Legal Case Summary
Haystead v DPP [2000] 3 All ER 690
Whether reckless battery requires the direct physical application of force on the victim.
Facts
A man punched a woman twice in the face while she was holding her child in her arms. As a direct result of the two punches, the child fell from the women’s arms and hit his head on the floor. The man was convicted of an offence of assault by beating of the child. The man was convicted of battery and assault of the child.
Issues
S 39 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 prohibits common assault and battery. The question of law arose as to whether the man could be found to be guilty of battery and assault of the child by beating for the purposes of s 39 if there was no physical application of force directly from the man to the physical body of the victim.
Decision / Outcome
A direct application of force could be applied through a medium that is controlled through the actions of a person and does not require a direct infliction of physical contact with the victim’s body. Although most batteries are commonly directly inflicted upon a victim’s body, it is not an essential requirement that the violence and harm ought to be so directly inflicted to a victim’s body for the purposes of a charge of battery and assault under s 39 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. The Court stipulated that the only difference between the man’s actions causing the baby to fall from his mother’s hands and his punching of the baby directly is that, in the present case, the charge is of reckless and not intentional battery.
Updated 19 March 2026
This case summary remains accurate as of 2025. Haystead v Chief Constable of Derbyshire [2000] 3 All ER 690 (also reported as Haystead v DPP) correctly states the law on battery under s.39 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, which remains in force unamended in this respect. The principle that battery does not require direct physical contact between the defendant and the victim — and can be established where force is transmitted indirectly — continues to be good law and is regularly cited in criminal law teaching materials. No subsequent statutory amendment or appellate authority has overturned or materially qualified the decision. One minor point of note: the article refers throughout to both ‘assault’ and ‘battery’ of the child, which reflects the charging practice under s.39; readers should be aware that in strict legal terms, the conviction at issue was for battery (assault by beating), not a separate assault charge.
