1. An unlawful act
R v Franklin (1883) 15 Cox CC 163
Franklin took a box from a refreshment stall on Brighton’s West Pier and threw it into the sea, killing a swimmer below. The prosecution argued that the wrongful interference with the stallholder’s property was itself enough to support manslaughter, irrespective of negligence.
Field J rejected that argument. A civil wrong against the stallholder did not, by itself, establish criminal liability for the swimmer’s death. The case went to the jury on negligence instead. Franklin was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to two months’ imprisonment. The distinction matters: his conviction did not establish that any civil wrong causing death amounts to manslaughter.
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Original report: 15 Cox CC 163–165.
R v Lamb [1967] 2 QB 981
Lamb pointed a revolver at his friend as a joke and pulled the trigger. Both treated the incident as harmless. Although the gun contained two bullets, neither was opposite the barrel, and Lamb did not understand that pulling the trigger would rotate the cylinder into a firing position. His friend was killed.
The Court of Appeal quashed the manslaughter conviction. The trial judge had wrongly treated pointing the gun and pulling the trigger as necessarily unlawful, without requiring the elements of assault. The defence of accident and the expert evidence about the understandable mistake also needed proper consideration. Dangerous conduct alone did not establish the underlying criminal act.
R v Arobieke [1988] Crim LR 314
The defendant had been convicted of manslaughter on the basis that his presence at a railway station had caused the victim, whom he knew to be terrified of him, to attempt an escape by crossing the railway tracks, with the result that he was electrocuted. The Court of Appeal quashed the conviction on the ground that there had been no criminal act by the defendant, as the evidence did not show that the defendant had physically threatened or chased the deceased.
R v Cato [1976] 1 WLR 110
Cato and Anthony Farmer injected each other with heroin. Each prepared his own syringe, but the other person administered the injection. Farmer died the following morning. Cato was convicted of manslaughter and of administering a noxious thing contrary to section 23 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861.
The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions. The injection had to contribute to death by more than a negligible amount; it did not have to be the sole cause. Heroin was a noxious substance, and Cato had deliberately injected it knowing what the syringe contained. Farmer’s consent did not provide a defence, although consent could be relevant when considering the alternative allegation of gross negligence or recklessness. Cato’s sentence was reduced to borstal training.
2. The act must be dangerous
R v Church [1966] 1 QB 59
Church assaulted a woman in his van and then threw her into a river, claiming that he thought she was dead. She was still alive and drowned. He was acquitted of murder but convicted of manslaughter.
The Court of Criminal Appeal explained that an unlawful act causing death was not automatically manslaughter. The act had to expose someone to a risk of harm that sober and reasonable people would recognise; serious harm need not be foreseeable.
Although part of the direction on unlawful-act manslaughter was wrong, the conviction stood. The jury could consider the assault and disposal of the body as one sequence, and the direction on criminal negligence was sufficient in the circumstances. The court applied the statutory proviso because no substantial miscarriage of justice had occurred. The 15-year sentence also stood.
R v Dawson (1985) 81 Cr App R 150
Three men attempted to rob a petrol-station attendant using a replica gun and a pickaxe handle. The attendant, aged 60, had serious heart disease unknown to them. He activated an alarm and the men fled. He subsequently collapsed and died from a heart attack.
The Court of Appeal quashed the manslaughter convictions because the jury had been misdirected about dangerousness. Emotional disturbance alone was insufficient: the relevant harm was physical injury, which could result from shock. The reasonable bystander had the knowledge available at the scene, not everything later revealed at trial. The jury therefore could not attribute knowledge of the attendant’s hidden heart condition to that bystander.
The court rejected the separate challenges to leaving causation to the jury and to the medical-evidence directions. The robbery and attempted-robbery sentences remained in place.
R v Watson [1989] 1 WLR 684
Watson and another man broke into the home of an 87-year-old man, verbally abused him and left without stealing anything. The householder, who had a serious heart condition, died about 90 minutes later. Medical witnesses disagreed about whether the burglary caused the fatal heart attack or whether it followed a later event.
