Morrells of Oxford Ltd v Oxford United Football Club Ltd [2001] Ch. 459
Restrictive Covenants – s.79 Law of Property Act 1925 (LPA) – Construction of Documents – Implied Contrary Intention
Facts
The claimant (M) applied for an injunction to enforce a restrictive covenant contained in a conveyance of land against O, who proposed to convert the land to use a football stadium. The covenant in question prohibited the building of licensed premises within half a mile of the public house which had been the object of the original conveyance.
It was contended by C that, due to the operation of s.79 LPA 1925, the covenant could be presumed to bind successors in title to the land unless a contrary intention was expressed. O was granted summary judgment under the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (Pt. 24) and M appealed.
Issue
The issue on appeal turned on the appropriate construction of s.79 LPA 1925. Namely, whether the words provisionally read in by the statute could, in the particular commercial context, usefully supplement the words of the particular document.
Decision / Outcome
Finding in favour of O, the Court of Appeal held that s.79 LPA could not apply to the covenant in question. The purpose of s.79 was to remove the need to provide expressly for covenants contained in a conveyance to bind successors in title by allowing such an intention to be inferred, in the absence of any contrary intention. Looking at the conveyance in the round (IRC Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1997] UKHL) such a contrary intention could be found, as other covenants contained in the conveyance were explicitly stated to bind successors, whereas the disputed covenant did not.
Updated 21 March 2026
This case summary remains broadly accurate. Morrells of Oxford Ltd v Oxford United Football Club Ltd [2001] Ch 459 is a Court of Appeal decision and continues to be a recognised authority on the construction of s.79 of the Law of Property Act 1925 in the context of restrictive covenants and successors in title. The legal principles described — that s.79 operates as a statutory default which can be displaced by a contrary intention appearing from the document as a whole — remain good law and have not been displaced by subsequent legislation or appellate authority.
One minor point of accuracy: the case cited for contextual construction of documents is more commonly referenced as Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896 (HL). The article abbreviates this as IRC Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society, which is potentially misleading, though the underlying legal proposition on construction remains correct. Readers should note this when citing. No statutory amendments to s.79 LPA 1925 have been made that would affect the position described.
