R (G and M) v Immigration Appeal Tribunal [2004] EWCA Civ 1731
Report citations: [2005] 1 WLR 1445; [2005] 2 All ER 165.
Court: Court of Appeal (Civil Division). Decision: 16 December 2004.
The Court of Appeal dismissed two asylum applicants’ appeals concerning access to judicial review. It held that the statutory review procedure under the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 provided an adequate alternative for the issues they wished to raise. The decision concerned how the court should exercise its discretion, rather than the removal of its jurisdiction.
Facts and procedural history
G, from Iran, and M, from Zimbabwe, each had an asylum claim refused by the Secretary of State. Their appeals to adjudicators failed, and the Immigration Appeal Tribunal refused permission for further appeals on points of law.
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Section 101 of the 2002 Act allowed a High Court judge to review the tribunal’s refusal on written submissions. The judge could affirm or reverse the refusal, but the statutory review decision was final: there was no oral renewal or further appeal from that decision.
G unsuccessfully sought statutory review and then applied for judicial review on the same grounds. M applied simultaneously for statutory review and permission to seek judicial review, again relying on the same grounds. His statutory review application also failed.
Collins J ultimately dismissed both judicial review claims without examining their substantive merits. He considered that pursuing judicial review on grounds that had been, or could have been, raised through statutory review was an abuse of process. G and M appealed.
Issues
The principal question was whether the court should entertain judicial review despite the alternative statutory remedy. G and M argued that review on paper was insufficient when fundamental rights could be at stake, because ordinary judicial review offered opportunities for oral argument and an appeal.
G also argued that restricting asylum applicants in this way discriminated against them contrary to Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
The court’s reasoning
The Court of Appeal emphasised the importance of judicial review to the rule of law. Nevertheless, courts ordinarily refuse that remedy where Parliament has provided a satisfactory alternative. The statutory procedure had not removed the High Court’s judicial-review jurisdiction; the Secretary of State accepted that position on appeal.
Parliament’s objective of resolving asylum claims promptly was legitimate. Allowing judicial review to repeat a failed statutory review, or to run alongside it on the same grounds, would undermine the intended finality. Speed alone, however, could not justify an inadequate safeguard for people entitled to asylum.
The court assessed the procedure as a whole. The paper review was one stage in a system involving consideration by the Secretary of State, an adjudicator and a legally qualified tribunal member. An experienced High Court judge then considered whether there was an arguable error of law affecting the outcome. The judge did not have to resolve the arguable legal issue itself. If the refusal was reversed, permission to appeal to the tribunal followed directly.
Although oral argument could sometimes change a judge’s mind, the court considered the paper procedure adequate and proportionate for that task. It was therefore a proper exercise of discretion to refuse judicial review of issues that statutory review had addressed, or could address.
Discrimination and outcome
The Article 14 argument also failed. The court accepted that the cases arguably fell within the ambit of Convention rights and that immigration status could be a protected ground. However, it did not accept that asylum applicants were necessarily in an analogous position to everyone using other tribunal procedures. It also considered the procedural distinction objectively justified, given the particular immigration context and the adequacy of statutory review.
Both appeals were dismissed. The court expressly confined its conclusion to cases where judicial review covered the same ground as the available statutory review. Judicial review remained open in principle for justiciable errors outside the statutory procedure.
Significance
The case distinguishes excluding the court’s jurisdiction from declining to exercise it because an adequate alternative remedy exists. It also shows why the adequacy of that remedy must be assessed within the whole procedure, while preserving access to judicial review for matters the alternative cannot resolve.
Source: Original Court of Appeal judgment.