Cooke v MGN Ltd [2014] EWHC 2831
Lack of “serious harm” in defamation claim under Defamation Act 2013.
Facts
The defendants published an article which suggested that various landlords made significant profit from renting poor quality social housing on a street which was featured in a television programme called “Benefits Street.” The claimants were a housing association which owned three properties on the street and its chief executive. The claimants complained that although the factual assertions concerning them were true, those assertions, read in context, were defamatory.
Issues
Section 1(1) Defamation Act 2013 provides that a statement is not defamatory unless its publication has caused or is likely to cause “serious harm” to the reputation of the claimant. The question of whether the claimants had suffered or were likely to suffer such harm was considered by the court as a preliminary issue.
Decision/Outcome
The word “serious” in section 1(1) of the Defamation Act 2013 was not defined and it was for the judge in contested claims to determine whether serious, and not merely substantial, harm to the claimant’s reputation had been or was likely to be caused. It was not sufficient to demonstrate serious distress or injury to feeling. In the instant case, the requirement of serious harm in the 2013 Act was not satisfied. The statements in the article did not fall into the category of statement which were so obviously likely to cause serious harm that the likelihood could be inferred from the words used. Although the words used were capable of being defamatory there was no specific evidence that the article had caused serious harm to the claimants’ reputations and none could be inferred. The claim was therefore dismissed.
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Updated 19 March 2026
This case summary remains accurate. Cooke v MGN Ltd [2014] EWHC 2831 is a valid and frequently cited authority on the serious harm threshold under section 1(1) of the Defamation Act 2013. The legal principles described — that serious harm must be demonstrated or properly inferred, and that distress or injury to feelings alone is insufficient — continue to represent good law.
Readers should note that the serious harm test has been further developed by subsequent case law, most significantly by the Supreme Court in Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd [2019] UKSC 27. In Lachaux, the Supreme Court confirmed that section 1(1) requires claimants to demonstrate actual serious harm as a fact, not merely that the words were seriously defamatory in nature. This goes further than the pre-2013 common law position and means that the threshold is assessed on the evidence, not simply inferred from the gravity of the words. Cooke v MGN is consistent with this approach and continues to be cited alongside Lachaux in defamation proceedings. The Defamation Act 2013 itself remains in force and unamended in the relevant respects.
