Sample 2:1 Undergraduate Law Seen Exam Answer
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See Our Exam Answer Sample See Our Exam Revision Notes SampleCartels in UK Law
'Cartels are one of the most harmful forms of anti-competitive conduct possible, which the civil law has proved ineffective in deterring and punishing. Subsequently, the UK's criminalisation of such behaviour via s.188 of the 2002 Enterprise Act is a laudable decision, and furthermore the offence is well constructed to achieve stronger regulation'. Discuss.
Introduction
It is widely recognised by the vast majority of commentators that cartels possess the potential to significantly harm the economy and disastrously distort markets;[1] indeed, observers do not shy in damning cartels as 'the biggest global financial fraud'[2] and 'the supreme evil' of antitrust.[3] In contrast, there is significantly less unanimity on the matter of how best to combat cartel behaviour. Recent decades have seen a global upsurge in state regulation, initially primarily in the civil arena, and now increasingly via the criminal law as more states seek to follow the USA's example of including criminal sanctions as part of an 'aggressive' regulation strategy.[4]
The UK is a prime example of such a state, with the decision to supplement the civil competition enforcement regimes with the introduction of a criminal offence for cartel activity, as per s. 188 of the 2002 Enterprise Act.[5] This move has been met with strongly mixed reviews, with proponents submitting it represents a desirably stronger response to cartels, whilst opponents retort it is 'great for a headline but not much else'.[6] Critics submit that s. 188 is an inappropriate misuse of the criminal law, and further that use of a criminal offence alongside civil leniency programmes is fundamentally irreconcilable. Moreover, s. 188 can be viewed as poorly constructed, and ill designed for practical application. On this basis, it will be asserted that the case made against s. 188 is compelling from both an academic and substantive perspective, and subsequently that the UK's approach to regulating and deterring cartel behaviour would benefit from repealing s. 188.
Context
As aforementioned, there is little disagreement that cartel behaviour holds the potential to cause severe disruption to a state's market; it rises above other forms of hardcore anti-competitive behaviour in that it objectively undermines the concept of the free and competitive liberal marketplace.[7] However, more than undermining the theoretical underpinnings of the EU's open market, empirical studies have shown that cartels operate significantly to the pecuniary detriment of the consumer and state alike.[8] As amended, s. 188 states that 'an individual is guilty of an offence if he agrees with one or more other persons to make or implement, or to cause to be made or implemented, arrangements of the following kind'.[9] The agreement must concern the specified price-fixing, supply or production limitation, market-sharing or bid-rigging arrangements involving at least two undertakings. On conviction on indictment, an individual faces up to five years in prison, a fine, or both.
In the UK, s. 188 was introduced to supplement (rather than replace) an existent civil enforcement regime, with many commentators contending that the pairing is both awkward and unnatural. Whilst the civil regime covers 'undertakings' generally (the EU's specifically devised term to cover all entities engaged in economic activity), the criminal approach is necessarily applicable to individuals who make the prohibited agreement, whatever their seniority. The UK's national competition authority is the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA). In England, Wales and Northern Ireland, proceedings can be brought by the CMA or Serious Fraud Office, or with the CMA's consent. In Scotland the public prosecutor is the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service.
Track Record
Since s. 188 was enacted, the number of cases prosecuted under it has been low. Early cases included R v. Whittle, Allison and Brammar (Marine Hoses) (2008),[10] R v. George et al (British Airways) (2010)[11] and Galvanized Steel Tanks (2015)[12]. A fourth case, concerning precast concrete drainage products, led to a guilty plea in 2016 and sentence in 2017. On one hand, it could be argued that the number of cases prosecuted is an improper measure of s. 188's impact, given it was intended to act as a deterrent more than a punishment, however it seems a more compelling perspective that s. 188 is simply failing to have major impact. Indeed, prior to s. 188's implementation, high-level commentators envisaged between six and ten major cases a year being prosecuted.[13]
Moreover, the convictions in Marine Hoses (2008) followed guilty pleas resultant from the work of the US Department of Justice, whilst Galvanized Steel Tanks (2015) resulted in one guilty plea and two acquittals after trial, and British Airways (2010) is widely perceived as having suffered from an embarrassing collapse due to basic errors, resulting in what O'Loughlin describes as 'the nadir of eight years of embarrassment for the OFT'.[14] It subsequently seems undeniable that s. 188 is defective in some manner, whether it be its theoretical underpinnings, structural construction or, as this paper submits, both.
