Brief Background
The Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943 is an Act of Parliament which governs the liabilities and the rights of those parties who are involved in a frustrated contract governed by English law. The Act provides a broader adjustment of payments and benefits than the common law previously allowed.
Why was it introduced?
Prior to the introduction of the Act, the rule applied in Chandler v Webster [1904] 1 KB 493 restricted the rights of a claimant seeking payment in the circumstances of a frustrated contract. In Chandler v Webster, Webster agreed to rent a room to Chandler so he could witness the king’s coronation procession. Chandler paid part of the price for his room on the basis of the agreement but the procession on the agreed date was cancelled. Chandler’s claim for a refund was rejected by the court and he had to pay the remainder of the sum that had been agreed. This rule was considered to be generally unjust; however, it stood for decades before the Law Revision Committee suggested changes to the rule by way of the Law Revision Committee’s Seventh Interim Report in 1939. It was felt that a less arbitrary rule should be imposed that allowed the claimant to claim for the money he/she had paid.
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Before the Act was passed, the House of Lords had already overruled Chandler v Webster in Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd [1943] AC 32, decided in 1942. Money paid could be recovered where there was a total failure of consideration, but the common law still did not provide a general adjustment for partial performance or the recipient’s expenses.
Following the recommendation, a Bill was introduced by the government in 1943 and the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943 came into effect on 5 August 1943.
What was the aim of the Act?
The aim of the Act was to provide greater protection to a party that is paying a sum of money on the basis of a contractual agreement in circumstances where the contract has been frustrated. Specifically, this would be to remedy the unfortunate situations that had been previously seen in cases such as Chandler v Webster.
What main changes did it make to the law?
As previously noted, the rule in Chandler v Webster provided that the claimant could not recover the money he/she had paid on the basis of the contract, before the contract had become frustrated. The primary change that the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943 made was to ensure that the sums paid would become recoverable where the Act applied, subject to the court’s power to allow retention for expenses, without requiring a total failure of consideration. Legally, this provided the opportunity for a party to recover the benefit which has unjustly enriched the other party.
Key Sections
Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943 section 1 is a lengthy section that states the adjustments to the rights of the parties to frustrated contracts. Section 1 (1) states that the Act applies to a contract governed by English law which has become impossible of performance or otherwise frustrated, with the parties discharged from further performance for that reason, subject to section 2.
Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943, section 1 (2) states that sums of money paid before the contract was discharged shall be recoverable by the payer from the recipient, while sums payable before discharge but still unpaid cease to be payable. However, this section allows the court, where just, to permit the payee to retain or recover sums for expenses incurred before discharge in or for the purpose of performing the contract. The allowance cannot exceed either those expenses or the total sums paid and payable before discharge. It is discretionary, not an automatic right to reimbursement. Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943, section 1 (4) states that in estimating the expenses of any party to the contract, the court may include such sum as appears ‘reasonable’ in relation to the overhead expenses of said party and work or services personally performed by that party. There is no further definition of reasonableness listed within the Act.
Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943, section 1 (3) deals with situations where one party may have obtained a valuable benefit, other than the payment of money, before discharge through another party’s performance. The performing party may recover a just sum, capped by the value of the benefit to the recipient. The court must consider the recipient’s relevant expenses and the effect of the frustrating event on the benefit.
Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943, section 2 deals with specific logistics of the introduction of the Act. For example, section 2 (1) states that the Act shall apply to contracts discharged on or after 1 July 1943, whether made before or after the Act’s commencement, but not contracts discharged before that date. Moreover, section 2 (2) states that the Act also applies to contracts to which the Crown is a party.
Lastly, Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943, section 3 (2) defines ‘court’ for the purposes of the Act to include the court or arbitrator determining the matter.
Importantly, Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943, section 2 (3) states that parties may agree on contractual terms which limit or exclude the terms within the Act. However, as Robert Goff J stated in BP Exploration Co (Libya) Ltd v Hunt (No 2) [1979] 1 WLR 783, at 829, the court must be careful before inferring, without a clear indication, that a clause was intended to apply in ‘radically changed circumstances’. Section 1 applies only so far as it is consistent with a contractual provision within section 2(3).
Section 2(4) preserves a properly severable part of the contract that was wholly performed before discharge, apart from any ascertainable payment still due for that part. The Act applies only to the remainder.
Section 2(5) excludes voyage charterparties and other contracts for the carriage of goods by sea, but not time charterparties or charterparties by demise. It also excludes insurance contracts, subject to section 1(5), and contracts within section 7 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 or other contracts for the sale, or sale and delivery, of specific goods frustrated because those goods have perished.
Under section 1(5), insurance proceeds are normally disregarded when deciding what a party may recover or retain, unless an express contractual term or legislation required that party to insure. Section 1(6) permits a benefit conferred on a third person in return for a contracting party’s obligations to be treated, where just, as a benefit to that contracting party.
2026 update
The Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943 remains in force and continues to regulate the financial consequences of contracts that have been discharged by frustration under English law.
The Act was introduced to mitigate the harsh common-law rule that previously applied when a contract became frustrated, under which losses generally “lay where they fell” and, before Fibrosa, money paid before the frustrating event could not normally be recovered.
Under section 1 of the Act, courts may adjust the financial position of the parties following frustration. Money paid before the frustrating event may be recoverable, and money due but unpaid generally ceases to be payable. Courts may also allow a party to retain or recover sums for expenses within section 1(2)’s limits, or require a just payment for valuable benefits within section 1(3)’s limits.
However, the Act does not determine when a contract is frustrated. The doctrine of frustration itself remains governed by common law, and the Act only deals with the allocation of losses and benefits once frustration has occurred. Frustration requires a supervening event, without default of either party, that makes performance impossible or radically different from the obligation undertaken; mere expense, delay or hardship is not enough. The contract’s allocation of risk and the circumstances matter: The Sea Angel [2007] EWCA Civ 547, at [111]. A force majeure clause may provide a contractual solution instead of common-law frustration.
Last updated: 11 November 2026