Matthews v United Kingdom [1999] ECHR 12

Matthews v United Kingdom [1999] ECHR 12; (1999) 28 EHRR 361

European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, 18 February 1999. Application no. 24833/94. European Parliament elections in Gibraltar and the right to vote.

Facts

Denise Matthews lived in Gibraltar. In April 1994 she applied to be registered to vote in elections to the European Parliament. The Electoral Registration Officer refused her application because Annex II to the 1976 Act concerning direct elections limited the United Kingdom’s application of that Act to the United Kingdom itself. Gibraltar was a dependent territory, but was not part of the United Kingdom.

Nevertheless, substantial areas of European Community law applied in Gibraltar under Article 227(4) of the EC Treaty. These included rules concerning the movement of persons, services and capital, health, the environment and consumer protection. Gibraltar’s exclusion from other areas, such as the customs territory, did not remove the effect of Community legislation on its residents.

The European Convention on Human Rights had been extended to Gibraltar in 1953, and Protocol No. 1 applied there from 1988. Matthews complained that her exclusion from the 1994 European Parliament elections breached Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, both alone and together with Article 14.

The legal questions

Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 protects free elections to the legislature. The case raised three connected questions: whether the United Kingdom remained responsible for the exclusion despite the international treaty arrangements governing the elections; whether the European Parliament formed part of Gibraltar’s legislature; and whether completely excluding Matthews from voting could be justified.

The Government argued that the United Kingdom could not change the 1976 arrangements unilaterally. It also maintained that the European Parliament was a supranational institution which lacked the powers necessary to qualify as a legislature. Alternatively, it argued that the electoral arrangements fell within the discretion allowed to states.

Decision

The Grand Chamber held, by fifteen votes to two, that the United Kingdom had violated Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. The European Parliament formed part of Gibraltar’s legislature for that provision, and Matthews had been denied the substance of her right to vote.

The court unanimously considered it unnecessary to decide the separate discrimination complaint under Article 14. Matthews did not claim damages. She received an award of £45,000 for costs and expenses, with any applicable VAT, less the legal aid already paid to her.

Why the United Kingdom remained responsible

The court distinguished a challenge to acts of the European Community itself from a complaint about the consequences of treaties entered into by a Convention state. The Community was not a party to the Convention, so its acts as such could not be challenged before the court. But transferring powers to an international organisation did not remove a state’s responsibility to secure Convention rights.

Here, the exclusion resulted from the 1976 electoral arrangements combined with the enlargement of the European Parliament’s powers under the Maastricht Treaty. These were international instruments freely entered into by the United Kingdom. In particular, the Maastricht commitments were made after Protocol No. 1 had become applicable to Gibraltar. The United Kingdom could not avoid responsibility merely because it lacked unilateral control over the arrangements (paragraphs 29–35).

Why the European Parliament counted as a legislature

The word legislature was not confined to a national parliament. Its meaning depended on the constitutional arrangements concerned. The Convention also had to be interpreted in light of developments since it was drafted; the later creation of a supranational parliament did not place that institution outside the provision.

The court examined the European Parliament’s actual role in the Community’s legislative process after Maastricht. Although it could not ordinarily initiate legislation itself, it could prevent measures being adopted under the co-decision procedure. It also had important powers concerning the appointment and removal of the European Commission, the budget and democratic supervision.

Taken together, its involvement in law-making and democratic oversight was sufficient. Community measures directly affected Gibraltar, and the European Parliament therefore formed part of its legislature for Article 3 purposes (paragraphs 39–54).

Exclusion from voting and the dissent

States enjoyed considerable discretion over their electoral systems. The Government pointed to Gibraltar’s small population and the difficulties of giving it its own constituency or attaching it to an existing United Kingdom constituency. However, Matthews had been denied any opportunity to participate in choosing representatives to a body involved in making law affecting her. The exclusion impaired the essence of the protected right (paragraphs 60–65).

Judges Freeland and Jungwiert dissented. They favoured restraint in applying the Convention to the Community’s institutions and questioned whether Article 3 extended beyond national or local legislatures. They also considered that the European Parliament’s lack of power independently to initiate and adopt legislation prevented it from qualifying as a legislature.

Legal significance

Matthews connected voting rights to the actual distribution of legislative power. The majority examined the European Parliament’s role within the wider institutional structure, rather than requiring it to possess every power of a national parliament. The decision also confirmed the United Kingdom’s continuing Convention responsibility for the consequences of the treaty arrangements at issue.

Judgment: Matthews v the United Kingdom, application no. 24833/94.