Theoretical Failings
A strong argument can be made that any criminal cartel offence is doomed by its very nature as anti-competitive behaviour, whilst undoubtedly harmful, ought not to lie within the ambit of the criminal law. Whilst there is no exhaustively defined and objectively agreed upon approach to determining what should or should not be a criminal action, it is generally true that criminal actions bear multiple common characteristics, and a general definition can be applied, as espoused by the noted scholar Glanville Williams.[15] Williams defines crime by the availability of criminal proceedings. Section 188 meets that test. The question is whether cartel behaviour ought to attract criminal sanctions.
Indeed, as is frequently posited by those who consider the boundaries of the criminal and civil spheres, the two ought be viewed as distinct entities, rather than as existing on a single scale.[16] Indeed, Robinson notes that no legal system, regardless of political system, economic development, or stage in historical development, has made the error of failing to distinguish the criminal and civil legal systems.[17]
Whilst there are a myriad of reasons for this, a core one lies in the fact that the criminal sanctions are associated with signalling 'moral condemnation', unlike civil penalties.[18] Thus, the criminal system is distinguishable from civil law in providing 'a communicative function' which aids in 'separating and labelling' immoral behaviour.[19] Notably, whilst the question of the relationship between morality and the law has occupied jurisprudential attention for centuries, epitomised in the thought-provoking debate between the positivist Hart and the natural lawyer Devlin J, such a question is beyond the scope of this paper.[20] Thus, whilst criminal sanctions can express moral condemnation, cartel behaviour does not always have this connotation. As lamented by O'Loughlin, there has been little effort to construct an effective 'enforcement culture' around the potentially severe impacts of anti-competitive behaviour.[21] Indeed, this is evidenced by empirical evidence from Stephan who notes that a very low percentage of the British population equate cartel behaviour with economic theft, with a sizable portion believing that there were multiple situations and exceptions in which cartel behaviour would be acceptable, for instance if it assisted in avoiding mass unemployment.[22] When the survey was conducted, dishonesty was an element of the offence and the Ghosh test applied. On the question of whether price-fixing was dishonest,[23] only 63% of Britons surveyed felt it was, whereas it can be reasonably presumed that other common crimes such as fraud, and theft, would likely be much more widely perceived as dishonest.[24] Whilst issues with public understanding is a frequent problem in relation to white collar and complex financial crime, it appears to be particularly present in regards to cartel behaviour.[25]
Subsequently, whilst many commentators applaud the reform to s. 188, which removed, for agreements made on or after 1 April 2014 concerning arrangements made or to be made on or after that date, the 'dishonesty' component of the offence, which had been 'routinely criticised' by commentators from the outset, it is ultimately unsurprising that this has not resulted in a sizable increase in charges and prosecutions.[26] Indeed, efforts to 'scapegoat' this aspect of the former offence have been deemed relatively unpersuasive,[27] although it is commonly viewed that this component was perhaps s. 188's greatest substantive flaw.[28] As Danagher cogently asserts however, the mere removal of this requirement from the face of the offence does not alter that 'the CMA's ability to convince a jury that a cartelist has acted dishonestly is paramount to the cartel offence's future success' as a juror might be unwilling to impose criminal sanctions on a person they view as having committed no major moral wrong, regardless of judicial direction.[29] This is an argument about jurors, rather than a requirement to prove dishonesty under the amended offence. Section 188A excludes arrangements subject to the specified advance disclosure or publication, and agreements made to comply with a legal requirement. Section 188B provides defences concerning lack of intent to conceal from customers or the CMA, or reasonable steps taken before agreement to disclose the arrangements to a professional legal adviser for advice.
