Countess of Dunmore v Alexander (1830) 9 S. 190
Contract law – Formation of contract
Facts
The Countess of Dunmore (C) was looking to change servant and wrote to Lady Agnew (LA) requesting information on the character of one of her servants, Alexander. LA responded and recommended Alexander, stating that she would accept the proposed wage. C accepted this and sent a letter to LA, acknowledging the agreement. LA was away from her residence but had the letter forwarded to the appropriate address. She acknowledged the letter and sent this on to Alexander. A day later, C wrote to LA stating that she no longer needed Alexander. LA forward the second letter by express post and both letters were delivered to Alexander at the same time. After C refused to house or pay Alexander, Alexander brought an action against her on the basis that there had been a completed contract and C had breached the terms.
Issue
C argued that as the two letters were received at the same time, Alexander had proper notice that she was not required. The issue for the court to consider was whether a party, who accepts an offer is entitled at the same moment to retract its acceptance.
Held
The court held that there was no completed contract and therefore Alexander was not entitled to the wages for which she had claimed. The court found that as the two letters were received at the same time by Alexander, there could be no contract but notably stated that if one had arrived in the morning and the other in the afternoon, this would have been different (as per Lord Balgray). As a result of the circumstance, C was allowed to revoke her offer.
Updated 19 March 2026
This article concerns the Scottish case of Countess of Dunmore v Alexander (1830) 9 S. 190, a foundational authority in the Scots law of contract formation, particularly regarding acceptance and revocation. The case remains good law and is regularly cited in Scots contract law teaching and scholarship. No subsequent legislation or judicial decision has overruled or materially altered the authority of this case in Scots law. Readers should note, however, that this case is a decision of the Court of Session applying Scots law and its direct authority does not extend to English contract law, which operates under different principles (most notably the postal rule established in Adams v Lindsell (1818) 1 B & Ald 681 and affirmed in Household Fire Insurance Co v Grant (1879) 4 Ex D 216). The article’s summary is broadly accurate, though it should be noted that the decision rested on the simultaneity of delivery: both letters reached Alexander at the same time, meaning acceptance and revocation arrived concurrently, with the result that no binding contract was formed. Lord Balgray’s obiter remark — that had the first letter arrived earlier in the day a completed contract would have existed — reflects the importance of the sequence of communication in Scots contract law. The article remains a reliable introductory summary of this case.
