Sample Undergraduate 2:1 International Law Essay

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How far is the use of autonomous weapons compatible with international law and to what extent should the law adapt to meet the legal challenges associated with this type of warfare?

Introduction

This work asks how far the use of autonomous weapons is compatible with international law and to what extent the law should adapt to meet the legal challenges associated with this type of warfare. It should be observed that autonomous weapons have, as Chengeta has observed, been the subject of debate in terms of their compatibility with myriad areas of law.[1] Due to the short word count of this work; however, it is not possible to address all of these issues, and the discussion below focuses on the interplay between the prohibition on the use of force and the self-defence exception, and the use of autonomous weapons. The work will begin by outlining the prohibition on the use of force in international law and the self-defence exception in terms of necessity. It will then examine the issues with proportionality and the level of human control with the use of such weapons. The extent to which the law should adapt will be assessed in each section.

Self-Defence and Necessity

The general prohibition on the use of force in international law is contained in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which provides that UN Members shall refrain in their international relations from ‘the threat or use of force’[2] against other States.  The scope and application of the provision is outside the parameters of this work. Rather, it is simply observed that this general prohibition contains a number of exceptions, namely the use of force where the authority of the UN Security Council[3] has been granted,[4] or in self-defence.[5] It is the latter which has been problematic in terms of the use of autonomous weapons.

Here, Article 51 of the UN Charter recognises the right of individual or collective self-defence ‘if an armed attack occurs’.[6] Again, discussion of the general scope of this requirement is beyond the parameters of this work: rather, it is simply noted that, as Redsell has explained, any use of force in self-defence must be both necessary and proportionate.[7] In terms of necessity, it is generally accepted[8] that a classic formulation appears in the assertions of Daniel Webster in the Caroline Incident, that what is required is that the need for action is ‘instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation’.[9] In preventing further attack, there are indeed a number of questions about whether there exists an anticipatory right of self-defence,[10] but these do not require consideration here: relevant instead is whether there are any implications in terms of the use of autonomous weapons and whether any action, taken in self-defence, is directed at a target whose attack is necessary to repel the armed attack. As Green and Waters observe, the question of targeting is key in determining whether action is necessary under the law of self-defence.[11] Of course these issues have been controversial in international law in the general sense, rather than merely in respect of the use of autonomous weapons. However, it is argued that it is in the latter sense that the issues have hinged on whether the law is sufficient to govern the use of such weapons, rather than simply consisting of discourses surrounding how the law operates. Evidence for this assertion may be taken from the work of Heyns, who raises a separate issue of capability under international humanitarian law: can autonomous weapons distinguish lawful targets from persons protected against attack?[12] This would appear to be a practical problem with the available technology rather than a strict legal problem, but this author would submit that such a conclusion would be too simplistic.

At first glance, the 2015 findings of the Dutch advisory bodies that, whilst some autonomous weapon systems were capable of distinguishing between military and civilian targets, there was no evidence that such systems were capable of applying such distinctions between an individual who is not a legitimate target, and one who is,[13] appear to confirm that the issue with autonomous weapons is a capability one, and one which will simply be resolved as technology develops. However, when taken together with the arguments of Chehtman that any response to an armed-attack justified by the law of self-defence must ‘take into consideration the choice of weapons, as they affect the number of casualties and the extent of the collateral harm that will be expectedly caused’,[14] this appears to show that a legal burden still rests on the State for their choice to employ the autonomous weapon. The system described by Scheltema could identify a potential target, but a human took the final decision to engage.[15]

However, it is argued that this is immaterial: it is submitted that the issue is not whether autonomous weapons are currently capable of accurately distinguishing between targets in the abstract, but rather that in choosing to employ such weapons,[16] States must consider both whether force is necessary in self-defence and whether the weapon can be used lawfully in the circumstances. The problem with the use of autonomous weapons in terms of the necessity argument does therefore appear to be reducible to the more general issues associated with the operation of the defence, rather than presenting any new challenges. Chengeta may be correct that autonomous weapons have raised ‘profound’[17] concerns in respect of international law, at least in terms of the necessity of self defence; however, it is argued that such issues do not appear to be any different to those in terms of whether State action is compatible with the law in the more general sense. Heyns and his colleagues address remotely piloted drones. By analogy, this author submits that autonomous weapons are not necessarily incompatible with international law, and that the issue is therefore how the current framework should be applied to their use rather than requiring an adaption of the law to meet any practical challenges associated with their usage.[18]  It is therefore argued that notwithstanding the fact that autonomous weapons may present new challenges to international law, in the sense that they are a new technology, these challenges may be addressed within the remit of the current law and do not require any adaption. For a State party to Additional Protocol I, Article 36 already requires a review of whether a new weapon would be prohibited in some or all circumstances. The legality of its use in a particular attack is a separate question. A system limited to intercepting incoming missiles at sea presents a different problem from one selecting people in a populated area, where the operator must be able to distinguish civilians from lawful targets.