Further, a common objective of the criminal law is to act as a means of responding to socially undesirable behaviour by punishing it, providing reprisal and endeavouring to re-educate. In contrast, the notion of deterrence as a primary motivation for criminalisation has been criticised, as evidence shows it a mistaken assumption that there is a direct negative correlation the occurrence of crime and the related penalty.[30] Nonetheless, it is widely known that s. 188 is primarily intended to be a deterrent.[31]
Structural Failings
Stemming from s. 188's dubious theoretical grounding, and alongside accusations that it is a misuse of the criminal law, lies its greatest structural error – namely that it operates uncomfortably alongside its civil counterpart. For instance, whilst s. 188 focuses on individuals and the civil prohibition on undertakings, in a competition law context, the justification for this difference is unclear.[32]
The CMA’s predecessor, the Office of Fair Trading (OFT), imposed a civil penalty of £58.5 million on British Airways in 2012, after the collapse of its criminal prosecution in 2010. Virgin Atlantic had reported the arrangement and escaped a civil fine. This shows what leniency can achieve in detecting a cartel, although it cannot tell us how many others were deterred.[33][34] Alongside the fact that the Competition and Markets Authority has more experience in the civil arena, it is evident that criminal inquiries and trials suffer from being more expensive and time-intensive, as well as being more uncertain in the courtroom, resulting in the very feasible possibility that the Competition and Markets Authority is simply avoiding bringing concurrent criminal cases, possibly viewing it as a poor use of limited resources and a potential source of embarrassment. Alongside the practical implications of this, this then raises doubts as to whether s. 188 is being equally and uniformly applied: a central tenet of both the rule of law generally and of the criminal law in particular.[35]
Furthermore, whilst the criminal law is typically associated with moral opprobrium, as aforementioned, a business may receive immunity from or a reduction in a civil fine under the leniency programme. An individual may separately obtain conditional immunity from criminal prosecution. A reduction in a company’s fine does not by itself protect its staff from prosecution. The awkwardness of s. 188 running alongside a leniency programme is aggravated by the fact that the latter are widely perceived as not only effective, but integral to a successful cartel regulation approach.[36] This is as cartel behaviour is difficult to expose, and thus unless an involved party makes a report, the behaviour often goes undetected. Indeed, an authoritative economic inquiry in 1991 estimated that a US price-fixing conspiracy had at most a 13–17% probability of indictment in any given year. Whilst a historical US estimate, it remains highly indicative of the difficulties faced by any competition regulation authority.[37] Nonetheless, 'public opinion is divided as to whether leniency programmes are justifiable', a matter exacerbated by the criminalisation of cartel behaviour as it results in the wholly reasonable question of why, if such behaviour truly merits punishment by the criminal law, can one receive exemption in exchange for information and co-operation?[38] Moreover, as leniency programmes typically give the immunity reward for the first guilty party that comes forward and indicates their conspirators, a significant public perception issue seems likely to arise as 'some guilty parties… go unpunished' and ' sanction on others [is allowed] to be substantially reduced'.[39]
Conclusion
In conclusion, whilst it is clear that cartels are extensively difficult to properly regulate, it is an inappropriate assumption that any difficulties in applying a civil detection and regulation programme will be improved via the supplementation of a criminal offence. Moreover, whilst anti-competitive behaviour as a form of economic theft can undoubtedly be tremendously harmful to the economy, and thus the consumer, this does not alter that society in general fails to assign the necessary moral condemnation and social stigma to cartel behaviour to merit the use of the criminal law. This structural issue is deepened by the fact that even were such opprobrium to develop, greater attention would then be focused on why leniency programmes are justifiable, when their contribution to detecting cartels is clearer than the deterrent effect of the criminal offence per se. However, s. 188 suffers from more than simple construction issues, cartel behaviour is simply and essentially unsuited to the ambit of criminal regulation, making it highly likely that no amount of reform or redesign will render it an effective regulation mechanism. It is subsequently prescribed that Parliament should repeal s. 188 and the Competition and Markets Authority's efforts would be significantly better utilised in improving the civil scheme.[40]
Bibliography
Legislation
Enterprise Act 2002, ss. 188, 188A, 188B and 190.
