the expense of
reputations, but really it has struck the best balance possible, and in so
doing avoided the ridiculous situation of libel tourism, which England is now
confronted with. Although the common law elements of defamation claims are very
similar in both countries, but the Constitutional protection of speech in the
US has allowed defendants in American courts to be much more successful in
defending defamation claims.[197]

10.0 CONCLUSION

The Defamation Act 2013 serves to give
out a strong message to loosen the ends of freedom of speech for the media to
publish statements which they think is relevant or significant. This Act does
not completely sacrifice the right to reputation but it strengthens the right
to freedom of speech for individuals and the press in UK. This inevitably
protects the role of the media.

David S Ardia in Reputation in a Networked World: Revisiting
the Social Foundations of Defamation Law stated “…Given that defamation
law serves so many important functions, one would expect that it has evolved
along with our networked society. But, alas, defamation law looks today much as
it did in 1964, when the Supreme Court issued its landmark decision in New
York Times v Sullivan, or even 1764, when colonial Americans began to
tinker with the common law’s English roots.[198]
Defamation law remains perplexed with minute and barren distinctions, filled
with technicalities and traps for the unwary and riddled with anomalies and
absurdities.”[199]

It is to be noted that British
defamation law causes a severe chilling effect on speech in America. The fear
of violating British law may cause media outlets in America to edit the content of their stories. A solution therefore
must be found in such a way that it would involve a balance between the freedom
of speech in America and the right to protect themselves from defamatory
statements. In a dispute between two nations that value basic freedoms, any
solution should stumble on the side of protection of freedom of speech, the
most important fundamental right that any nation celebrates.

In addition, the introduction of the
serious harm makes it more difficult for an individual to bring a claim in
defamation, therefore giving individuals more flexibility to exercise their
right to free speech. However, the Act will not go as far as to implement
non-liability approach to defamation as it is important to attach a reasonable
restraint when it comes to the exercise of free speech as it is also important
to protect the reputations of members of society as well as corporate bodies. It
is difficult to predict the future of defamation law however it is safe to
assume that the media will continue to lobby for a relaxation of the libel
laws, particularly in the area of qualified privilege.[200] In
conclusion, the right to free speech is not extensively limited or crippled by
defamation laws in the UK but rather an acceptable balance has been reached or
is being reached between the right to free speech and the need to protect the
right to reputation.

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---

[1] S. I. Strong
and Liz Williams, Complete tort law: Text, cases, & materials (2nd
edition, OUP Oxford. Copyright. 2011) 346

[2] ‘House of Lords – Social Media And
Criminal Offences – Communications Committee’ (Publications.parliament.uk)
<https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201415/ldselect/ldcomuni/37/3704.htm>
accessed 4 April 2017

[3] Marialuisa Taddia, ‘The media, defamation and
lawyers’ (11 January 2017) <https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/law/the-media-defamation-and-lawyers/5054757.article>
accessed 14 January 2017

[4]  ‘Defamation act 2013 aims to
improve libel laws’ (BBC 31 December 2013) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-25551640>
accessed 14 January 2017

[5] [2001] 2 AC 127; [1999] 3 WLR
1010; [2000] EMLR 1; [1999] 4 All ER 609 

[6] [2005] EWCA Civ 74; [2005] QB 904;
[2005] 2 WLR 1577; [2005] EMLR 377

[7] ‘History of defamation’, (18
October 2013)
<https://englishlegalhistory.wordpress.com/2013/10/18/history-of-defamation/>
accessed 30 January 2017

413.nant
and often written defamation is known as libel where else the impermenant and
often spoken about is known as slander.

