Miller Case
HOUSE OF LORDS
LORD DIPLOCK, LORD KEITH OF KINKEL, LORD BRIDGE OF HARWICH, LORD BRANDON
OF OAKBROOK AND LORD BRIGHTMAN
16 FEBRUARY, 17 MARCH 1983
The actus reus of the offence of arson, contrary to s 1(1) and (3)a of the Criminal Damage Act 1971, is present if the defendant
accidentally starts a fire and thereafter, intending to destroy or
damage property belonging to another or being reckless whether any such
property would be destroyed or damaged, fails to take any steps to
extinguish the fire or prevent damage to such property by that fire (see
p 981 d to f, p 982 f to j, and p 983 j to p 984 b, post).
Updated 20 March 2026
This article accurately describes the legal principle established in R v Miller [1983] 2 AC 161 (HL). The case remains good law. The “duty to act” principle it established — that a defendant who accidentally creates a dangerous situation may incur criminal liability through a subsequent omission to act — continues to be applied in English criminal law and is regularly cited in academic and judicial contexts. The Criminal Damage Act 1971, ss 1(1) and 1(3), under which Miller was convicted of arson, remain in force without material amendment to those provisions. No subsequent legislation or appellate authority has overruled or substantially qualified the Miller principle. The article can be read with confidence as a statement of current law, though students should note that later cases such as R v Evans [2009] EWCA Crim 650 have extended related omissions liability into other contexts, which may be worth reading alongside Miller for a fuller picture.
