Introducing Family Law
These Family Law pages were originally prepared by the Law Department at St. Brendan’s Sixth Form College. They are no longer being updated and no responsibility is accepted for them by St. Brendan’s College or LawTeacher.net This Chapter was last updated on 27 July 2000
Family law, as the phrase is generally understood, deals with the creation and removal of legal status, its consequences, and the protection (both physical and financial) of family members. It is concerned mainly with the nuclear family – that is, with the relationships between spouses, and between parents (or guardians) and children. Members of the extended family have some rights and come into the picture occasionally, as do local authorities chiefly in their child protection role. The word “family” has various meanings: at its narrowest it may describe the traditional “nuclear family” of a father, a mother and young children, but it has much wider meanings too. It may include other relatives, adopted and fostered children, and (increasingly these days) cohabitants of the same or different sexes.
X Y & Z v United Kingdom (or Whittle v UK) (1997) 24 EHRR 143, ECHR
A female-to-male transexual complained that English law refused to register him as father of the children born (by artificial insemination) to his long-term female cohabitant. The European Court of Human Rights dismissed his complaint, saying national governments must be allowed a wide margin of appreciation in this changing area, but unanimously affirmed that “family life” in Art.8 extended to his situation. Factors such as the length of and mutual commitment to a relationship should be taken into account, and on the facts there were clear de facto family ties linking the applicant, his cohabitant and her child.
Fitzpatrick v Sterling Housing Association (1999) unreported, HL
Reversing the Court of Appeal, the House of Lords (Lords Slynn, Nicholls and Clyde, Lords Hutton and Hobhouse dissenting) held that a gay man was entitled to take over the tenancy formerly held by his long-term male partner, now deceased, under the Housing Act 1988. Lord Slynn said the legislation could not be interpreted to allow P’s claim on the basis that he had been living “as the husband or wife” of the deceased – if Parliament had intended such a relationship to include same-sex partners it would surely have said so – but P could claim as “a member of the family” living with the deceased at the time of his death. The word “family” is used in many senses, he said, some wider than others, and if P could show (as on the facts he could) the mutual inter-dependence, sharing of lives, caring and love, commitment and support that are rebuttably presumed to exist between married couples, that would be enough to establish a family relationship.
Although statutes play a quite important part in family law – the Children Act 1989 is a particularly important piece of legislation, and there are others of similar significance – there are relatively few fixed principles. Such statutes often contain checklists of criteria to be applied or matters to be considered, but leave the ultimate decision to the judges. Judges therefore exercise a wide discretion particularly in matters relating to the care of children and the distribution of property on divorce.
The doctrine of precedent thus plays only a limited part in family law: most cases are regarded as having been decided on their particular facts, and can be distinguished without too much difficulty if following them would cause injustice. The Court of Appeal is reluctant to overturn the discretionary decision of a lower court unless it is blatantly unreasonable or clearly wrong in law.
Updated 19 March 2026
This article was last updated in July 2000 and is now substantially outdated in several respects, though some of its foundational observations about the nature of family law remain broadly accurate.
The most significant developments since publication include: the Civil Partnership Act 2004, which created legal status for same-sex couples; the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013, which extended marriage to same-sex couples in England and Wales; and the Gender Recognition Act 2004, which introduced a formal mechanism for legal recognition of acquired gender. These statutes materially affect the article’s discussion of cohabitants, same-sex relationships, and transgender individuals. The position described regarding the registration of a transgender person as a parent (referencing X, Y and Z v United Kingdom [1997]) has been affected by subsequent domestic and Strasbourg developments, though the precise current position on parental registration for transgender persons remains an evolving area of law.
Regarding Fitzpatrick v Sterling Housing Association [1999] 4 All ER 705, the decision itself remains good law, but its practical significance was considerably altered by Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] UKHL 30, in which the House of Lords held that the Human Rights Act 1998 required the relevant provision of the Rent Act 1977 to be read so as to include same-sex partners as spouses, going further than Fitzpatrick had allowed. The article’s account of Fitzpatrick does not reflect this important subsequent development.
The Children Act 1989 remains in force and central to family law, as the article states, though it has been significantly amended, including by the Children and Families Act 2014. The article’s general observations about judicial discretion and the limited role of precedent in family law remain broadly accurate.
Readers should treat this article as a historical introduction only and consult current sources for the present legal position.