The Supreme Court dismissed Jesse Quaye’s appeal and held that legislation limiting minimum-term reviews of detention during His Majesty’s pleasure to offenders under 18 when sentenced is compatible with articles 5, 7 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Quaye committed murder at 17 but was sentenced at 18 to an indeterminate sentence with a 15-year minimum term, so he could not seek a review that remained open to his younger co-defendant. The Court found no arbitrary detention, no heavier penalty, and an objectively justified age distinction.
On 10 May 2014 Jesse Quaye, then aged 17 years and nine months, and Ayomindy Bile, then 15, went uninvited to a party and stabbed Connor Barrett, who died. Quaye was convicted of murder in November 2014, by which time he was 18. On 16 January 2015, aged 18 years and five months, both were sentenced under section 90 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 to detention during His Majesty’s pleasure, with a minimum term of 15 years. The judge took the statutory 12-year starting point for an offender under 18 at the time of the murder, increased it for the knives and the circumstances, and allowed for mitigation including the absence of an intention to kill. Release after the minimum term depended on the Parole Board. Bile, still 15 at sentence, received the same minimum term.
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Detention during His Majesty’s pleasure is an indeterminate sentence. Until 2000 the Secretary of State decided both the minimum period and release, and was required to keep the detention under continuing review because the offender had been a child. From 30 November 2000 the trial judge fixes the minimum term and, once it has been served, the Parole Board assesses risk. The Secretary of State must release the detainee if the Board so directs. A policy of clemency nevertheless allowed an application, at the halfway point, for a possible reduction for exceptional progress. From 18 February 2021 that policy ceased to apply to anyone aged 18 or over when sentenced. Sections 27A and 27B of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997, in force from 28 June 2022, placed a similar limit in statute: only a person under 18 when sentenced may apply for a minimum-term review, which the High Court determines. Section 27A(11) states that there is no other right to request a review. Quaye therefore could not apply; Bile could. The 2021 policy change itself was not challenged.
The challenge
Quaye sought declarations that sections 27A and 27B were incompatible with articles 5, 7 and 14 of the Convention. The Divisional Court held that removing any possibility of reducing the minimum term risked arbitrary detention contrary to article 5, and unlawful age discrimination contrary to article 14 read with article 5. It did not decide article 7. The Court of Appeal quashed the declarations. It held that section 27A did not engage articles 5 or 7 and that the difference in treatment, although within article 14, was objectively justified. Quaye appealed.
Article 5
Lord Stephens and Lady Simler, with whom Lord Sales, Lord Briggs and Lord Hamblen agreed, held that the present statutory scheme no longer implied a duty to keep the minimum term under continuing review. The Court did not need to decide whether section 82A of the 2000 Act, taken on its own, had already brought such a duty to an end. Sections 27A and 27B then occupied the field: a review is available only as section 27A provides, and not to those aged 18 or over at sentence. The Secretary of State cannot use the prerogative to fill that gap.
Article 5(1)(a) permits detention after conviction by a competent court. Where there is a sufficient causal connection with a lawful conviction, and no bad faith or similar defect, the length of the sentence is for the national authorities. Quaye’s minimum term was fixed under the statutory scheme by reference to the seriousness of the offence, his culpability and maturity when he committed it, the welfare principle, and the aggravating and mitigating factors. He could have appealed if he considered it excessive. Denying a later request for a reduction by way of clemency does not make detention for that term arbitrary. There is no Convention principle requiring every indeterminate sentence imposed for an offence committed in childhood to be reviewed. The article 5 ground failed.
Article 14
Age is an “other status”. An offender who commits murder as a child but is sentenced at 18 is in an analogous position to one sentenced while still under 18; Bile’s case was a direct comparison. Section 27A therefore treats them differently according to age at sentence. Because the challenge concerned general legislative rules, the Supreme Court made its own proportionality assessment rather than merely reviewing the Court of Appeal’s.
A wide margin was appropriate. Age is not a suspect ground. The provision is recent primary legislation on penal policy, balancing the interests of victims’ families against those of offenders, and there was no European consensus requiring a review in every such case. Child offenders continue to be sentenced differently from adults: the court applies the welfare principle, relevant guidelines, and a starting point linked to age at the offence. Section 27A changes only the later opportunity to seek a reduction.
The aim, apparent from the statute and the 2020 white paper A Smarter Approach to Sentencing, was to reduce the distress caused when families are contacted about a review and invited to make a fresh victim personal statement, revisiting the murder. A bright line at 18 — the age at which the criminal justice system generally treats a person as an adult — was a rational and no more intrusive means of pursuing that aim. The purpose of a review, to reflect accelerated maturation after sentence, applies with less force to those who are already adults when sentenced. Parliament considered and rejected an amendment that would have set the cut-off at 26.
Nor was this the retrospective removal of a legal right. From February 2021 the published policy already excluded those aged 18 or over at sentence. What was lost was an opportunity under a changeable policy, not a substantive entitlement. Limited transitional provision preserved some applications already made. Any sense of harshness carried little weight beside Parliament’s judgment of a fair balance. The article 14 ground failed.
Article 7
Article 7 prohibits imposing a heavier penalty than the one applicable when the offence was committed. Convention case law distinguishes the penalty from measures concerned only with its execution or enforcement. Changes to early-release arrangements have been treated as execution.
The penalty imposed on Quaye was indefinite detention, with a minimum term fixed by the court to reflect seriousness, culpability and harm, and with the possibility of release on licence once that term had been served if the Parole Board was satisfied about risk. Removing the chance to seek an earlier Parole Board hearing, through a reduction of the minimum term, concerns how the sentence is enforced. It does not redefine the penalty. The sentence remains reducible after the minimum term. Requirements of foreseeability under article 7 do not apply to measures of execution. The article 7 ground failed.
Verdict: The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeal. It held that sections 27A and 27B of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 are compatible with articles 5 and 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights and with article 14 read together with article 5.
Source: R (on the application of Quaye) v Secretary of State for Justice [2026] UKSC 34
