Legal Case Summary
McGhee v National Coal Board [1973] 1 WLR 1
To satisfy causation, a claimant need only prove that the negligent behaviour most likely made a material contribution to the injury.
Facts
The claimant, McGhee, contracted a skin condition (dermatitis) in the course of his employment with the defendant, the National Coal Board. The defendant requested McGhee work with the brick kilns, but failed to satisfy their statutory duty to provide a washing area to allow employees to remove the dust from the kilns at the end of the day. Subsequently, employees could not wash off the dust till they returned home.
Two possible causes were identified for McGhee’s dermatitis: exposure to brick dust during the working day, and the continued exposure received between the end of the day and being able to wash at home.
Issues
Could the defendant be found liable for the claimant’s injuries, or, as the defendant’s asserted, could the chief relevant authority of Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw [1956] AC 613 be distinguished on the grounds that it could not be ascertained whether every skin abrasion of the claimant’s exposed to the brick dust was responsible for his contracting dermatitis, whilst in Bonnington Castings it had been determined that all the harmful silica breathed by the claimant had contributed to his injury.
Decision / Outcome
The House of Lords held that the instant case ought not be distinguished from Bonnington Castings; the claimant did not need to prove that all of his abrasions and their exposure to brick dust had contributed to his illness, but rather that the dust exposure stemming from the defendant’s negligent breach of statutory duty had, on the balance of probabilities, materially increased the likelihood of him developing dermatitis.
Updated 20 March 2026
This summary remains broadly accurate as a statement of the decision in McGhee v National Coal Board [1973] 1 WLR 1. However, readers should be aware of two important subsequent developments that significantly affect how this case should be understood.
First, in Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority [1988] AC 1074, the House of Lords clarified that McGhee did not establish a broad principle that materially increasing the risk of injury is equivalent to materially contributing to injury. The Lords held that McGhee was decided on its particular facts involving a single causative agent, and that the ‘material contribution to risk’ approach does not apply where there are multiple distinct potential causes.
Second, and more significantly, the Supreme Court in Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2002] UKHL 22 and subsequently in Barker v Corus UK Ltd [2006] UKHL 20 revisited the McGhee principle in the context of mesothelioma caused by asbestos exposure, developing a specific and limited ‘Fairchild exception’ to orthodox causation rules. The Compensation Act 2006 s.3 further modified the position in mesothelioma cases by restoring joint and several liability following Barker. Students should treat McGhee as an important but now contextualised authority, read alongside these later developments rather than in isolation.