Melbury Road Properties 1995 Ltd v Kreidi [1999] 3 E.G.LR. 108
LAND LAW – REGISTRATION – CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST
Facts
The defendant sought to extend his lease pursuant to a statutory framework. He served the notice of claim required, and was later informed that the reversion of the lease had been assigned to another sometime after he served the notice. No entry was made in the Land Register pertaining to the notice, but the conveyance of the reversion was stated to be ‘subject to and with the benefit of’ the notice.
Issues
Registration of land confers a guarantee that the land is not encumbered by any interest or claim not contained within the register. There are only a few exceptions to this principle of indefeasibility, which includes constructive trusts.
The issue in this case was whether the notice of claim was binding on the successor-in-title to the lease’s reversion. The claimant argued that it was binding on several grounds, including constructive trust.
Decision/Outcome
The County Court held that the notice was not binding.
The Court restated the principle that a constructive trust will only arise if the court is satisfied that the conscience of the claimant is sufficiently affected that it would be unconscionable to allow him to rely on his strict legal rights. They held that mere notice/knowledge of the interest is not sufficient to ground unconscionability, given the need to ensure certainty in registered dispositions.
In this case, there was insufficient evidence of any facts making it unconscionable for the successor-in-title to insist on his strict legal rights. The clause in the transfer referring to the notice did not impose a new obligation on the parties: it was merely a description of something which was already expected to occur. The defendant was still free to serve a new notice.
Updated 21 March 2026
This article accurately summarises the County Court decision in Melbury Road Properties 1995 Ltd v Kreidi [1999] 3 EGLR 108. The core legal principles discussed — namely that mere notice or knowledge of an unregistered interest is insufficient to give rise to a constructive trust, and that unconscionability requires something more than knowledge alone — remain consistent with subsequent case law and general principles of English land law. The article’s treatment of registered land and the limits of constructive trusts as an exception to indefeasibility remains broadly sound. Readers should note, however, that the registered land framework has since been substantially reformed by the Land Registration Act 2002, which replaced the Land Registration Act 1925 and introduced significant changes to overriding interests, the land register, and related concepts. The 2002 Act governs this area today. While the underlying equitable principles discussed in the case are unaffected, any reader applying these principles in practice should do so by reference to the 2002 Act rather than the pre-2002 framework. The article does not explicitly identify the statutory basis for the lease extension claim; this appears to be the Leasehold Reform, Housing and Urban Development Act 1993, which remains in force, though the leasehold reform landscape in England is currently subject to ongoing legislative change following the Leasehold and Freehold Reform Act 2024.