Proportionality and The Issue of Human Control?

In terms of the proportionality requirement of self-defence, it is clear from the International Court of Justice’s[19] dicta in Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua[20] and Case Concerning Oil Platforms[21] that the scale and effects of the force used must be proportionate to the defensive purpose of repelling the attack.[22] As the ICJ noted in Oil Platforms, the United States also had to show that the platforms were ‘legitimate’ military targets. The choice of target bore on whether the attack was necessary.[23] As Redsell observes, the issue of proportionality is concerned with the means used to respond in self-defence.[24] Once again therefore, it is argued that in terms of autonomous weapons, the issue for the law will centre on whether, as Weizmann explains, the force used by the defending State does not ‘exceed’[25] what is needed to terminate the current attack and prevent its continuation.[26] Again therefore, it is argued that there is nothing inherent in the concept of autonomous weapons requiring the current law to adapt: the issue is once again how the weapons are used, rather than the fact that they are used at all.

Support for this argument may be found in the following discussion. As Coughlin notes, it is inherent in the concept of an autonomous weapon system that, once activated, it can select and attack targets without further human intervention;[27] Van den Boogaard observes that the nature of autonomous weapon systems means that these targeting functions are performed by the weapon system.[28] Whilst it has been argued above that in terms of assessing whether autonomous weapons are compatible with the provisions of the self-defence exception, the question turns on the choice of weapon, this may fail to take into account the fact that, during an armed conflict, a separate rule of international humanitarian law applies. An attack must be cancelled or suspended if it becomes apparent that the expected incidental harm to civilians or civilian objects would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.[29] In this regard, Van den Boogaard argued that autonomous weapon systems operating in complex environments were unable to make such determinations ‘within the context of the whole’[30] action, rather than merely the particular action being taken at that point. This author does not disagree with this argument in principle: rather, it is simply argued that again such an assertion is easily addressed within the current legal framework. The choice to use such weapons which are not currently capable of making these distinctions[31] may render a State in violation of the proportionality requirements. This leaves Chengeta’s concern that limited human control can make individual responsibility difficult to establish.[32] State responsibility is a separate matter: where a State’s armed forces choose to use an autonomous weapon, their conduct remains attributable to the State. Its responsibility turns on whether that conduct breaches an international obligation.

Conclusion

It has been shown that in terms of the use of force and the self-defence exception, there are a number of difficulties arising from the use of autonomous weapons. However, it has been argued that these difficulties may be addressed within the current international law framework without adaption of the Charter being required. The ICRC calls for binding prohibitions and restrictions on autonomous weapons. Such rules could clarify which uses are permissible without changing the conditions for self-defence. It is submitted that the true difficulty with autonomous weapon systems is the choice to employ such weapons where their limitations prevent lawful use in the circumstances: the choice of action; however, is still exercised by the State and thus liability may be imposed accordingly under the current framework.

Bibliography

Table of ICJ Cases

  • Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua [1986] ICJ Rep 14.
  • Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Iran v United States of America) [2003] ICJ Rep 161.

Table of International Conventions

  • UN Charter 1945.
  • Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Protocol I), 1977.

Secondary Sources

  • Chee Mook S, ‘Is Anticipatory Self-Defence Lawful?’ (2003) Cov LJ 9(1) 1-12.
  • Chehtman A, ‘The ad bellum Challenge of Drones: Recalibrating Permissible Use of Force’ (2017) EJIL 28(1) 173-197.
  • Arend AC, ‘International Law and the Preemptive Use of Military Force’ (2003) The Washington Quarterly 89-103.
  • Coughlin T, ‘The Future of Robotic Weaponry and the Law of Armed Conflict: Irreconcilable Differences’ (2011) UCL Juris Rev 17 67-99.
  • Green JA and Waters CPM, ‘Military Targeting in the Context of Self-Defence Actions’ (2015) NJIL 84(1) 3-28.
  • Heyns C, ‘Autonomous Weapons in Armed Conflict and the Right to a Dignified Life: An African Perspective’ (2017) South African Journal on Human Rights 33(1) 46-71.
  • Heyns C, Akande D, Hill-Cawthorne L and Chengeta T, ‘The International Law Framework Regulating the Use of Armed Drones’ (2016) ICLQ 65(4) 791-827.
  • Redsell G, ‘Illegitimate, Unnecessary and Disproportionate: Israel’s Use of Force in Lebanon’ (2007) CSLR 3(1) 70-85

[1] T Chengeta, ‘What Level of Human Control Over Autonomous Weapon Systems is Required by International Law’ (2018) EJIL Talk available at: https://www.ejiltalk.org/what-level-of-human-control-over-autonomous-weapon-systems-is-required-by-international-law/ accessed 16/6/2018.