[8] John Hodgson and John
Lewthwaite, Tort law textbook (OUP Oxford. Copyright. 2007)
413

[9] Arnold J. Goldman and William D.
Sigismond, Cengage Advantage Books: Business Law: Principles And
Practices (1st edn, South-Western Cengage Learning 2014) 83

[10] Vivienne
Harpwood, Modern Tort Law (6th edn, Cavendish Publishing 2005) 371

[11] Mark
Lunney and Ken Oliphant, Tort law: Text and materials (5th
edition, Oxford University press 2013) 687

[12] Rachael Mulheron, Principles of tort law (Cambridge
University Press 2016) 756

[13]  [1894] 1 QB 671

[14]
Mark Lunney and Ken Oliphant, Tort law: Text and materials (5th
edition, Oxford University press 2013) 687

[15] Ibid

[16] s166 of the Broadcasting Act 1990

[17] Vera Bermingham and Carol Brennan, Tort law directions (5th
edn, Oxford University Press 2016) 316

[18] s4(1) of the Theatres Act 1968,

[19] Simon F. Deakin, Angus Johnston, and Basil Markesinis, Markesinis
and Deakin’s tort law (7th edition, OUP Oxford 2012) 637

[20] [1934] 50 TLR 581

[21] Ursula
Smartt, Media law for journalists (SAGE 2006) 164

[22] Christian
Witting, Street on torts (14th edition, Oxford University
Press 2015) 544

[23]
Mark Lunney and Ken Oliphant, Tort law: Text and materials (5th
edition, Oxford University press 2013) 688

[24] [1893] 9
TLR 257

[25] Ibid

[26] S. I. Strong and Liz Williams, Complete tort law: Text, cases,
& materials (2nd edition, OUP Oxford. Copyright. 2011) 359

[27] Vera Bermingham and Carol Brennan, Tort law directions (5^th edition, Oxford
University Press 2016) 317

[28]
[1972] 2 WLR 645

[29] Chris Turner and Sue Hodge, Unlocking
Torts (3rd edn, Routledge 2013) 311

[30] [1936] 52 TLR 669

[31] Ibid 312

[32] Ibid

[33] [1996] 4 All ER 1008

[34] Barbara Harvey and John
Marston, Cases And Commentary On Tort (6th edn, Oxford
University Press 2009) 524

[35] Paul Magrath, ‘Law Report:
`Hideously Ugly’ Tag Could Be Defamatory’ (The Independent, 1996)
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/law-report-hideously-ugly-tag-could-be-defamatory-5597940.html>
accessed 4 April 2017.

[36] ‘Defamation – Case Law: Berkoff V
Burchill’ (Mavrkydefamationcaselaw.blogspot.co.uk, 2007)
<http://mavrkydefamationcaselaw.blogspot.co.uk/2007/01/berkoff-v-burchill.html>
accessed 5 April 2017.

[37] Chris Turner and Sue Hodge, Unlocking
Torts (3rd edn, Routledge 2013) 314

[38] Simon Deakin, Angus Johnston and Basil
Markesinis, Markesinis And Deakin’s Tort Law (7th edn, Oxford
University Press 2013) 645

[39] [1944] AC 116,122

[40]  ‘Defamation – Case Law:
Knupffer V London Express Newspaper’ (Mavrkydefamationcaselaw.blogspot.co.uk,
2007) <http://mavrkydefamationcaselaw.blogspot.co.uk/2007/01/knupffer-v-london-express-newspaper.html>
accessed 5 April 2017.

[41] Chris Turner
and Sue Hodge, Unlocking Torts (3rd edn, Routledge 2013) 315

[42] Ibid

[43] [1826] 2 C P 307

[44] [1910] AC 20

[45] Tom Welsh, Walter Greenwood and
David Banks, Mcnae’s Essential Law For Journalists (19th edn,
Oxford University Press 2007) 240

[46] [1940] 1 KB 377

[47] Cees van Dam, European
Tort Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2013) 114

[48] David Howarth and others, Hepple
And Matthews’ Tort Law: Cases And Materials (7th edn, Bloomsbury).

