R v Craig and Bentley (1952) The Times, 10 December
Incitement to murder – Joint Enterprise – Equal Liability – Capital Punishment
Facts
Derek William Bentley (B), 19, and Christopher Craig (C), 16, attempted to burgle a warehouse. B carried a knife and a knuckle-duster, given to him by C, and C carried a gun. B was arrested, and while in the custody of the police he shouted “let him have it” to C, following which C entered into a gun fight with Police Constable Sidney Miles (M), who died as a result. C was convicted of murder and B was convicted as an accomplice to murder.
Issues
The issue in question was whether B could be convicted for murder as an accessory in joint enterprise, where he had not fired the fatal shot. B argued that there was no joint agreement to resist arrest by violence, but if there had been, he had dissociated himself from it.
Decision/Outcome
A person who aids or encourages a crime can be held equally liable as the person who actually committed the crime. B was an accessory in the joint enterprise to the killing of M when resisting arrest, which was murder under the common law principle of constructive malice. The common law doctrine of constructive malice is now abolished under the Homicide Act 1957, which also introduced the defence of diminished responsibility, relevant to B due to the argument that he had an actual mental capacity of an 11-year-old. C, being a minor at the time, was detained at Her Majesty’s Pleasure. B was hanged, murder being a capital offence at this time in England and Wales but now abolished under the Murder (Abolition of the Death Penalty) Act 1965. B was royally pardoned, however, in 1993, and his conviction quashed in 1998 due to the inconsistencies in evidence and misdirection by the judge at trial, however the principle of equal liability still stands.
Updated 20 March 2026
This article is broadly accurate in its account of the facts, legal principles, and subsequent legislative developments. The key points — joint enterprise liability, the abolition of constructive malice by the Homicide Act 1957, and the abolition of capital punishment under the Murder (Abolition of the Death Penalty) Act 1965 — remain correct statements of law.
One point requires clarification: the article states that Bentley was “royally pardoned” in 1993. More precisely, he received a partial royal pardon in 1993 in respect of the sentence only (not the conviction itself). His conviction was subsequently quashed by the Court of Appeal in R v Bentley [2001] 1 Cr App R 21, decided in July 1998, on the grounds of material irregularities in the summing-up, including misdirection by the trial judge. The article’s reference to “1998” for the quashing of the conviction is correct.
Readers should also note that the law on joint enterprise liability has developed significantly since this case. In particular, the Supreme Court in R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8 departed from the approach established in Chan Wing-Siu [1985] AC 168, ruling that mere foresight of a co-defendant’s act is insufficient to establish accessory liability; the prosecution must prove that the secondary party intended to assist or encourage the principal to commit the offence. This does not affect the outcome in Craig and Bentley on its own facts, but students should be aware that the broader doctrine of joint enterprise has been substantially restated and that Jogee is now the leading authority.
