Legal Case Summary
Shadwell v Shadwell (1860) 9 CB NS 159; 142 ER 52
Performance of a duty imposed by a contract with a Third Party
Facts
The defendant was the plaintiff’s uncle. The uncle promised to pay his nephew £150 a year until the nephew’s income reached 600 guineas provided the nephew married his fiancée. The uncle paid 12 instalments but then died, and the payments stopped. The nephew sued his uncle’s estate for the remaining payments.
Issues
A marriage contract was legally enforceable at the time. However, the marriage contract was between the nephew and his fiancée, and was not mad with the uncle. The defendants claimed that as a result the nephew had provided no consideration for the uncle’s promise to pay him. This was a voluntary gift and could not be enforced. The nephew argued that his going through with the marriage was consideration.
Decision / Outcome
Erle CJ said that performance of the marriage contract was consideration, even though the contract was made with a third party to the agreement, as the uncle’s promise was an inducement to the nephew to perform this contract. He said that the plaintiff had, by getting married, made a material change in his position and had induced his wife to do the same. They may have incurred pecuniary liabilities that would be a loss to them if the promised income was withheld. He recognised that marriage could be a benefit to interested relatives, and so the uncle did derive a benefit from the marriage. Therefore, the marriage was good consideration.
Updated 20 March 2026
This article accurately summarises the decision in Shadwell v Shadwell (1860) 9 CB NS 159, a foundational English contract law case on consideration and the performance of pre-existing contractual duties owed to a third party. The case remains good law for the proposition that performance of a duty owed to a third party can constitute valid consideration, and it continues to be cited in this context in English contract law. Students should note, however, that the broader doctrine of consideration — particularly regarding pre-existing duties — has been significantly developed by later cases. Most notably, Williams v Roffey Bros & Nicholls (Contractors) Ltd [1991] 1 QB 1 (CA) extended the circumstances in which practical benefit can constitute consideration when performing an existing contractual duty to the other contracting party, though it did not directly overrule Shadwell. Additionally, the legal enforceability of a promise to marry, which was a significant element of the factual background in Shadwell, was abolished by the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1970, s.1. This does not affect the core legal principle the case establishes regarding consideration, but students should be aware that the factual context — a legally binding obligation to marry — could not arise in the same way today. The article otherwise remains accurate as a statement of the historical decision and the principle it stands for.
