Richmond Adult Community College v McDougall [2008] EWCA Civ 4
Disability discrimination. The assessment of disability and the likelihood of disability recurring
M had suffered from psychological disorders but recovered after medical treatment. M was offered a job as a database assistant for the College. When the College learned of M’s medical history it withdrew the offer. M brought a disability discrimination claim.
The employment tribunal accepted that M had a mental impairment but held that she was not disabled within the meaning of section 1 of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995, as the impairment did not have a substantial and long-term adverse effect and there was no evidence that the condition was likely to recur.
The EAT reversed the decision, stating that the tribunal ought to have taken into account medical evidence between the date of the discrimination and the hearing of the claim, which showed a relapse.
The College appealed on the basis that when considering whether the effect of a medical condition was likely to recur the employer had to base its decision on the circumstances existing at that date, and that what actually happened after that date was not relevant to the tribunal’s decision.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal. On the facts, there was no evidence at the time of the decision that M’s condition was likely to recur. The tribunal should only consider evidence available at the relevant time.
Updated 20 March 2026
This case summary remains accurate as a description of the Court of Appeal’s decision in Richmond Adult Community College v McDougall [2008] EWCA Civ 4. However, readers should note an important legislative development: the Disability Discrimination Act 1995, under which this claim was brought, has been repealed and replaced by the Equality Act 2010. The definition of disability is now found in section 6 of and Schedule 1 to the Equality Act 2010, and the associated guidance on matters to be taken into account in determining questions relating to the definition of disability was updated in 2011. The core legal principle established in this case — that a tribunal assessing whether an impairment is likely to recur should consider only evidence available at the relevant time, not post-decision evidence of an actual relapse — is understood to remain good law under the 2010 Act framework, as the statutory language on recurrence is materially similar. Students should therefore read this case in the context of the Equality Act 2010 rather than the now-repealed 1995 Act.
