R v Geddes (1996) 160 JP 697
Additional citation: [1996] Crim LR 894. Court: Court of Appeal (Criminal Division). Decision: 25 June 1996.
The Court of Appeal quashed a conviction for attempted false imprisonment. The evidence strongly indicated an intention to commit the offence, but did not show that Geddes had gone beyond preparation and begun to carry it out.
Facts and proceedings
On 20 July 1994, Gary Geddes entered Dorothy Stringer School in Brighton. He had no connection with the school and no right to be there. A teacher found him in the boys’ lavatories with a rucksack. He left despite being called to stop, discarding the bag in bushes. It contained a large knife, lengths of rope and tape. A cider can bearing his fingerprints was found in a lavatory cubicle.
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The prosecution alleged that Geddes had been waiting in the cubicle to seize and restrain a boy. The defence disputed the inferences drawn from the can and the equipment. Evidence of conversations with a housing officer was excluded at trial and could not support the charge.
The trial judge rejected a submission that there was no case to answer. He considered that entering the cubicle with the necessary equipment and intention could amount to an attempt. A jury convicted Geddes in September 1995. A separate offensive-weapon count was left on the file without a jury verdict.
The issue on appeal
Section 1(1) of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981 required an intention to commit the offence and an act going beyond mere preparation. The appeal principally challenged the judge’s ruling that the evidence was legally sufficient to put the attempted false imprisonment charge before the jury.
The distinction mattered because the jury did not have an unrestricted power to decide whether conduct amounted to an attempt. Under section 4(3), that factual question arose only if the judge first found sufficient evidence in law to support it.
The court’s reasoning
Lord Bingham CJ, giving the court’s judgment, accepted that the circumstances and contents of the rucksack provided strong evidence of Geddes’s intentions. However, intention and preparation did not establish that he had started committing the offence.
Drawing on R v Gullefer, R v Rowley and R v Campbell, the court treated the dividing line as a matter for judgment on the particular facts. It asked whether the conduct showed an actual attempt to commit the offence, or merely readiness, equipment and positioning to do so.
Even accepting that Geddes had entered a cubicle, he had neither contacted nor communicated with any pupil and had confronted none. The rucksack helped explain what he might have intended, but did not establish that he had begun imprisoning anyone. His entry into the school did not, on these facts, bridge that gap.
Decision
The evidence was insufficient in law to show an act beyond mere preparation. The judge should therefore have withdrawn the charge from the jury. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and quashed the conviction.
The decision separated evidence of a criminal plan from evidence that its execution had begun. It did not establish a universal requirement of contact with a victim: the court expressly treated the boundary between preparation and attempt as dependent on the facts.
Source: Original Court of Appeal judgment, Smith Bernal transcript.