Dooley v Cammell Laird [1971] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 271
NEGLIGENCE – EMPLOYER DUTY OF CARE – PSYCHIATRIC DAMAGE – PRIMARY VICTIM
Facts
The claimant (C) was a crane operator working for the defendant (D). C was loading cargo from a quay onto a ship when the rope carrying the load snapped. The load fell into the hold of the ship, where C knew other workers were standing. Nobody was injured, though C suffered nervous shock as a result of what seeing what he believed to be the death or serious injury of some of his co-workers. The trauma of the event aggravated C’s pre-existing neurasthenia and, as a result, he could not return to work as a crane operator. C brought an action in negligence against D, seeking damages for psychiatric injury.
Issue
Whether D owed a duty of care to take reasonable steps in safeguarding their employees from the risk of nervous injury, as well as physical injury.
Decision/Outcome
The application for a declaration was dismissed. Parental rights, as such, did not exist, except insofar as necessary to safeguard the best interests of a minor. In some circumstances, a minor would be able to give consent in their own right, without the knowledge or approval of their parents. The test proposed by Lord Scarman posits that a minor will be able to consent to treatment if they demonstrate “sufficient understanding and intelligence to understand fully what is proposed” ([1986] AC 112, 187[D]). The test is now often referred to as ‘Gillick competence’ and is an integral aspect of medical and family law.
Updated 19 March 2026
Editorial note: The Decision/Outcome section of this article contains a serious error: it reproduces the outcome and legal principles from Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] AC 112, a wholly unrelated case concerning Gillick competence and parental consent in medical law. This text has no connection to Dooley v Cammell Laird [1951] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 271 (note also that the correct year of the report is 1951, not 1971 as stated in the article heading).
The actual decision in Dooley v Cammell Laird was given by Donovan J, who held that the defendants were liable for the claimant’s nervous shock. The court found that the defendants owed a duty of care not only to protect employees from physical injury but also from psychiatric injury (nervous shock). Because the rope had broken due to the defendants’ negligence, and because it was foreseeable that a crane operator might suffer nervous shock upon witnessing the apparent endangerment of colleagues in the hold, the claimant succeeded. The case is historically significant as an early example of a primary victim psychiatric injury claim, and it was later considered in Page v Smith [1996] AC 155, where the House of Lords confirmed that primary victims who are within the zone of physical danger may recover for psychiatric injury without needing to satisfy the control mechanisms applicable to secondary victims established in Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1992] AC 310. The article’s Decision/Outcome section must be disregarded entirely as it describes a different case. Readers should consult reliable primary sources for an accurate account of this decision.
