Livingstone v Ministry of Defence [1984] NI 356
Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland — 19 October 1984
Facts
Livingstone was struck and injured by a plastic baton round fired by a soldier in Belfast on 23 September 1979. Security forces had cordoned off streets near Divis Street and Millfield to prevent an unlawful procession reaching the city centre. Rioting had taken place nearby, and the defence said that baton rounds were fired after the security forces came under attack.
Livingstone sued the Ministry of Defence and the Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary. He pleaded negligence and, separately, assault, battery and trespass to the person. It was not disputed that a soldier had deliberately fired the round which struck him.
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Procedural history
Gibson LJ dismissed the action after finding no negligence. However, his judgment dealt only with negligence and did not decide the separately pleaded claim in assault and battery. Livingstone appealed.
The defendants had not pleaded a specific justification for firing the round, such as self-defence or reasonable force used to prevent crime.
Issues
Could battery be established without proof that the soldier intended to strike Livingstone himself? The appeal also concerned the omitted battery claim and whether the defendants could introduce a justification which they had not pleaded at trial.
Decision
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial. It rejected the argument that battery required an intention to strike the particular person who was injured.
The defendants were refused permission to amend their defence to introduce justification for the purposes of the appeal. They were, however, allowed to plead that defence for the new trial. The appeal therefore did not finally resolve whether the firing was justified.
Reasoning: intention and justification
Hutton J explained that deliberately applying force to one person could constitute battery against another person directly struck instead. His example was a soldier who aimed at one rioter but missed and hit a nearby rioter. The unintended identity of the person struck did not make the application of force unintentional for this purpose.
The defendants had argued that there was no evidence of an intention to hit Livingstone and that the soldier might have aimed at someone else. That possibility did not defeat the battery claim. It was an argument about the legal requirement of intention, rather than a finding identifying another person as the soldier’s actual target.
Justification remained a distinct question. An intentional application of force could be lawful if the defendants established an applicable defence. The failure to prove negligence did not dispose of the battery claim, under which the defendants had to establish justification once the intentional application of force was proved.