R v Howe [1987] AC 417 concerned duress and participation in murder. The House of Lords held that duress was unavailable to anyone charged with murder, whether the person carried out the killing or participated in another way. It departed from DPP for Northern Ireland v Lynch and dismissed the four appellants’ appeals.
The two sets of proceedings
Howe and Bannister were tried with Murray and Bailey for two murders and a conspiracy to murder, arising from events on three successive days in October 1983. They claimed that they had acted because they feared Murray would kill them if they disobeyed him.
In the first killing, Howe and Bannister assaulted Mitchell Elgar, but Bailey inflicted the final strangulation. On the basis accepted for the trial, Howe and Bannister were treated as secondary participants and the judge left duress to the jury. In the second killing, they themselves strangled Martin Pollitt at Murray’s direction, and the judge ruled that duress was unavailable to them as the actual killers. The intended third victim escaped. Duress was left to the jury on the conspiracy charge.
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Howe and Bannister were convicted on all three counts. Their appeal challenged both the exclusion of duress for the actual killers and the objective element in the directions where the defence had been left to the jury.
The linked proceedings involved Burke and Clarkson. Burke shot Henry Botton, who was due to give evidence in proceedings involving Clarkson. Burke claimed that he had agreed to shoot Botton because he feared Clarkson, but also maintained that the gun discharged accidentally. The judge excluded duress as a defence to murder, while leaving it available in relation to manslaughter if the jury accepted the account of an accidental killing. Both men were convicted of murder.
Why the distinction between participants was rejected
The earlier decision in Lynch had allowed a secondary party to murder to raise duress, while leaving the position of the actual killer open. In Abbott v The Queen, the Privy Council had refused to extend the defence to an actual participant in the killing.
The House concluded that the resulting distinction was unsustainable. A person who organises or instigates a murder may be more culpable than the person who carries it out. The different roles did not provide a fair or workable boundary for the defence.
The Lords resolved that difficulty by withdrawing the defence from secondary participants, rather than extending it to actual killers. Using the power to depart from its previous decisions, the House declined to follow Lynch.
The reasons for excluding duress
The speeches emphasised the protection of innocent life and the longstanding rule against excusing murder because the defendant had been threatened. Lord Hailsham rejected the argument that a person could justify choosing another innocent person’s death to preserve their own life or that of someone close to them.
The Lords also considered the limits of judicial reform. The Law Commission had proposed legislation making duress available more widely, with defined conditions, but Parliament had not enacted it. Several speeches regarded such a major change as a matter for legislation.
The agreement on the result did not mean that every Lord regarded the rule as satisfactory. Lord Brandon expressly considered it illogical and unjust that duress could afford a complete defence to less grave crimes but no partial defence to murder. Nevertheless, he agreed that any alteration should be made legislatively.
The House rejected a proposed compromise under which duress would reduce murder to manslaughter. Duress was not simply the absence of criminal intent: a threatened person might intentionally commit the prohibited act. Where the defence was available and established, it excused liability; it did not operate as a general partial defence.
The other two certified questions
The House confirmed that a person who procured a killing could be convicted of murder even where the actual killer had a personal basis for acquittal or conviction only of manslaughter. The instigator’s liability was not automatically reduced with the killer’s. Clarkson’s argument could therefore not secure a reduction of his conviction merely by relying on Burke’s claimed defence.
The House also upheld the objective element in duress. Where that defence was available, it failed if the prosecution established that a sober person of reasonable firmness, sharing the defendant’s relevant characteristics and situation, would not have yielded to the threats. The defendant’s own fear was therefore not the sole test.
Outcome and scope
On 19 February 1987, the House dismissed the appeals and answered the three certified questions respectively no, yes and yes. The murder convictions remained in place, as did Howe and Bannister’s conspiracy convictions.
Lord Griffiths also expressed the view that duress should be unavailable for attempted murder. The appeals themselves did not concern an attempted-murder conviction, so that observation should be distinguished from the ruling on the murder charges before the House.
Report citations: [1987] AC 417; [1987] 2 WLR 568; [1987] 1 All ER 771.
Source: House of Lords, full judgment in the conjoined appeals of Howe, Bannister, Burke and Clarkson.