[49] David Oughton and Barbara
Harvey, Law Of Torts (8th edn, Oxford University Press 2015)
159

[50] Mark Lunney and Ken
Oliphant, Tort Law: Text And Materials (3rd edn, Oxford
University Press 2008) 722

[51] Chris Turner, Unlocking
Torts (4th edn, Routledge 2014) 354

[52] Ibid

[53] [1915] 3 KB 32

[54] Mark Lunney and Ken Oliphant, Tort law:
Text and materials (5th edition, Oxford University press 2013) 714

[55] [1888] 20 QBD 635

[56] Kirsty Horsey and Erika Rackley, Kidner’s
Casebook on Torts (13^th edition Oxford University Press, 2015) 481

[57] Chris Turner, Unlocking
Torts (4th edn, Routledge 2014) 355

[58] [1991] 1 QB 283

[59] Ibid

[60] ‘What Are Some Defenses To
Defamation? | Rottenstein Law Group LLP’ (Rotlaw.com)
<http://www.rotlaw.com/legal-library/what-are-some-defenses-to-defamation/>
accessed 6 April 2017.

[61] [1894] 1 QB 671

[62] Mark
Lunney and Ken Oliphant, Tort Law: Text And Materials (3rd
edn, Oxford University Press 2008) 719

[63] Ministry of Justice, ‘Draft
Defamation Bill’ (2011) 14

[64] [1998] 4 All ER 155

[65] Kirsty
Horsey and Erika Rackley, Kidner’s Casebook on Torts (13^th edition
Oxford University Press, 2015) 381

[66] [2010] UKSC 53

[67] Hilaire Barnett, Constitutional
& Administrative Law (10th edn, Routledge 2017) 456

[68] [1943] KB 746 at 753

[69] Mark
Lunney and Ken Oliphant, Tort Law: Text And Materials (3rd
edn, Oxford University Press 2008) 725

[70] s4 Defamation Act 2013

[71] [2012] UKSC 11 

[72] Jane Wright, Tort Law And
Human Rights (2nd edn, Hart Publishing 2017) 257

[73] Siamala
Krishnan, ‘Lord Lester’s Defamation Bill: Striking A Balance?’ (2012) 23 Ent.
L. R.

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the buyer would under the contract be bound to take delivery of them. r whereby
it w

[74] Kirsty Horsey and Erika Rackley, Kidner’s
Casebook on Torts (13^th edition Oxford University Press, 2015) 387

[75] William P. Statsky, Essentials
Of Torts (2nd edn, West Legal Studies 2001) 273

[76] Mark
Lunney and Ken Oliphant, Tort Law: Text And Materials (3rd
edn, Oxford University Press 2008) 729

[77] [2001] AC 395

[78] Vera
Bermingham and Carol Brennan, Tort Law Directions (3rd edn,
Oxford University Press 2012) 265

[79] Denis Keenan, Smith &
Keenan’s English Law (14th edn, Pearson Education Limited 2004) 568

[80] [1895] 2 QB 189

[81] Alastair
Mullis and Ken Oliphant, Torts (1st edn, Palgrave Macmillan
2011). 301

[82] Mark
Lunney and Ken Oliphant, Tort Law: Text And Materials (3rd
edn, Oxford University Press 2008) 736

[83] [1975] AC 135, [1974] 1 All ER 662

[84] Vera
Bermingham and Carol Brennan, Tort Law Directions (5th edn,
Oxford University Press 2016) 357

[85] Ibid

[86] Kirsty Horsey and Erika Rackley, Kidner’s
Casebook on Torts (13^th edition Oxford University Press, 2015) 390

[87] Ibid

[88]
Rory Dunlop, ‘Case Analysis: Article 10, The Reynolds Test And The Rule In The
Duke Of Brunswick’S Case: The Decision In Times Newspaper Ltd V The United
Kingdom’ <http://www.39essex.co.uk/docs/articles/RDL_Times_v_UK.pdf>
accessed 16 March 2017.

[89] Neville Cox, ‘The Future Of The
Reynolds Defence In Irish Defamation Law Following The Defamation Act 2009.’
(2014) 51 Irish Jurist.

[90] Joshua Rozenberg, ‘Ten-Point Test
Of Responsible Journalism’ (Telegraph.co.uk, 2004)
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1476714/Ten-point-test-of-responsible-journalism.html>
accessed 8 April 2017.