[2] UN Charter 1945, Article 2(4).

[3] UNSC.

[4] UN Charter 1945, Article 42.

[5] ibid at Article 51.

[6] ibid.

[7] G Redsell, ‘Illegitimate, Unnecessary and Disproportionate: Israel’s Use of Force in Lebanon’ (2007) CSLR 3(1) 70-85, 78.

[8] A Clark Arend, ‘International Law and the Preemptive Use of Military Force’ (2003) The Washington Quarterly 89-103, 95.

[9] Letter from Daniel Webster to Lord Ashburton (1842) available at: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/br-1842d.asp#web1 accessed 16/6/2018.

[10] S Chee Mook, ‘Is Anticipatory Self-Defence Lawful?’ (2003) Cov LJ 9(1) 1-12, passim.

[11] JA Green and CPM Waters, ‘Military Targeting in the Context of Self-Defence Actions’ (2015) NJIL 84(1) 3-28, passim.

[12] C Heyns, ‘Autonomous Weapons in Armed Conflict and the Right to a Dignified Life: An African Perspective’ (2017) South African Journal on Human Rights 33(1) 46-71, 46.

[13] Advisory Council on International Affairs and Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International Law, ‘Autonomous Weapon Systems: The Need for Meaningful Human Control’ (2015), 25, available at: https://www.adviesraadinternationalevraagstukken.nl/site/binaries/site-content/collections/documents/2015/10/02/autonome-wapensystemen/Autonomous_Weapon_Systems_AIV-CAVV-Advisory-report-97_201510.pdf accessed 16/6/2018.

[14] A Chehtman, ‘The ad bellum Challenge of Drones: Recalibrating Permissible Use of Force’ (2017) EJIL 28(1) 173-197, 192.

[15] H Scheltema, ‘Lethal Automated Robotic Systems and Automation Bias’ (2015) EJIL Talk available at: https://www.ejiltalk.org/lethal-automated-robotic-systems-and-automation-bias/ accessed 16/6/2018.

[16] T Chengeta, ‘What Level of Human Control Over Autonomous Weapon Systems is Required by International Law’ (2018) EJIL Talk available at: https://www.ejiltalk.org/what-level-of-human-control-over-autonomous-weapon-systems-is-required-by-international-law/ accessed 16/6/2018.

[17] ibid.

[18] C Heyns, D Akande, L Hill-Cawthorne and T Chengeta, ‘The International Law Framework Regulating the Use of Armed Drones’ (2016) ICLQ 65(4) 791-827, 793. Additional Protocol I, arts 36, 48 and 57. ICRC, Frequently asked questions about autonomous weapon systems.

[19] ICJ.

[20] Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua [1986] ICJ Rep 14 at [176]-[249].

[21] Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Iran v United States of America) [2003] ICJ Rep 161.

[22] ibid at [51] and [74]-[77].

[23] ibid at [51] and [76].

[24] G Redsell, ‘Illegitimate, Unnecessary and Disproportionate: Israel’s Use of Force in Lebanon’ (2007) CSLR 3(1) 70-85, 83.

[25] N Weizmann, ‘Autonomous Weapon Systems Under International Law’ (2014) Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, Academy Briefing No 8, 10, available at: https://www.geneva-academy.ch/joomlatools-files/docman-files/Publications/Academy%20Briefings/Autonomous%20Weapon%20Systems%20under%20International%20Law_Academy%20Briefing%20No%208.pdf accessed 16/6/2018.

[26] ibid.

[27] T Coughlin, ‘The Future of Robotic Weaponry and the Law of Armed Conflict: Irreconcilable Differences’ (2011) UCL Juris Rev 17 67-99, 69.

[28] J Van den Boogaard, ‘Proportionality and Autonomous Weapons Systems’ (2016) Opinio Juris available at: http://opiniojuris.org/2016/03/23/proportionality-and-autonomous-weapons-systems/ accessed 16/6/2018.

[29] ibid. Additional Protocol I, arts 51(5)(b) and 57(2)(b).

[30] Van den Boogaard (n 28).

[31] ibid.

[32] T Chengeta, ‘What Level of Human Control Over Autonomous Weapon Systems is Required by International Law’ (2018) EJIL Talk available at: https://www.ejiltalk.org/what-level-of-human-control-over-autonomous-weapon-systems-is-required-by-international-law/ accessed 16/6/2018. International Law Commission, Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001), arts 2 and 4.

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