Crowhurst v Amersham Burial Board [1878] LR 4 Ex D 5
Non-Natural use of land, planting of trees/plants with potentially toxic properties
Facts
The defendant planted a yew tree on their property, however these trees were planted very close to the claimant’s own property (approximately 4 feet away). Over time, the trees grew and eventually the branches grew to the point that they reached over the fence separating the two properties. Due to this, the leaves of the tree were able to fall on the claimant’s property where the claimant’s horse was able to eat them. The horse did just that and eventually died from yew poisoning as yew leaves are toxic to different types of farm animals such as cows and apparently, horses. The claimant brought an action against the defendant for damages for the death of his horse. This claim was based on the rule in Rylands v Fletcher.
Issues
The issue in this case was whether planting a tree could be treated as a non-natural use of the land in the context and therefore bring the case under the scope of the rule in Rylands v Fletcher.
Decision/Outcome
The court held that the defendant was liable for the damage caused to the claimant due to his planting of the yew tree. Since the tree had poisonous properties (at least for some animals), this was a non-natural use of the land. It could not be an ordinary use to plant trees which have the potential to harm the livestock of one’s neighbours and this can be seen as bringing something dangerous onto the land. Further, the tree could be said to have “escaped” the land as its branches reached out onto neighbouring land, even though the tree itself obviously did not move.
Updated 19 March 2026
This case summary remains accurate as a statement of the historical decision in Crowhurst v Amersham Burial Board (1878). However, readers should be aware of important subsequent developments to the rule in Rylands v Fletcher more broadly.
The House of Lords in Cambridge Water Co v Eastern Counties Leather plc [1994] 2 AC 264 confirmed that foreseeability of damage is a requirement under Rylands v Fletcher, and emphasised that the rule is a sub-species of nuisance rather than a distinct tort. More significantly, in Transco plc v Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council [2003] UKHL 61, the House of Lords substantially narrowed the scope of the rule, particularly clarifying the meaning of ‘non-natural use’ and expressing considerable scepticism about the rule’s future role. Their Lordships indicated that ‘non-natural use’ requires something out of the ordinary in the context of the locality, and that ordinary domestic or industrial uses are unlikely to qualify. These developments mean that whether a case like Crowhurst would succeed today under Rylands v Fletcher is less certain than the article implies. Students should treat Crowhurst as an illustration of the Victorian-era interpretation of non-natural use rather than as a reliable guide to how courts would approach such facts under current law.