Legal Case Summary
R v Pagett (1983) 76 Cr App R 279
CAUSATION – NOVUS ACTUS INTERVENIENS – SELF DEFENCE
Facts
The appellant shot at a police officer who was trying to arrest him, and subsequently attempted to use a pregnant teenage girl standing nearby as a human shield to defend himself against retaliation by the officer. The officer returned fire, killing the girl. At trial the defendant was acquitted of murder but convicted of manslaughter, which he appealed.
Issues
The issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the officer’s action in shooting at the defendant constituted a novus actus interveniens such as to break the chain of causation between the defendant’s actions and the death of the victim.
Decision/Outcome
It was held that a neither a reasonable act taken for the purpose of self-preservation, nor an act done in the execution of a legal duty, could not constitute a novus actus interveniens for the purposes of the causal chain. The Court suggested that in a homicide case it is rarely necessary to give the jury more than a simple direction on the issue of causation; a direction that the defendant’s act need not be the sole cause of death is usually sufficient. In this case, the defendant had done two dangerous acts which a sober and reasonable person would realise were likely to cause harm, firstly by firing at the officer and secondly by forcing the victim to shield him from return fire. Both of these acts had in fact contributed significantly to the victim’s death. The conviction of manslaughter was therefore upheld.
Updated 20 March 2026
This summary of R v Pagett (1983) 76 Cr App R 279 remains legally accurate. The case continues to be good law on causation in criminal law, particularly regarding novus actus interveniens. The principle that a reasonable act of self-preservation or an act done in execution of a legal duty will not break the chain of causation has been consistently applied and affirmed in subsequent case law, including R v Kennedy (No 2) [2007] UKHL 38, where the House of Lords engaged extensively with causation principles. There have been no statutory or judicial developments that undermine or materially alter the position as described. Note that the summary contains a minor double negative in the Decision/Outcome section (‘a neither a reasonable act… could not constitute’), which slightly obscures the legal rule as stated by the Court of Appeal; readers should understand that the correct principle is that such acts do not break the chain of causation.
