R v Mullen [2000] QB 520
Abuse of process; deportation; alleged collusion
(307 words)
Facts
Mullen was brought back to England from Zimbabwe due to being wanted by the police. Upon his arrival, he was arrested and later convicted of conspiracy to cause explosions. He was sentenced to 30 years in prison. His application for leave to appeal his sentence was refused, however, he could later appeal his conviction.
Issues
There was evidence that English and Zimbabwean security services had colluded to make it impossible for Mullen to get access to a lawyer during his deportation. Mullen did not complain about the trial itself, he purely relied on the circumstances of his deportation and lack of access to a lawyer as reasons for his “unsafe” conviction within the meaning of s. 2(1)(a) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 (as substituted by s. 2 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1995).
Decision/Outcome
The Court of Appeal allowed Mullen’s appeal. It held that while Mullen was certainly guilty (he himself admitted to have been properly convicted following a fair trial), he was still a victim of abuse of the lawful administration of justice. The Court directed that the severity of the offence alleged had to be weighed against the authorities’ conduct – i.e. the authorities must have been aware of the essential need for legal advice during detention and deportation. Denial of access to legal advice breached not only Zimbabwean law but also Mullen’s human rights. Had Mullen’s rights been respected, he may not have been tried in England. The Court of Appeal found that the prosecution omission to voluntarily disclose information relevant to Mullen’s defence also had to be taken into account. Mullen could rely on s. 2(1)(a) of 1968 Act and claim his conviction was “unsafe” even if the sole ground of appeal was that the prosecution was an abuse of process (lack of objection during trial was not fatal to the appeal).
Updated 20 March 2026
This case summary remains broadly accurate as a statement of the Court of Appeal’s decision in R v Mullen [2000] QB 520. The statutory framework cited — s. 2(1)(a) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 as substituted by s. 2 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1995 — remains in force in its current form. The principle established in Mullen, that a conviction may be quashed as ‘unsafe’ where there has been a serious abuse of process in bringing the defendant to trial, even where the trial itself was fair and the defendant was factually guilty, remains good law. However, readers should note that the subsequent history of this case is significant: following his release, Mullen applied for compensation under the Criminal Justice Act 1988 s. 133, which is limited to cases where a new or newly discovered fact shows a miscarriage of justice. The Secretary of State refused compensation, and the courts ultimately found (in R (Mullen) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 18) that s. 133 did not apply because the quashing was not based on a new fact showing innocence. This House of Lords decision does not affect the accuracy of the Court of Appeal’s ruling as summarised here, but students relying on Mullen in the context of compensation for wrongful conviction should be aware of this important limitation confirmed at the highest level.