[91] Ibid

[92] Ibid

[93] Ibid

[94] Kirsty Horsey and Erika Rackley, Kidner’s
Casebook on Torts (13^th edition Oxford University Press, 2015) 391

[95] Ibid

[96] Ibid

[97] Ibid

[98]
Ibid

[99] Ibid

[100] Richard Kidner, Casebook
On Torts (12th edn, Oxford University Press 2012) 379

[101] Kirsty Horsey and Erika Rackley, Kidner’s
Casebook on Torts (13^th edition Oxford University Press, 2015) 391

[102]  Kee Yang Low, ‘Reynolds Privilege Transformed’ (2014) 130 L.Q.R.

[103] ‘Media Law’ (Law Society
Gazette, 2006) <https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/law/media-law/4230.article>
accessed 19 March 2017.

[104] Rory Dunlop, ‘Article 10, The
Reynolds Test And The Rule In The Duke Of Brunswick’S Case: The Decision In
Times Newspaper Ltd V The United Kingdom’ (39 Essex Street) <http://www.39essex.co.uk/docs/articles/RDL_Times_v_UK.pdf>
accessed 8 April 2017.

[105]
Ibid

[106] [2001]
EWCA Civ 1805; [2002] QB 783;
[2002] 2 WLR 640; [2002] 1 All ER 652; [2002] EMLR 241

[107] Tom Welsh, Walter Greenwood and
David Banks, Mcnae’s Essential Law for Journalists (19th edn,
Oxford University Press 2007) 275

[108]

 <http://login.westlaw.co.uk/ma state that
the buyer would under the contract be bound to take delivery of them. r whereby
it w Neville Cox, ‘The Future Of The
Reynolds Defence In Irish Defamation Law Following The Defamation Act 2009.’
(2014) 51 Irish Jurist.

[109] [2006] UKHL 44

[110] Ursula Smartt, Media &
Entertainment Law (2nd edn, Routledge 2014) 53

[111]  David Rolph, ‘A Critique Of The Defamation Act 2013: Lessons For And
From Australian Defamation Law Reform’ (2016) 21 Comms. L.

[112] Alastair Mullis and Ken
Oliphant, Torts (1st edn, Palgrave Macmillan 2011) 307

[113] Jenny Steele, Tort Law:
Text, Cases, And Materials (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2010) 796

[114] [2007] EWCA Civ 972

[115] Jenny Steele, Tort Law:
Text, Cases, And Materials (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2010) 797

[116] [2010] EMLR 26; [2010] HRLR 30

[117] Vera Bermingham and Carol
Brennan, Tort Law Directions (4th edn, Oxford University Press
2014) 298

[118]  Owen Bowcott, ‘Times Libel Ruling Restores Reynolds Public Interest
Defence’ (The Guardian, 2012) <https://www.theguardian.com/media/2012/mar/21/times-libel-reynolds-defence>
accessed 18 March 2017.

[119] Harry Melkonian, Defamation,
Libel Tourism And The SPEECH Act Of 2010 (1st edn, Cambria Press
2011).

[120] of the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)

[121] Vera
Bermingham and Carol Brennan, Tort Law Directions (4th edn,
Oxford University Press 2014) 298

[122]  Sally Martin, ‘The Defamation Act 2013: The Emperor’s New Clothes? – Litigation,
Mediation & Arbitration – UK’ (Mondaq.com, 2013) <http://www.mondaq.com/x/282472/Libel+Defamation/The+Defamation+Act+2013+The+Emperors+New+Clothes>
accessed 19 March 2017.

[123] Boris Uphoff and Vincent Schroder,
‘The UK Defamation Act 2013 Comes Into Effect’ (The National Law Review,
2014) <http://www.natlawreview.com/article/uk-defamation-act-2013-comes-effect>
accessed 19 March 2017.

[124] Major 2014, ‘Major Changes to
Defamation Law In The UK To Take Effect 1 January 2014 | White & Case LLP
International Law Firm, Global Law Practice’ (Whitecase.com, 2013)
<https://www.whitecase.com/publications/article/major-changes-defamation-law-uk-take-effect-1-january-2014>
accessed 19 March 2017.

[125] House Of Commons – Press
Standards, Privacy And Libel – Culture, Media And Sport Committee’ (Publications.parliament.uk,
2010)
<https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmcumeds/362/36206.htm>
accessed 21 March 2017.

