Legal Case Brief
Lampleigh v Braithwaite (1615) Hob 105
When past consideration may be good consideration.
Facts
The defendant, Braithwaite, killed a man. He asked the plaintiff, Lampleigh to secure him a pardon from the king. The plaintiff spent many days doing this, riding and journeying at his own cost across the country to where the King was and back again. Afterwards, the defendant promised to pay the plaintiff £100 in gratitude. He later failed to pay the money. The plaintiff sued.
Issues
The defendant argued that the plaintiff had acted before any promise to pay was given by the defendant. Therefore, he had only provided past consideration for a promise given in the future. The court considered whether this past consideration was sufficient to create a valid contract.
Decision/Outcome
The court found in favour of the plaintiff. The promise was indeed given after the plaintiff had acted. However, the plaintiff had acted upon a request made by the defendant. The court considered that the original request by the defendant contained an implied promise to pay the plaintiff for his efforts. Bowen LJ said:
‘A mere voluntary courtesie will not have a consideration to uphold an assumpsit. But if that courtiesie were moved by a suit or request of the party that gives the assumpsit, it will bind’.
Consequently, the court held that if A does something for B at their request and afterward B promises to pay A for their trouble, then that promise is good consideration. The later promise was considered to be part of the same single transaction and was, therefore, enforceable.
Updated 19 March 2026
This case brief accurately describes the facts, issues, and outcome of Lampleigh v Braithwaite (1615) Hob 105, a foundational common law authority on past consideration. The legal principle it established — that past consideration may be valid where it was given at the promisor’s request and a promise of payment was implied at the outset — remains good law in England and Wales. It continues to be applied and affirmed in later authorities, most notably by the Privy Council in Pao On v Lau Yiu Long [1980] AC 614, which consolidated the conditions under which past consideration will be treated as sufficient. There have been no statutory changes that affect this principle. One factual point to note: the quotation in the article is attributed to ‘Bowen LJ’, which is an anachronistic attribution — the case was decided in 1615, long before Bowen LJ’s time. The quoted passage is drawn from the original report of the case itself. This does not affect the accuracy of the legal principle stated, but students should be aware of the attribution error to avoid reproducing it in academic work.