Cases
R v George, Burns, Burnett & Crawley [2010] EWCA Crim 1148.
R v Ghosh [1982] 3 WLR 110.
R v Stringer(Nicholas) (24 June 2015) unreported, Crown Ct (Southwark).
R v Whittle, Allison & Brammar [2008] EWCA Crim 2560.
Verizon Communications Inc. v Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP (2004) 540 US 398 (USA)
Articles
Ashworth A, 'Is the Criminal Law a Lost Cause?' (2000) 116 LQR 225.
Alfter M and Young J, 'Economic Analysis of Cartels - Theory and Practice' (2005) ECLR 546.
Beaton-Wells C, 'The politics of cartel criminalisation: a pessimistic view from Australia' (2008) 29(3) ECLR 185.
Bryant P and Eckard EW, 'Price-Fixing: The Probability of Getting Caught' (1991) 73(3) Econ & Stat R 531.
Danagher L, 'The convergence of past and present challenges to the criminal cartel law of the UK' (2015) ECLR 305.
Devlin P, The Enforcement of Morals (2nd edn, Liberty Fund, 2010).
Jones A & Williams R, 'The UK response to the global effort against cartels: is criminalization really the solution' (2014) 2(1) Antitrust E J, 100.
Hart HLA, The Concept of Law (3rd edn, OUP 2012)
Furse M, 'The cartel offence - "great for a headline but not much else"?' (2011) 32(5) ECLR 223.
O'Loughlin P, 'The criminal enforcement of antitrust law - the importance of building an enforcement culture and how to create it' (2016) 5(1) UCL JL 116.
MacCulloch A, 'Honesty, Morality and Cartel Offence' (2007) 28 ECLR 355.
Ramage S, 'Criminal Cartels' (2008) 178 Crim LR 5.
Robinson P, 'The Criminal-Civil Distinction and the Utility of Desert' (1996) 76 Boston Uni LR 201.
Stephan A, 'Four Key Challenges to the Successful Criminalization of Cartel Laws' (2014) 2(2) Antitrust E J 355.
Stephan A 'How Dishonesty Killed the Cartel Offence' [2011] CLR 446.
Young R and Aldersey-Williams J, 'CMA fines company for attending cartel meeting, despite refusing to join' (2017) Mar Corp Brief 11.
Williams G, 'The Definition of a Crime' [1955] CLP 107.
Other
Hammond and Penrose, Proposed Criminalisation of Cartels in the UK: A Report for the Office of Fair Trading (November 2001), OFT 365, [3.6].
OECD Publication, 'Recommendation of the Council Concerning Effective action Against Hard Core Cartels' C(98)35 (May 1998).
Stephan A, 'Survey of Public Attitudes to Price-Fixing and Cartel Enforcement in Britain' (2007) CCP Working Paper 07-12 (available online at: http://competitionpolicy.ac.uk/documents/8158338/8256114/CCP+Working+Paper+07-12.pdf) 23.
[1] OECD Publication, 'Recommendation of the Council Concerning Effective action Against Hard Core Cartels' C(98)35 (May 1998).
[2] S Ramage, 'Criminal Cartels' (2008) 178 Crim Law 5, 5.
[3]Verizon Communications Inc. v Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP (2004) 540 US 398.