[126] Philip Steele, ‘Defamation Act
2013: A Sensible Balance Or A Step Back? – Philip Steele’ (Inforrm’s Blog,
2014)
<https://inforrm.wordpress.com/2014/01/03/defamation-act-2013-a-sensible-balance-or-a-step-back-philip-steele/>
accessed 20 March 2017.

[127] ‘Defamation Act 2013 Aims to
Improve Libel Laws – BBC News’ (BBC News, 2013)
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-25551640> accessed 19 March 2017.

[128] Mark Scodie, ‘Defamation In
Employment’ (2014)
<http://www.bwbllp.com/file/bwb-empup-defamation-march14-pdf> accessed 20
March 2017.

[129] Defamation
Act 2013

[130] Philip Steele, ‘Defamation Act
2013: A Sensible Balance Or A Step Back? – Philip Steele’ (Inforrm’s Blog,
2014)
<https://inforrm.wordpress.com/2014/01/03/defamation-act-2013-a-sensible-balance-or-a-step-back-philip-steele/>
accessed 20 March 2017.

[131] Explanatory Notes To Bills:
DEFAMATION BILL’ (Publications.parliament.uk)
<https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/2012-2013/0005/en/13005en.htm>
accessed 20 March 2017.

[132] [2002] EWCA Civ 1772, [2003] EMLR

[133] Laura Scaife, Handbook Of
Social Media And The Law (1st edn, Infroma law from Routledge 2015) 86

[134] Defamation
Act 2013

[135] Philip Steele, ‘Defamation Act
2013: A Sensible Balance Or A Step Back? – Philip Steele’ (Inforrm’s Blog,
2014) <https://inforrm.wordpress.com/2014/01/03/defamation-act-2013-a-sensible-balance-or-a-step-back-philip-steele/>
accessed 20 March 2017.

[136] Ibid

[137] [2001] EMLR 31 CFA 

[138] Olivia O’Kane, ‘The Defamation Act
2013 And Its Explanatory Notes – Insight Articles – News & Events – Carson
Mcdowell’ (Carson-mcdowell.com, 2013)
<https://www.carson-mcdowell.com/news-and-events/insights/the-defamation-act-2013-and-its-explanatory-notes>
accessed 21 March 2017.

[139] Phillip Steele, ‘The New Law Of
Defamation: A Sensible Balance Or Step Back? | Brabners LLP’ (Brabners LLP,
2013)
<http://www.brabners.com/news/new-law-defamation-sensible-balance-or-step-back>
accessed 20 March 2017.

[140] [2010] UKSC 53

[141] Olivia O’Kane, ‘The Defamation Act
2013 And Its Explanatory Notes – Insight Articles – News & Events – Carson
Mcdowell’ (Carson-mcdowell.com, 2013)
<https://www.carson-mcdowell.com/news-and-events/insights/the-defamation-act-2013-and-its-explanatory-notes>
accessed 21 March 2017.

[142] Phillip Steele, ‘The New Law Of
Defamation: A Sensible Balance Or Step Back? | Brabners LLP’ (Brabners LLP,
2013)
<http://www.brabners.com/news/new-law-defamation-sensible-balance-or-step-back>
accessed 20 March 2017.

[143] Defamation
Act 2013

[144] ‘Defamation Act 2013’ (Legislation.gov.uk)
<http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/26/section/4/enacted> accessed
20 March 2017.

[145] Iain Wilson and Max Campbell,
‘Defamation Act 2013: A Summary And Overview – Iain Wilson And Max Campbell’ (Inforrm’s
Blog, 2014)
<https://inforrm.wordpress.com/2014/01/21/defamation-act-2013-a-summary-of-the-act-iain-wilson-and-max-campbell/>
accessed 20 March 2017.

[146] Ibid

[147] Defamation
Act 2013

[148] ‘Defamation Act 2013’ (Legislation.gov.uk)
<http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/26/section/5/enacted> accessed
20 March 2017.

