Pursell v Horn [1838] 112 ER 966
Battery, direct versus indirect contact, throwing water on a person
Facts
In this case the defendant threw water on the claimant and got both the claimant and the claimant’s clothes, wet. The claimant started an action for battery. This was a novel approach since until then battery had generally been confined to more direct contact, such as touching of a person in anger (Cole v Turner (1704)), but sought to build on cases such as Gibbons v Pepper (1695) where indirect contact causing harm was actionable (in that case the wrongful action was slapping a horse and causing it to hurt the Claimant).
Issues
The issue in this case was what degree of direct physical contact was required in order for a claim in battery to be successfully. Essentially the question was whether it was necessary for direct contact to occur between the bodies of the claimant and defendant or whether indirect contact would suffice.
Decision/Outcome
The court held that throwing water on a person can constitute a battery, regardless of the lack of physical contract between the defendant and the claimant’s bodies. The requirement for directness was not completely discarded however, as the court made a distinction between situations in which the defendant only succeeds in splashing the claimant’s clothes and a situation in which he splashes both the claimant’s clothes and their body. The defendant getting wet because their clothes became wet would be insufficient for battery, but direct contact between the water thrown and the claimant’s body was sufficient.
Updated 20 March 2026
This article accurately describes the historical case of Pursell v Horn [1838] 112 ER 966 and its role in the development of the tort of battery. The underlying legal principles remain good law. The distinction between direct and indirect contact in battery, and the proposition that an intermediary instrument (such as thrown water) making contact with the claimant’s body can suffice, continues to be recognised in English tort law. The references to Cole v Turner (1704) and Gibbons v Pepper (1695) as contextual authorities are historically accurate. No subsequent statutory intervention or appellate authority has overturned the principles discussed. Students should note, however, that the broader law of battery has been further developed through later cases — including in particular the House of Lords decision in Wilson v Pringle [1987] QB 237 and the subsequent clarification in Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1, which addressed the requirement of hostility (or lack thereof) and the nature of the direct act requirement. Those developments are relevant context for a full understanding of modern battery law, though they do not undermine the specific point this case establishes.