[4] C Beaton-Wells, 'The politics of cartel criminalisation: a pessimistic view from Australia' (2008) 29(3) ECLR 185, 185.
[5] Enterprise Act 2002, ss. 188, 188A, 188B and 190.
[6] M Furse, 'The cartel offence - "great for a headline but not much else"?' (2011) 32(5) ECLR 223.
[7] M Alfter and J Young, 'Economic Analysis of Cartels - Theory and Practice' (2005) ECLR 546, 547.
[8] A Jones & R Williams, 'The UK response to the global effort against cartels: is criminalization really the solution' (2014) 2(1) Antitrust E J, 100.
[9] Enterprise Act 2002 (n 5), ss. 188 and 190.
[10]R v Whittle, Allison & Brammar [2008] EWCA Crim 2560.
[11]R v George, Burns, Burnett & Crawley [2010] EWCA Crim 1148.
[12]R v Stringer(Nicholas) (24 June 2015) unreported, Crown Ct (Southwark). CMA, Supply of precast concrete drainage products: criminal investigation (15 September 2017); see also G Young and J Aldersey-Williams, 'CMA fines company for attending cartel meeting, despite refusing to join' (2017) Mar Corp Brief 11.
[13] Hammond and Penrose, Proposed Criminalisation of Cartels in the UK: A Report for the Office of Fair Trading (November 2001), OFT 365, [3.6].
[14] P O'Loughlin, 'The criminal enforcement of antitrust law - the importance of building an enforcement culture and how to create it' (2016) 5(1) UCL JL 116, 129.
[15] G Williams, 'The Definition of a Crime' [1955] CLP 107.
[16] A Ashworth, 'Is the Criminal Law a Lost Cause?' (2000) 116 LQR 225.
[17] P Robinson, 'The Criminal-Civil Distinction and the Utility of Desert' (1996) 76 Boston Uni LR 201.
[18]ibid 202.
[19]Ibid.
[20] See generally: HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (3rd edn, OUP 2012), cf. P Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (2nd edn, Liberty Fund, 2010).
[21] O'Loughlin (n 14).
[22] A Stephan, 'Survey of Public Attitudes to Price-Fixing and Cartel Enforcement in Britain' (2007) CCP Working Paper 07-12 (available online at: http://competitionpolicy.ac.uk/documents/8158338/8256114/CCP+Working+Paper+07-12.pdf) 23.
[23] R v Ghosh [1982] 3 WLR 110
[24] Stephan (n 22) 18.
[25] A MacCulloch, 'Honesty, Morality and Cartel Offence' (2007) 28 ECLR 355.
[26] L Danagher, 'The convergence of past and present challenges to the criminal cartel law of the UK' (2015) ECLR 305.
[27]Ibid 308.
[28] A Stephan 'How Dishonesty Killed the Cartel Offence' [2011] CLR 446.
[29] Danagher (n 26) 309.
[30] Ashworth (n 16) 250 - 252.
[31] A Stephan, 'Four Key Challenges to the Successful Criminalization of Cartel Laws' (2014) 2(2) Antitrust E J 355.
[32] Jones and Williams (n 8), 123 – 124.
[33] OFT, Airline passenger fuel surcharges on long-haul flights: price-fixing (19 April 2012).
[34] See also: A Stephan 'How Dishonesty Killed the Cartel Offence' [2011] CLR 446.
[35] A Stephan, 'The UK cartel offence: a purposive interpretation? (2014) Crim LR 879.
[36] Stephan 'How Dishonesty Killed the Cartel Offence' (n 34) 453. CMA, Short guide to cartels and leniency for individuals.
[37] P Bryant and EW Eckard, 'Price-Fixing: The Probability of Getting Caught' (1991) 73(3) Econ & Stat R 531.
[38] Stephan 'Survey' (n 22).
[39]ibid 3.
[40] Furse (n 6).
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