Das v Linden Mews Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 590
Easements, use of rights for the purposes of the dominant tenement
Facts
Two residents of Linden Mews formed a company called Linden Mews Ltd. The purpose of the company was the purchase a plot of land on which the residents of two other houses had a practice of parking their cars. The residents who used the land for parking asserted that they had an easement over it, while Linden Mews Ltd asserted that this was incorrect and that they were trespassing. In addition, Linden Mews Ltd demanded parking charges. The argument by Linden Mews Ltd was that any rights which the other residents went only as afar as a right to load and unload goods or take on and drop off passengers. It was asserted that broader rights would go against the decision in Harris v Flower (1904) 74 LJ Ch 127, which had established that a dominant owner could only enjoy rights attached to the dominant tenement for the benefit of that tenement and no other.
Issue
The issue in the case was whether the habitual use of the land for parking would be enough to grant them an easement and more generally how the rights attached to the dominant tenement could be used.
Decision/Outcome
It was held that on the facts of the case no easement existed to park on the land under dispute. However, it was also held that the lower court’s granting of an injunction was a flawed decision due to a failure to consider whether damages might have been a more appropriate remedy.
Updated 21 March 2026
This case summary remains broadly accurate. Das v Linden Mews Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 590 is a real and correctly cited Court of Appeal decision, and the summary correctly reflects the core outcome: no easement to park was established on the facts, and the Court of Appeal found the injunction granted below was flawed for failure to consider damages as an alternative remedy. The underlying principle from Harris v Flower (1904) — that a dominant owner cannot use an easement for the benefit of land other than the dominant tenement — remains good law and continues to be applied in English courts. There have been no statutory changes or subsequent Court of Appeal or Supreme Court decisions that overrule or materially qualify the principles discussed in this summary. Readers should note that the law on easements more broadly has been the subject of Law Commission attention (see the Law Commission Report Making Land Work: Easements, Covenants and Profits à Prendre, Law Com No 327 (2011)), which proposed reforms to the creation and scope of easements, but as of the current date those recommendations have not been implemented by Parliament. The article’s description of the Harris v Flower principle is accurate, though readers seeking fuller treatment of easements and their permissible use should consult up-to-date land law texts alongside this summary.
