Leakey v National Trust [1979] EWCA Civ 5
Court of Appeal, 31 July 1979. Reported at [1980] QB 485.
An occupier who knows, or ought to know, of a natural hazard on the land may have to take reasonable steps to protect neighbouring property. The Court of Appeal applied that principle to soil and debris falling from the National Trust’s hillside. Liability depended on a failure to take reasonable care; it was not strict liability for everything nature caused.
The hillside and the neighbours
The National Trust owned and, for the purposes of the proceedings, admitted occupying Burrow Mump, a steep hill near Bridgwater. Mr and Mrs Leakey owned one house at its western foot; Mr Storey owned the adjoining house. Soil, rocks and other debris had slipped from the bank onto their land over many years.
Law Teacher writing support
Writing a law essay?
We choose a writer who is an expert in your area of law and qualified to at least the academic level you select. Most of our writers hold a master’s degree or PhD, have teaching experience, or both.
Send us your question and, if you wish, any marking criteria. We’ll write an essay to your instructions.
The parties agreed that the instability resulted from the hill’s geology, contours and exposure to weather. It had not been caused or aggravated by human activity. The Trust nevertheless knew, from at least 1968, that the bank threatened the properties below.
In September 1976 Mrs Leakey reported a large crack and the danger of a major collapse. The Trust denied responsibility because the movement was natural, and rejected her offer to contribute half the estimated cost of reducing the bank. A substantial fall followed. Debris accumulated against the Leakeys’ kitchen wall, but the Trust refused to remove it. It offered permission for the neighbours to enter its land and deal with the problem themselves.
The proceedings and result
The neighbours sought preventive orders, removal of the fallen material and damages for nuisance. An interim injunction required the Trust to undertake protective work. At trial, O’Connor J held it liable and awarded £50 to the Leakeys and nominal damages of £2 to Storey. The awards were small partly because the Trust had already carried out and paid for protective work, including removal of fallen material.
The judge refused a final injunction but explained that further encroachment could support a fresh damages claim. The neighbours abandoned their request for an injunction on appeal. The Court of Appeal unanimously dismissed the Trust’s appeal, leaving the finding of liability and damages awards in place. It granted permission to appeal to the House of Lords.
Why a natural hazard could create a duty
The principal question was whether Goldman v Hargrave [1967] 1 AC 645, a Privy Council decision, correctly stated English law. In that case, a tree caught fire after a lightning strike. The occupier cut it down but failed to extinguish the remaining fire, which spread to neighbouring land. The Privy Council recognised a duty to respond reasonably to the hazard.
Megaw LJ found no sound distinction between fire spreading from a tree and soil slipping from unstable ground. In either case, a naturally occurring danger on one property could damage another. The relevant failure was the occupier’s inadequate response once aware, or reasonably expected to be aware, of the hazard.
The reasoning built on Sedleigh-Denfield v O’Callaghan [1940] AC 880, where a trespasser had created a flooding risk on the defendant’s land. The defendant’s failure to deal with a danger it knew or ought to have known about could give rise to liability. Megaw LJ rejected an automatic exemption merely because nature, rather than a trespasser, created the danger.
Why this was not strict liability
The Trust relied on Rylands v Fletcher and the distinction between natural and non-natural use of land. Megaw LJ explained that its rule of strict liability did not determine this claim. The absence of a non-natural use did not establish that an occupier could never owe a duty of reasonable care.
This distinction matters. The Trust was not responsible simply because its hillside moved. Liability arose from failing to respond reasonably to a known threat. Conversely, the existence of a duty does not mean that every failure to undertake works is a breach.
The limits of reasonable steps
The duty requires no more than is reasonable in the circumstances to prevent or minimise the risk. Relevant considerations include the likelihood and potential seriousness of damage, the practicality and cost of precautions, and the time available to act.
The occupier’s individual circumstances also matter. Physical ability may affect what action can be expected; financial resources may matter where substantial expenditure is needed. Megaw LJ envisaged a broad assessment, not routine detailed investigation of the parties’ finances. In appropriate circumstances, warning the neighbour and offering access for agreed works, or proposing a fair sharing of costs, might discharge the duty.
The Trust had initially challenged the extent of the work required but withdrew that argument. It accepted that, if the duty existed with the scope described in Goldman, the judgment against it should stand.
Nuisance and the court’s agreement
The Trust also argued that the claim failed because it pleaded nuisance rather than negligence. Megaw LJ considered nuisance an appropriate description of this failure to protect neighbouring land. Even if the label were technically wrong, the substance of the pleaded duty was clear and the Trust had suffered no prejudice.
Cumming-Bruce LJ agreed with Megaw LJ. Shaw LJ also agreed with the result, while expressing reservations about imposing responsibility for a danger created entirely by nature. Those reservations underline the importance of the judgment’s limiting principle: reasonable precautions assessed in context, rather than an obligation to eliminate every natural risk at any cost.
Source: the full Court of Appeal judgment.