Legal Case Summary
R v Malcherek; R v Steel [1981] EWCA Crim J0317-6; [1981] 1 WLR 690; [1981] 2 All ER 422; (1981) 73 Cr App R 173
Victim requiring medical treatment – Act breaking chain of causation
Facts
Malcherek
Malcherek stabbed his wife in the abdomen. She was treated for the wound and a few days later she collapsed in hospital. Her heart later stopped and surgery was performed to remove a blood clot. It restarted after about thirty minutes, by which time there was a grave risk of brain damage, and she was placed on a ventilator. Her condition subsequently deteriorated. On 5 April, after tests indicated irretrievable brain damage, the ventilator was disconnected.
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Steel
Steel attacked a girl and caused serious head injuries. She was taken to hospital and put on a life support machine almost immediately. Shortly afterwards it was concluded that her brain had stopped working and the machine was disconnected.
Issues
In each case, the medical treatment that was given was considered normal and in line with approved medical practice. Both Malcherek and Steel were convicted of murder. In both instances, the trial judges withdrew the issue of causation from the jury as it was clear the initial injuries inflicted were the cause of death. Malcherek appealed against his conviction; Steel applied for leave to appeal and to call further medical evidence. They challenged the withdrawal of causation from the juries.
Decision / Outcome
Malcherek’s appeal and Steel’s applications were dismissed. Discontinuing life support following competent, careful treatment did not absolve the assailants where the original injuries remained an operating cause of death. There was no evidence that the original injuries had ceased to cause the deaths. On this basis, the issue of causation was properly withdrawn from the juries by the trial judges.
The proposed further medical evidence, concerning the criteria for brain death and the way tests had been carried out, could not alter that causal conclusion. The court declined to admit it. Its decision addressed causation; it did not lay down a general definition of death.
