Sample Undergraduate 2:1 EU Law Assignment
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The Rule of Law within Article 2 of the TEU
Introduction
The European Union (“EU”) prides itself on being based on the rule of law – it is therefore not surprising that the rule of law is enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (“TEU”).[1] The rule of law itself encompasses underlying constitutional principles such as legal certainty, prohibition on arbitrary state powers and the existence of independent and impartial courts.[2] Respect for the rule of law is generally considered a precondition for EU membership as provided by Article 49 TEU.[3] However, developments in countries such as Poland have threatened the very foundations of these founding principles. In order to prevent systemic threats to these founding principles the EU has provided for an enforcement mechanism under Article 7 TEU.[4] The procedure involves both preventative and sanctioning mechanisms – however it has frequently been questioned whether Article 7 is sufficient to ensure compliance with the rule of law.[5] This paper will examine the scope of Article 7 and the EU’s response to the Polish constitutional crisis.
Background to the Polish Constitutional Crisis
From late 2015, the newly elected Polish government introduced a number of reforms that gravely undermined the rule of law.[6] The early reforms concerned Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal. In December 2017 the Law and Justice (PiS) government also secured changes to the Supreme Court and the National Council for the Judiciary. The Supreme Court legislation lowered the retirement age from 70 to 65, affecting about 37% of the sitting judges unless the President agreed to extend their service.[7] Furthermore, the Supreme Court legislation created two additional chambers.[8] The Chamber of Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs was to hear extraordinary appeals and electoral disputes, while the Disciplinary Chamber was to hear, among other matters, disciplinary cases involving judges.[9] Finally, a law of December 2017 altered the appointment regime for the National Council for the Judiciary – which is the body primarily responsible for ensuring independence of the judiciary.[10] The law itself cut short the terms of the Council’s 15 judicial members and transferred the power to elect their successors from the judiciary to the Sejm.[11] The vast politicisation of the judiciary has been internationally criticised for being contrary to the principles of the rule of law.[12] More directly however, the European Commission has noted that these reforms are an intrinsic threat to the democracy in Poland which is contrary to the founding principles of the EU.[13]
In December 2017 the Commission brought the Polish reforms within the framework of Article 7(1) by proposing that the Council determine a clear risk of a serious breach of the rule of law. In May 2024 it withdrew the proposal after considering Poland’s action plan and commitments. The Commission concluded that there was no longer a clear risk of a serious breach. The procedure ended without any suspension of Poland’s rights. Further to this, to what extent are the EU institutions truly able to intervene into systemic threats to the rule of law within the EU.
Gravity of the Breach and Enforcement Proceedings
While the principles of rule of law are contained within Article 2 of the TEU, it is Article 7 TEU that provides an enforcement mechanism against these systematic threats to the rule of law. The threshold for measures under Article 7 is relatively high. Under Article 7(1), one third of the Member States, the European Parliament or the Commission may put forward a reasoned proposal. After hearing the state concerned and obtaining Parliament’s consent, the Council may determine by a majority of four fifths of its members that there is a clear risk of a serious breach. It may make recommendations and must regularly check whether the grounds for its finding still apply. The separate procedure in Article 7(2) requires the European Council, acting unanimously on a proposal by one third of the Member States or the Commission, to find a serious and persistent breach. It must obtain Parliament’s consent and invite the state concerned to submit observations.[14] Once that finding has been made, the Council may suspend rights, including Council voting rights, by qualified majority. Treaty obligations remain binding. The Council may vary or revoke a suspension by qualified majority if circumstances change. The state concerned does not vote. Abstentions by other European Council members do not prevent unanimity. Parliament’s consent requires two thirds of the votes cast, representing a majority of its members.
While the Treaties themselves provide little guidance on the interpretation of threats to Article 2, Closa, Kochenov and Weiler suggest three characteristics indicative of a grave breach. The first characteristic is known as unconstitutional constitutionalism – whereby political power is abused in perfectly legal means.[15] For example, utilising the legislature to pass unconstitutional and anti-democratic legislation through perfectly acceptable means. The other two characteristics involve the dismantlement of the democratic state and systemic corruption.[16] The politicization of the judiciary illustrates the danger of dismantling judicial checks. In the Polish proceedings the Commission relied on specific threats to constitutional review and judicial independence.[17]
However, it nevertheless appears that while Article 7 generally provides the council with the tools to prevent states from exhibiting authoritarian tendencies – the present formulation of Article 7 renders it ineffective in practice.[18] The main limiting factor in the Polish case was the need for unanimity in the European Council before rights could be suspended. Hungary’s government at the time had indicated it would oppose a finding against Poland.[19] No Article 7(2) determination was made.[20]
This ineffectiveness of Article 7 is perhaps further evidenced by a parallel situation in Hungary, where the Council was still examining the position under Article 7(1) in October 2026. Under a separate regulation protecting the EU budget, the Council imposed measures against Hungary in 2022. It lifted those measures in October 2026.[21]
A way forward?
