Brogden v Metropolitan Railway Co (1877) 2 App Cas 666
Formation of contract; acceptance by conduct; an agreement awaiting formal execution.
Facts
Brogden and his partners owned collieries and supplied coal to the Metropolitan Railway Company. Their earlier dealings involved varying quantities and prices. In November 1871, against a rising coal market, they proposed a longer-term supply contract at a fixed price. The parties’ representatives negotiated and the railway’s officer, Burnett, prepared a draft.
The draft provided for weekly supplies from 1 January 1872 at 20 shillings per ton, subject to changes in railway carriage charges. The railway could require quantities between 220 and 350 tons a week. The arrangement was to continue for a year and then for a further year unless the stipulated notice was given in November 1872. It also contained an arbitration clause with the arbitrator’s name left blank.
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Alexander Brogden inserted the partners’ names, made alterations and named William Armstrong as arbitrator. He wrote “approved” and signed his own name. His agent returned the document to Burnett on 21 December 1871. Burnett put it in a drawer; formal counterparts were never executed or exchanged.
The next day the railway requested 250 tons a week from the beginning of January, and the suppliers confirmed that arrangement. Supplies followed. Coal was invoiced and paid for at the price specified in the draft, including adjustments corresponding to changes in carriage charges. The parties’ correspondence about quantities and shortages also referred to a contract.
A dispute eventually arose over the continuing obligation to supply. The railway brought an action for breach of contract; Brogden and his partners defended it by denying that a binding contract existed. Judgment was entered for the railway, with damages assessed at £9,643, and upheld by a majority of the Court of Appeal. The suppliers appealed to the House of Lords.
Issue
The question was whether the parties had adopted the draft as a binding agreement through their conduct, despite the absence of completed formal documents or an express acceptance of Brogden’s alterations. The insertion of the arbitrator’s name was a proposal requiring the railway’s assent; Brogden’s approval alone did not settle that point.
Acceptance shown by the dealings
Lord Cairns explained that an intention to record an agreement formally does not necessarily prevent an earlier binding agreement. The parties’ letters and dealings could establish agreement even though their documents remained incomplete in form.
Several features connected their dealings to this particular draft. Supplies began on the date it specified. The price differed from the earlier price and remained fixed despite market fluctuations, with only the carriage adjustments contemplated by the draft. The quantities ordered were within its limits. The suppliers’ letters referred to their contractual obligation and offered explanations for deficiencies rather than asserting an unrestricted right to stop supplying.
Those circumstances showed adoption of the proposed terms, including the arbitrator provision. Brogden’s signature was also effective on behalf of the partnership: he was its authorised principal, and the document identified the partners. His use of “approved” signified approval of the substance of the bargain, rather than a lawyer’s approval of drafting form alone.
Lord Hatherley regarded the agreement as complete when the first January supplies were invoiced at the changed price and that price was accepted and paid. The expectation of formal copies did not, on these facts, make their execution a condition that had to be satisfied before either party could be bound.
Why silence alone was insufficient
The House did not treat Burnett’s act of putting the draft in a drawer as acceptance. Lord Blackburn expressly rejected the proposition that a person’s private mental assent could complete a contract without any outward indication. An offer could invite acceptance through an act, expressly or implicitly, and performance of that act could signify assent. Here, the relevant evidence was the parties’ subsequent conduct in dealing with each other on the draft terms.
Blackburn emphasised that the railway bore the burden of proving that both parties had adopted the informal agreement. He continued to hesitate over the factual inference, while recognising strong evidence in the changed price and declining to dissent from the result. His reservation concerned whether the evidence was sufficient, rather than whether acceptance by conduct was legally possible.
Outcome and principle
The House of Lords affirmed the judgment and dismissed the suppliers’ appeal with costs. The railway could enforce the agreement despite the missing formal execution.
The case demonstrates the need to connect performance to the terms said to have been accepted. Merely continuing an existing trading relationship would not explain why the entire draft governed future supplies. The agreed price, quantities, commencement date and correspondence supplied that connection here. The decision therefore rests on objectively demonstrated agreement, rather than silence or an undisclosed intention to accept.