Haystead v DPP [2000] EWHC QB 181; [2000] 3 All ER 890
Also known as Haystead v Chief Constable of Derbyshire. Battery; application of force through another person; recklessness.
Facts
John Haystead punched a woman twice in the face while she was holding her twelve-month-old son. As an immediate result of the punches, she lost hold of the child, who fell and hit his head on the floor. The child was visible to Haystead. The magistrates found that he had been reckless as to the risk of injury to the child arising from the violence he used against the mother.
Haystead faced three charges of assault by beating: one concerning the mother, one concerning the child and one concerning a neighbour. He pleaded guilty to the charges involving the two adults, but denied the charge involving the child. The magistrates rejected his submission that there was no case to answer and convicted him on that charge.
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He appealed by way of case stated to the Divisional Court. The appeal was heard by Laws LJ and Silber J on 12 May 2000. It concerned the conviction for the battery of the child, not the other two offences.
Issue
Haystead argued that battery required direct physical contact between the defendant and the victim, either through the defendant’s body or through something controlled by his actions, such as a weapon. He had struck the mother rather than the child. His argument was that the resulting fall did not satisfy the physical element of battery.
The finding of recklessness was not challenged. The court therefore separated the question of Haystead’s state of mind from the question whether his conduct amounted to an application of force to the child. It was unnecessary to decide afresh whether he had foreseen the risk.
The court’s reasoning
Laws LJ explained that, although the charge referred to section 39 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, assault by beating remained a common law offence. Section 39 provided for the summary trial and punishment of common assault and battery. The accepted definition of battery involved an intentional or reckless application of force to the complainant.
The mother’s movement and loss of hold were entirely and immediately caused by Haystead’s punches. Laws LJ saw no material difference between that sequence and the use of a weapon to knock the child to the floor, except that the battery here was reckless rather than intentional. Haystead’s force had caused the child to fall; the absence of a punch landing on the child did not prevent a conviction.
The court considered the discussion of battery in R v Ireland, a case involving silent telephone calls and psychiatric injury. That discussion did not establish the restriction Haystead sought to impose. The court also considered DPP v K, concerning acid placed in a hand dryer, and authorities addressing injury caused without a straightforward blow to the victim.
Laws LJ did not find it necessary to define the outer boundary between all injuries inflicted by an assault and those inflicted without an assault. Even on the narrower test advanced for Haystead, the facts were sufficient: the mother’s loss of hold followed immediately from his violence. The ruling did not depend on adopting an unlimited definition of indirect battery.
Transferred malice
The prosecution suggested that the conviction could be supported by transferred malice. Laws LJ doubted that analysis and did not rely on it. The established recklessness concerning the child, together with the application of force through the mother, provided the grounds for upholding the conviction. There was no need to transfer Haystead’s intention concerning the mother to the child.
Outcome
The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal and answered the magistrates’ question in the affirmative: on the facts found, Haystead could be convicted of assaulting the child by beating. Silber J agreed with Laws LJ.
The court certified a point of law of general public importance concerning whether battery requires direct physical contact between defendant and complainant, but refused leave to appeal. Certification did not alter the dismissal of Haystead’s appeal or grant permission for a further appeal.
Source: Full Divisional Court judgment and subsequent discussion of certification, 12 May 2000.