Current status: The Supreme Court overruled Roe v Wade and Planned Parenthood v Casey in Dobbs v Jackson Women’s Health Organization on 24 June 2022. Roe’s constitutional abortion-rights framework is therefore no longer binding. The account below explains the 1973 decision and its later treatment.
Roe v Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), concerned Texas laws which permitted abortion only to save the pregnant woman’s life. The Supreme Court held that this restriction infringed the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. It recognised a qualified right to decide whether to end a pregnancy, balanced against state interests in maternal health and potential life.
Law Teacher writing support
Writing a law essay?
We choose a writer who is an expert in your area of law and qualified to at least the academic level you select. Most of our writers hold a master’s degree or PhD, have teaching experience, or both.
Send us your question and, if you wish, any marking criteria. We’ll write an essay to your instructions.
The claim and the appeal
In March 1970, Jane Roe, an unmarried pregnant woman in Dallas County, sued District Attorney Henry Wade. She wanted a safe abortion by a licensed doctor but said that Texas law prevented it and that she could not afford to travel elsewhere. Dr James Hubert Hallford, who faced two prosecutions under the same legislation, intervened. A married couple, the Does, brought a related claim about the possibility of an unwanted future pregnancy.
A three-judge District Court declared the abortion statutes unconstitutional but refused an injunction. It located the relevant privacy right in the Ninth Amendment, applied through the Fourteenth Amendment. Appeals challenged both the declaration and the refusal of an injunction. The Supreme Court first heard argument in December 1971, heard reargument in October 1972 and delivered its decision on 22 January 1973. It did not decide the appeal in 1971.
Roe’s pregnancy had ended before the Supreme Court proceedings concluded. Nevertheless, her claim remained live: pregnancy was too short to allow ordinary appellate review before its conclusion, and the issue could recur. This was the exception to mootness for disputes capable of repetition yet evading review.
The other claimants were treated differently. Hallford had not established grounds for federal intervention in his pending state prosecutions, where he could raise his constitutional arguments. The Does’ claim depended on uncertain future events and did not present an actual controversy.
Privacy, liberty and the state’s interests
Justice Blackmun’s majority opinion located the relevant right in the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of personal liberty under the Due Process Clause. Earlier decisions had recognised privacy interests in marriage, contraception, procreation and family life. The Court considered that this protection extended to a woman’s decision whether to terminate a pregnancy.
The majority did not recognise an unlimited right to abortion. It accepted state interests in maternal health, medical standards and potential life. Under its approach, restrictions upon the fundamental right required a compelling state interest and had to be drawn narrowly to serve that interest.
Texas argued that a foetus was a person protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court rejected that interpretation of the Amendment’s word “person”. It expressly declined to decide when life begins. Its conclusion about constitutional personhood did not prevent the state from protecting potential life; the question was when that interest justified restricting the pregnant woman’s choice.
The framework adopted in 1973
The Court treated maternal health and potential life as separate interests which became compelling at different stages. Its framework was:
- Before approximately the end of the first trimester: the abortion decision and its implementation were left to the medical judgment of the attending physician, in consultation with the patient.
- After approximately the first trimester: the state could regulate abortion in ways reasonably related to maternal health, including requirements concerning practitioners and facilities.
- After viability: the state could regulate or prohibit abortion to protect potential life, except where abortion was necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, to preserve the woman’s life or health.
The viability stage was significant because it concerned the foetus’s capacity for life outside the womb. The decision did not authorise a complete third-trimester ban without a life-or-health exception. Nor did the first-trimester rule mean that anyone could lawfully perform an abortion: the Court accepted that states could require a licensed physician.
Texas’s legislation drew no distinction between stages of pregnancy and allowed abortion only to save the woman’s life. It therefore went beyond the restrictions the majority considered constitutionally permissible. The Court invalidated the challenged criminal abortion provisions without needing to decide the separate argument that they were too vague.
Decision and disagreement
The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s judgment concerning Roe, including the declaration of unconstitutionality. It did not order an injunction, proceeding on the assumption that the Texas authorities would respect its ruling. It reversed the declaration in Hallford’s favour and required dismissal of his intervention. The dismissal of the Does’ claim stood.
Justice Stewart supported the result on the basis of substantive liberty under the Due Process Clause. Justice Rehnquist’s dissent criticised both the constitutional reasoning and the Court’s division of pregnancy into stages. He favoured examining whether the legislation had a rational relationship to a valid state objective and considered the majority’s detailed framework closer to legislative decision-making.
Later treatment: Casey and Dobbs
In Planned Parenthood v Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), the Court retained Roe’s central protection of abortion choice before viability but abandoned its trimester framework, applying an undue-burden test to restrictions instead.
In Dobbs (2022), the Court held that the Constitution does not confer a right to abortion and expressly overruled both Roe and Casey. It returned authority to regulate abortion to the people and their elected representatives. Dobbs did not itself impose a nationwide abortion ban. Roe remains important to the history of constitutional privacy and substantive due process, but its abortion-rights holding must be read with that overruling clearly in view.