[149] Defamation
Act 2013

[150] Pritpal Bhachu and Yousif Al
Zarouni, Tort Law: A Revision Guide For Law Students (1st edn,
Yousif Al Zarouni 2016) 66

[151] Defamation
Act 2013

[152] Philip Steele, ‘Defamation Act
2013: A Sensible Balance Or A Step Back? – Philip Steele’ (Inforrm’s Blog,
2014) <https://inforrm.wordpress.com/2014/01/03/defamation-act-2013-a-sensible-balance-or-a-step-back-philip-steele/>
accessed 20 March 2017.

[153] [2010] EWCA Civ 350

[154] Olivia O’Kane, ‘The Defamation Act
2013 And Its Explanatory Notes – Insight Articles – News & Events – Carson
Mcdowell’ (Carson-mcdowell.com, 2013)
<https://www.carson-mcdowell.com/news-and-events/insights/the-defamation-act-2013-and-its-explanatory-notes>
accessed 21 March 2017.

[155] Defamation
Act 2013

[156] Kirsty Horsey and Erika
Rackley, Tort Law (4th edn, Oxford University Press 2015) 486

[157] [2001] 2 AC 277

[158] Olivia O’Kane, ‘The Defamation Act
2013 And Its Explanatory Notes – Insight Articles – News & Events – Carson
Mcdowell’ (Carson-mcdowell.com, 2013) <https://www.carson-mcdowell.com/news-and-events/insights/the-defamation-act-2013-and-its-explanatory-notes>
accessed 21 March 2017.

[159] Defamation
Act 2013

[160] Philip Steele, ‘Defamation Act
2013: A Sensible Balance Or A Step Back? – Philip Steele’ (Inforrm’s Blog,
2014)
<https://inforrm.wordpress.com/2014/01/03/defamation-act-2013-a-sensible-balance-or-a-step-back-philip-steele/>
accessed 20 March 2017.

[161] James Kitching, ‘English
Defamation Law – The Requirement For “Serious Harm” And Other
Important Changes Impacting The Protection Of Your Reputation | Lexology’ (Lexology.com,
2014)
<http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=6cd0e337-604f-43e9-9a82-2e667d6731d1>
accessed 21 March 2017.

[162] Defamation
Act 2013

[163] David Hooper, ‘How The Court Will Interpret Whether
England Is The Most Appropriate Place To Bring A Libel Action’ (2016) 27 Ent.
L. R.

[164] Philip Steele, ‘Defamation Act
2013: A Sensible Balance Or A Step Back? – Philip Steele’ (Inforrm’s Blog,
2014)
<https://inforrm.wordpress.com/2014/01/03/defamation-act-2013-a-sensible-balance-or-a-step-back-philip-steele/>
accessed 20 March 2017.

[165] Timothy Pinto, ‘Defamation Act
2013 – A Boost For Free Speech – Part 4: Single Publication Rule, Forum
Shopping And Juries – Timothy Pinto’ (Inforrm’s Blog, 2013)
<https://inforrm.wordpress.com/2013/05/24/defamation-act-2013-a-boost-for-free-speech-part-4-single-publication-rule-forum-shopping-and-juries-timothy-pinto/>
accessed 21 March 2017.

[166] Faizan Sadiq,
‘Defamation Act 2013 – What’s Changed?’ (The Student Lawyer)
<http://thestudentlawyer.com/2013/08/19/defamation-act-2013-whats-changed/>
accessed 22 March 2017.

[167] Ibid

[168] Ibid

[169] Ministry of Justice, ‘Draft
Defamation Bill’ (2011).

[170] Ursula Smartt, Media &
Entertainment Law (2nd edn, Routledge 2014) 131

[171] Anamaria-Mitina Mihaita,
‘Defamation Act 2013: Free Speech Or Reputation? | North East Law Talk’ (Blogs.ncl.ac.uk,
2013)
<https://blogs.ncl.ac.uk/nelr/2013/06/25/defamation-act-2013-free-speech-or-reputation/>
accessed 10 April 2017.

