R v Gnango [2012] 2 WLR 17
Joint Enterprise and Parasitic Accessory Liability
Facts
The defendant was a London teenager engaged in gang warfare. He had been in conflict with another person known as TC and in October 2007 took a gun and went to look for him. While out searching in a car park in New Cross, the defendant came under fire from a person known in the case as Bandana Man (suspected to be TC). The defendant returned fire. At that time Magda Pniewska, a 26 year old woman, was crossing the car park on her way home and was hit by a bullet from Bandana Man’s gun. She died. The so called Bandana Man was not apprehended and neither was TC (if it was a different person). The defendant was charged and convicted of murder under the joint enterprise rules.
Issues
While the doctrine of transferred malice made Bandana Man guilty of murder, the issue was whether the rules on joint enterprise could make the defendant equally guilty of Ms Pniewska’s murder, through an interaction between the principles of joint enterprise and transferred malice. In this case the situation was particularly complex since the two alleged accomplices were actively trying to kill one another. The question to answer for the Supreme Court was specifically whether joint enterprise could be applied in such a situation.
Decision/Outcome
It was held in this case that there is no impediment in the law on joint enterprise to treat two defendants as acting together even if they were engaged in attempting to harm or murder each other. It was still possible for a person to be a party to a crime even if he was the intended (or actual) victim. The defendant was therefore indeed guilty of murder.
Updated 21 March 2026
This article accurately summarises the facts and outcome of R v Gnango [2011] UKSC 59 (reported as [2012] 2 WLR 17), in which the Supreme Court upheld the defendant’s murder conviction on joint enterprise principles.
Readers should be aware of one important subsequent development. The Supreme Court’s landmark decision in R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8 (and the associated Privy Council decision in Ruddock v The Queen) significantly changed the law on parasitic accessory liability, which had operated under the framework established in Chan Wing-Siu [1985] AC 168. The Jogee court held that foresight of what a principal might do is evidence of intent, but is not itself a sufficient mental element for accessory liability; intention to assist or encourage the principal’s act is required. This affects the broader doctrine of joint enterprise and parasitic accessory liability discussed in this article. The article does not address Jogee, and students should consider how that ruling may bear on the reasoning in Gnango, particularly insofar as it relied on parasitic accessory liability principles. The core holding of Gnango itself — that two people shooting at each other can in principle be treated as acting in a joint enterprise — has not been formally overruled, but its reasoning should be read in light of the reformulated law set out in Jogee.
