Legal Case Summary
R (Anderson) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] UKHL 46; [2003] 1 AC 837; [2002] 3 WLR 1800; [2002] 4 All ER 1089
Prisoners; mandatory life sentence; right to hearing
Facts
Anderson received mandatory life sentences after having been convicted of two murders. The trial judge and Lord Chief Justice recommended a 15-year tariff, but the Secretary of State set it at 20 years. The tariff was the punitive period to be served before release on licence could be considered, rather than a guarantee of release.
Issues
Under s. 29 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997, the Secretary of State could decide, on advice by the trial judge, the Lord Chief Justice and departmental officials, the minimum punitive period to be served by an adult murderer in England and Wales before release on licence could be considered. Anderson argued that his tariff should have been decided by the judiciary (like the cases of those sentenced to discretionary life sentences) and that the Secretary of State, deciding his tariff as a member of the executive, breached his right to a fair and independent hearing under Article 6 of the ECHR (scheduled in the Human Rights Act 1998). The Court of Appeal found that Parliament deliberately left the discretion to fix mandatory life sentence tariffs in the Secretary of State’s hands. The European Court of Human Rights subsequently held that there was no material difference between mandatory and discretionary life sentences in terms of tariff fixing.
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Decision / Outcome
The House of Lords allowed Anderson’s appeal to the extent of making a declaration of incompatibility. Looking at the substance of tariff-fixing rather than its formal description, it held that the Secretary of State was performing a judicial sentencing function. While the European Court’s decisions are not binding on domestic courts, in this case, the decision finding no material difference between mandatory and discretionary life sentences in terms of tariff should be applied as it rested on an accurate understanding of tariff-fixing. Tariff fixing was legally the same as sentencing and thus, should be covered by Article 6. Consequently, as a member of the executive, the Secretary of State should not have fixed the claimant’s tariff, so s. 29 of the 1997 Act was declared incompatible with Article 6(1) of the ECHR under section 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998.
The House could not use section 3 of the Human Rights Act to remove the Home Secretary’s role or make the judicial recommendation binding, because that would contradict Parliament’s clear intention. The declaration did not affect the validity or continuing operation of section 29, and did not substitute a 15-year tariff or order Anderson’s release.
Additional citations: [2003] HRLR 7; 13 BHRC 450; [2003] 1 Cr App R 32; [2003] UKHRR 112.