R v Bourne [1952] 36 Cr App R 1251
Aiding and abetting – Bestiality – Liability where principal offender lacked mens rea
Facts
Sydney Joseph Bourne (B) subjected his wife Adelaide Bourne (A) to bestiality by terrorising her into submission against her will of sexual intercourse with a dog. B was convicted of aiding and abetting his wife to commit buggery with a dog. The offence of buggery requires only the act itself, the mens rea being irrelevant. B appealed against his conviction.
Issues
The issue in question was whether an accused could be convicted of aiding and abetting where the person aided and abetted was as not guilty as a principal. B argued that he could not be convicted of aiding and abetting a crime where there was no common design in which the aider and abettor are acting together and where the principal offender, A, could not be convicted since she acted under B’s duress.
Decision/Outcome
Mens rea or consent is immaterial to establishing the offence of buggery, whether with man or beast; the crime is committed if an act of buggery is committed. If it was shown that the principal offender, A, acted under duress, it would not have shown that no offence had been committed but would excuse A from punishment. The full offence of buggery therefore still committed by A, B was a principal in the second degree and an aider and abettor to the crime of buggery which was committed by A. A would have been entitled to be acquitted on the ground of duress. The appeal was dismissed and conviction upheld.
Updated 20 March 2026
This article accurately summarises the decision in R v Bourne (1952) 36 Cr App R 125. The core legal principle — that a defendant can be convicted as an aider and abettor even where the principal offender would have a personal defence (such as duress) excusing rather than justifying their conduct — remains good law and continues to be cited in discussions of secondary liability and the doctrine of innocent agency.
Readers should note, however, that the substantive offence discussed (buggery) has been significantly reformed. The Sexual Offences Act 2003 abolished the offence of buggery entirely in England and Wales, replacing it and related offences with a new framework of sexual offences. Conduct of the type described in this case would now be charged under different provisions of the 2003 Act. The article’s value is therefore primarily doctrinal, in illustrating the aiding and abetting principle, rather than as a guide to current sexual offences law.
Additionally, readers studying secondary liability more broadly should be aware that the Supreme Court’s decision in R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8 significantly reformed the law of joint enterprise, though that development does not affect the narrower principle about duress and secondary liability illustrated by Bourne itself.
