Greig v Insole [1978] 1WLR 302
Change of rules on edibility for test match cricket in restraint of trade
Facts
A private sports promoter entered into contracts with leading cricketers for a series of test matches. The international cricketing governing body (ICC) passed a resolution to the effect that any player who should play in a match disapproved by the ICC would thereafter be disqualified from playing in a test match without the express consent of the ICC. It passed another resolution banning any match arranged by the private sports promoter.
Issue
Three cricketers sought a declaration that the changes of the rules by the ICC were ultra vires and an unlawful restraint of trade. They claimed that the changes in the rules were void as denying them the freedom to practice their profession how they wished. The promoter also sought a declaration that the ICC had unlawfully induced the players to break their contracts with it. The defendants (including the ICC) contented, inter alia, that the contracts with the promoter were void and/or that as they were “employers’ associations’ they were exempt from being sued in tort under the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974.
Decision/Outcome
The Court held that the contracts with the promoter were neither void nor voidable. Since they were enforceable, and since the actions of the defendants were clearly intended to apply pressure to the contracting players, the defendants had acted, albeit in good faith, without justification and in breach of contract. The defendants had not acted reasonably in imposing a bar which was prima facie in restraint of trade. Furthermore, the ICC was not exempt under the 1974 Act because, under its constitution, its members were regarded as being the member counties as opposed to the cricketing governing body.
Updated 19 March 2026
This article accurately summarises the decision in Greig v Insole [1978] 1 WLR 302, and the legal principles described remain good law. The case continues to be cited as an important authority on restraint of trade in the context of professional sport and on inducement to breach of contract.
One point worth noting for readers: the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974, referenced in the article, has since been repealed and consolidated. The current principal legislation in this area is the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992. This does not affect the correctness of the article’s description of the 1974 Act as it applied at the time of the decision, but students should be aware that the statutory landscape has changed since 1978. The substantive outcome and legal reasoning of the case are unaffected by this later legislative development.
