Gore v Van Der Lann [1967] 2 W.L.R. 358
Contract – Enforcement by third party – Stay of proceedings – Fraud – Allegation of fraud on third party
Facts:
The Liverpool Corporation (LC) issued free bus passes to pensioners. Pensioners were required to sign an agreement that waived the liability of all LC servants for any injury caused to a pensioner while on the bus and that any responsibility would be worn by LC. Gore was a pass holder and fell in an attempt to board a bus. She sued the bus conductor for damages. LC applied to have Gore’s action stayed under s 41 of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925. LC claimed that by Gore bringing the action, she was acting so as to defraud the LC.
Issues:
Whether the defendant was entitled to a stay on proceedings.
Held:
Appeal by the plaintiff was allowed. It was held that by LC accepting Gore’s application for damages, her action constituted “a contract for the conveyance of a passenger in a public service vehicle” which effectively voided by s 151 of the Road Traffic Act 1960. There was no contractual requirement for LC to indemnify their employee, the bus conductor when an action for damages arose. Any obligation specified in the terms of the bus pass was overturned by s 151. As such, LC had no entitlement to relief for the defendant under s 41 of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925. LC had no grounds for preventing Gore from taking action against the defendant.
Updated 19 March 2026
This case summary remains an accurate account of the decision in Gore v Van Der Lann [1967] 2 QB 333. However, readers should note that both pieces of legislation central to the case have since been repealed and replaced. Section 41 of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925 was repealed and its substance re-enacted in what is now section 49(3) of the Senior Courts Act 1981. Section 151 of the Road Traffic Act 1960 was repealed and replaced, with equivalent provisions now found in section 149 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, which similarly avoids any agreement restricting or excluding the liability of a person using a motor vehicle to a passenger carried otherwise than for hire or reward. The legal principles established in the case — particularly that a third party cannot rely on a contractual exemption clause to stay proceedings brought against them by the contracting party’s counterpart, and that statutory provisions override such clauses in the context of passenger conveyance — remain good law. Additionally, students should be aware that the broader question of third-party rights in contract has since been substantially addressed by the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, though that Act post-dates this case and does not affect its core ratio.