On dangerousness, the Court of Appeal held that the reasonable bystander could be given knowledge acquired throughout the burglary. The unlawful act comprised the whole intrusion, rather than ending at the instant of entry. Watson’s awareness of the householder’s frailty and approximate age could therefore be considered even if he knew nothing about the occupant beforehand.
This ground of appeal failed, although the manslaughter conviction was quashed on the separate causation issue discussed below.
R v Ball [1989] Crim LR 730
The defendant had been involved in a dispute with his neighbour, the victim, over her parking her vehicle on his land. The victim, accompanied by two men, called on the defendant to investigate the disappearance of her vehicle. An argument developed which culminated in the defendant grabbing a handful of cartridges, loading his shotgun, and firing at the victim. The victim was killed in the attack. The defendant was acquitted of murder, on the basis that he had honestly believed that he had loaded the gun with blank cartridges and had only intended to frighten the victim, but was convicted of manslaughter.
The defendant appealed on the basis that the trial judge had erred in directing the jury as to how they should have assessed the ‘dangerousness’ of his unlawful act, in that they had not been told to bear in mind the defendant’s mistaken belief, that he was firing blanks, when applying the Dawson test. In dismissing the appeal, the Court of Appeal held that once it was established that the defendant had intentionally committed an unlawful act, the question of its dangerousness was to be decided by applying the objective test (as in Dawson). The court refused to impute to the reasonable man the defendant’s mistake of fact, ie believing the live cartridges to be blanks.
3. Substantial cause of death
R v Dalby [1982] 1 WLR 425
Dalby unlawfully supplied prescription Diconal tablets to a friend. The friend injected himself and later received further injections of an unspecified substance with another person’s assistance. He was found dead the next afternoon.
The Court of Appeal quashed Dalby’s manslaughter conviction. The unlawful supply was not itself an act causing direct injury: the friend’s subsequent use of the drugs was crucial to the death. The court described the required unlawful act as one directed at the victim and likely to cause immediate injury. The decision concerned the causal gap between supplying drugs and their later administration, rather than the situation in Mitchell, where an assault immediately injured a different person.
R v Mitchell [1983] QB 741
During an argument in a post-office queue, Mitchell assaulted an elderly man, who fell against an elderly woman. She suffered a fractured femur and later died from a pulmonary embolism resulting from the injury.
The Court of Appeal upheld Mitchell’s manslaughter conviction. His unlawful and dangerous act did not have to be aimed at the person who died. The woman was injured through the immediate sequence set in motion by the assault, despite Mitchell having no direct physical contact with her. The causal connection distinguished the case from the supply of drugs in Dalby.
R v Goodfellow (1986) 83 Cr App R 23
Goodfellow set fire to his council house, hoping to be rehoused and to make the fire look like an attack by someone else. The fire killed his wife, his two-year-old son and another woman who was staying there. Two of his other children escaped.
The Court of Appeal upheld his manslaughter convictions. Arson could be an unlawful and dangerous act even though it was directed at property rather than at the people who died. The court treated Dalby as addressing causation: the question was whether an intervening act separated the defendant’s conduct from the deaths, rather than whether he intended to harm the victims.
R v Watson [1989] 1 WLR 684
(For facts see above.) The defendant appealed successfully on the ground that his counsel had been denied a sufficient opportunity to address the jury on the issue of whether the excitement caused by the arrival of the police and the council workman could have taken over as the operating and substantial cause of death.
4. Mens rea
DPP v Newbury and Jones [1976] UKHL 3; [1977] AC 500
Two boys, each about 15, pushed part of a paving stone from a railway bridge towards an approaching train. It went through the front-cab window and killed the guard seated beside the driver. Both boys were convicted of manslaughter.
The House of Lords dismissed their appeals. The prosecution had to establish that they intentionally committed an unlawful and dangerous act which caused death. It did not additionally have to prove that they personally foresaw harm or knew the act was unlawful or dangerous. Dangerousness was assessed objectively, using the test in Church. This did not dispense with the intention required for the underlying unlawful act.