The absence of sanctions under Article 7 in the Polish case sends a worrying message to EU Member States regarding the overall significance of the rule of law. Whereby grave threats to the rule of law may go largely overlooked. Perhaps this is because the EU is worried about a potential backfire of the stringent enforcement of Article 2. There is still a very fine line between surrendering to general EU principles and preserving national sovereignty.[22] The decision to invoke punitive measures under Article 7 is a very serious one – and one which will gravely impinge the national sovereignty of a Member State, and as a result these procedural hurdles are necessary.[23] As a result it is likely that the EU institutions will need to rely on more diplomatic measures to try and resolve threats to the rule of law. Unfortunately, this means that when diplomacy fails – Member States may simply refuse to cooperate with these foundational principles of the EU.[24]
In order to address the current shortcomings of Article 2 and Article 7 a number of solutions have been proposed. The first proposal in this regards suggests that it may be necessary to couple Article 2 with additional EU treaty provisions such as Article 4 (3).[25] Article 4(3) TEU promotes the principle of sincere cooperation between the Union and the Member States.[26] As a result, the substance of Article 2 would be rendered a more collective duty.[27] Whereby Member States are generally required to help promote the rule of law and general EU principles. This a more passive and long term approach to promoting the rule of law. Rather than a direct enforcement strategy.
At the same time, while it is necessary to ensure there is long term promotion of the rule of law – there must still be some level of enforcement if Member States do infringe upon these principles. Article 258 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) already provides a more concrete enforcement procedure. Under Article 19(1) TEU, the Commission secured judgments against Poland over the early retirement of Supreme Court judges, the disciplinary regime for judges and restrictions on courts checking whether a tribunal was independent and lawfully established. In December 2025 the Court also found that Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal did not meet the requirements of an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law.[28] If a Member State fails to comply with an infringement judgment, the Commission may return to the Court under Article 260(2) TFEU to seek a lump sum or penalty payment.[29] In April 2026, in proceedings against Hungary under Article 258, the Court found a breach of Article 2 TEU itself. The legislation at issue manifestly and particularly seriously denied the equal dignity and rights of LGBTI+ persons. These proceedings did not require a Treaty amendment.[30]
Conclusion
The constitutional crisis in Poland has been brought onto the international agenda for its grave threats to the rule of law. While there has been general condemnation from both the EU institutions and the Member States themselves, the reality is their current EU legal framework appears to be ill equipped to manage threats to the rule of law. The sanctioning arm of Article 7 rests heavily on unanimity – and in such highly political situations it is often difficult to receive this unanimity. As a result, the current framework appears to be ill equipped to manage genuine threats to the rule of law within the EU. Nevertheless, the Polish constitutional crisis does offer the EU the opportunity to reevaluate the current functioning of Article 7 and perhaps choose to adopt a more ad hoc enforcement procedure. Unfortunately, it will remain to be seen whether the EU opts to implement substantive changes to Article 7 or Article 2 via treaty amendments. For the time being, the solution to the Polish constitutional crisis rests in part on effective diplomacy.
Bibliography
Primary Sources
Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union (2012) OJ C 326.
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (2012) OJ C 326,
C(2017) 9050 Commission Recommendation regarding the rule of law in Poland complementary to Commission Recommendations (2017).
Cases C-619/18, C-791/19, C-204/21 and C-448/23, Commission v Poland. Case C-769/22 Commission v Hungary, judgment of 21 April 2026. Council Implementing Decisions (EU) 2022/2506 and 2026/2324.
Secondary Sources
Carlos Closa, Dimitry Kochenov and J.H.H. Weiler, 'Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union' (2014) EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2014/25.
Baratta R, 'Rule Of Law ‘Dialogues’ Within The EU: A Legal Assessment' (2016) 8 Hague Journal on the Rule of Law
Chronowski N and Varju M, 'Two Eras Of Hungarian Constitutionalism: From The Rule Of Law To Rule By Law' (2016) 8 Hague Journal on the Rule of Law
Drewniowska K, 'The Constitutional Court In Poland In 2016 - The Polish Constitutional Crisis' (2016) 2 Polish Law Review
Garner O, 'Reinforcing Rule Of Law Oversight In The European Union' (2017) 15 International Journal of Constitutional Law
Hotham L and Nacif L, 'Article 7 TEU And The Polish Case – A Recast – KSLR EU Law Blog' (Blogs.kcl.ac.uk, 2018) <https://blogs.kcl.ac.uk/kslreuropeanlawblog/?p=1274#.Wyz8fFMvxo4> accessed 23 June 2018
Hertogh M, 'Your Rule Of Law Is Not Mine: Rethinking Empirical Approaches To EU Rule Of Law Promotion' [2014] SSRN Electronic Journal
Kochenov D, Magen A and Pech L, 'Introduction: The Great Rule Of Law Debate In The EU' (2016) 54 JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies
Müller J, 'Should The EU Protect Democracy And The Rule Of Law Inside Member States?' (2015) 21 European Law Journal
[1] Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union (2012) OJ C 326.