[172] Ibid

[173] Ibid

[174] Kirsty Horsey and Erika
Rackley, Tort Law (4th edn, Oxford University Press 2015) 467

[175] Human Rights Act 1998

[176] ‘The Human Rights Act | Equality
and Human Rights Commission’ (Equalityhumanrights.com) <https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/human-rights/human-rights-act>
accessed 26 March 2017.

[177] Johannes Morsink, The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting, And Intent (1st
edn, University of Pennsylvania Press 1999) 1

[178] R FINKELSTEIN and M RICKETSON,
‘REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT INQUIRY INTO THE MEDIA AND MEDIA REGULATION’ (2012)
<http://www.abc.net.au/mediawatch/transcripts/1205_finkelstein.pdf>
accessed 24 March 2017.

[179]
this shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart
information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless
of frontiers

[180]  Peter Coe, ‘The Value Of Corporate Reputation And The Defamation Act
2013: A Brave New World Or Road To Ruin?’ (2013) 18 Comms. L.

[181]  Lee Roach, Card And James’ Business Law (3rd edn,
Oxford University Press 2014) 453

[182] [2001] EMLR 943

[183] Simon Deakin, Angus Johnston and
Basil Markesinis, Markesinis And Deakin’s Tort Law (7th edn,
Oxford University Press 2013) 646

[184] this includes freedom to hold opinions without
interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any

media and regardless of frontiers

[185] Corinna Coors, ‘Opinion Or
Defamation? Limits Of Free Speech In Online Customer Reviews In The Digital
Era’ (2015) 20 Comms. L.

[186]  Simon Singh, ‘Simon Singh: It Is Too Late For Me, But Libel Laws Must
Change For The Public Good’ The Telegraph (2010) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/7294539/Simon-Singh-it-is-too-late-for-me-but-libel-laws-must-change-for-the-public-good.html>
accessed 26 March 2017.

[187] ‘International Guarantee · What We
Do · Article 19’ (Article19) <https://www.article19.org/pages/en/international-guarantee.html>
accessed 26 March 2017.

[188] House of Commons Culture, Media
and Sport Committee, ‘Press Standards, Privacy And Libel’ (The Stationary
Office Limited 2010) <https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmcumeds/362/362ii.pdf>
accessed 26 March 2017 

[189] Mark Lunney and Ken
Oliphant, Tort law: Text and materials (5th edition, Oxford
University press 2013) 764

[190] Ibid

[191] Ibid

[192] Robert Balin, Laura Handman and
Erin Reid, ‘Libel Tourism and the Duke’s Manservant – An American Perspective’
(2009) 3 European Human Rights Law Review 303, 304.

[193] Jideofor Adibe, ‘Between Free
Speech And Protection Of Reputation’ (Dailytrust.com.ng, 2014) <https://www.dailytrust.com.ng/daily/columns/thursday-columns/36331-between-free-speech-and-protection-of-reputation>
accessed 1 April 2017.

[194] Keith Schilling, ‘The
Americanisation Of English Libel Laws’ (2000) 11 Ent. L. R.

[195] 376 U.S. 254 (1964)

[196] Richard A. Parker, Free
Speech On Trial: Communication Perspectives On Landmark Supreme Court Decisions (1st
edn, The University Of Alabama Press 2003) 120

[197] Michael Socha, ‘Double Standard: A Comparison Of British And American
Defamation Law’ (2004) 23 Penn State International Law Review
<http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1637&context=psilr>
accessed 4 April 2017. 20

[198] David S Ardia, ‘Reputation in a Networked world: Revisiting the social
foundations of defamation law by David S. Ardia: SSRN’ (10 October 2010)
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1689865> accessed 28 February 2017

inal
activites. iament, rather les accusing the claimant of being involved in
international criminal activites. iament, rather

[199] Ibid

inal
activites. iament, rather les accusing the claimant of being involved in
international criminal activites. iament, rather

[200]  Lucy Trevelyan, ‘Claimant-Friendly Defamation Laws Could Be About To
Change’ (Law Society Gazette, 2010) <https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/analysis/claimant-friendly-defamation-laws-could-be-about-to-change/57665.article>
accessed 13 April 2017.