[2] Roberto Baratta, 'Rule Of Law ‘Dialogues’ Within The EU: A Legal Assessment' (2016) 8 Hague Journal on the Rule of Law.
[3] Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union (2012) OJ C 326, Article 49.
[4] Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union (2012) OJ C 326, Article 7. Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (2012) OJ C 326, Article 354.
[5] Leo Hotham and Lucas Nacif, 'Article 7 TEU And The Polish Case – A Recast – KSLR EU Law Blog' (Blogs.kcl.ac.uk, 2018) <https://blogs.kcl.ac.uk/kslreuropeanlawblog/?p=1274#.Wyz8fFMvxo4> accessed 23 June 2018.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid. European Commission, Rule of Law: Commission launches infringement procedure to protect the independence of the Polish Supreme Court, 2 July 2018.
[8] C(2017) 9050 Commission Recommendation regarding the rule of law in Poland complementary to Commission Recommendations (2017).
[9] Ibid.
[10] ibid.
[11] ibid.
[12] C(2017) 9050 Commission Recommendation regarding the rule of law in Poland complementary to Commission Recommendations (2017).
[13] C(2017) 9050 Commission Recommendation regarding the rule of law in Poland complementary to Commission Recommendations (2017).
[14] TEU, Article 7. TFEU, Article 354. Leo Hotham and Lucas Nacif, 'Article 7 TEU And The Polish Case – A Recast – KSLR EU Law Blog' (Blogs.kcl.ac.uk, 2018) <https://blogs.kcl.ac.uk/kslreuropeanlawblog/?p=1274#.Wyz8fFMvxo4> accessed 23 June 2018.
[15] Carlos Closa, Dimitry Kochenov and J.H.H. Weiler, 'Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union' (2014) EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2014/25. See also Oliver Garner, 'Reinforcing Rule Of Law Oversight In The European Union' (2017) 15 International Journal of Constitutional Law.
[16] Closa, Kochenov and Weiler (n 15).
[17] European Commission, Reasoned Proposal in accordance with Article 7(1) TEU regarding the rule of law in Poland, COM(2017) 835 final.
[18] Jan-Werner Müller, 'Should The EU Protect Democracy And The Rule Of Law Inside Member States?' (2015) 21 European Law Journal
[19] Leo Hotham and Lucas Nacif, 'Article 7 TEU And The Polish Case – A Recast – KSLR EU Law Blog' (Blogs.kcl.ac.uk, 2018) <https://blogs.kcl.ac.uk/kslreuropeanlawblog/?p=1274#.Wyz8fFMvxo4> accessed 23 June 2018.
[20] Council of the European Union, Article 7 procedures, timeline for Poland, May 2024.
[21] Nóra Chronowski and Márton Varju, 'Two Eras Of Hungarian Constitutionalism: From The Rule Of Law To Rule By Law' (2016) 8 Hague Journal on the Rule of Law. Council Implementing Decisions (EU) 2022/2506 and 2026/2324. General Affairs Council, 13 October 2026.
[22] Marc Hertogh, 'Your Rule Of Law Is Not Mine: Rethinking Empirical Approaches To EU Rule Of Law Promotion' [2014] SSRN Electronic Journal.
[23] Leo Hotham and Lucas Nacif, 'Article 7 TEU And The Polish Case – A Recast – KSLR EU Law Blog' (Blogs.kcl.ac.uk, 2018) <https://blogs.kcl.ac.uk/kslreuropeanlawblog/?p=1274#.Wyz8fFMvxo4> accessed 23 June 2018.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Leo Hotham and Lucas Nacif, 'Article 7 TEU And The Polish Case – A Recast – KSLR EU Law Blog' (Blogs.kcl.ac.uk, 2018) <https://blogs.kcl.ac.uk/kslreuropeanlawblog/?p=1274#.Wyz8fFMvxo4> accessed 23 June 2018.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Oliver Garner, 'Reinforcing Rule Of Law Oversight In The European Union' (2017) 15 International Journal of Constitutional Law.
[28] Cases C-619/18, C-791/19, C-204/21 and C-448/23, Commission v Poland.
[29] TFEU, Article 260(2).
[30] Case C-769/22 Commission v Hungary, judgment of 21 April 2026. For the earlier discussion see Leo Hotham and Lucas Nacif, 'Article 7 TEU And The Polish Case – A Recast – KSLR EU Law Blog' (Blogs.kcl.ac.uk, 2018) <https://blogs.kcl.ac.uk/kslreuropeanlawblog/?p=1274#.Wyz8fFMvxo4> accessed 23 June 2018.
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