Legal Case Summary
Sim v Stretch [1936] 2 All ER 1237
Libel; telegram; words capable of defamatory meaning
Facts
The claimant had a housemaid for a limited period of time, who re-entered the service of the defendant. Upon the maid’s arrival, the defendant sent the following telegram to the claimant: “E. has resumed her service with us today. Please send her possessions and the money you borrowed, also her wages to […]”.
Issues
The claimant sued for libel, arguing that the telegram included defamatory allegations – namely, that they implied financial difficulties on the claimant’s side (e.g. that he was forced to borrow, failed to pay the maid’s wages, etc.). The defendant denied that these words could be capable of constituting defamation in themselves or by innuendo.
Decision/Outcome
Lord Atkin established a test in his judgment to decide whether words ‘in their ordinary signification’ were capable of defamatory meaning. Stating that the classic approach whereby the claimant is exposed to hatred, ridicule or contempt might be too narrow, he proposed the following test: “would the words tends to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally?”. If the words are found to be capable of constituting defamation, then it is for the jury to decide whether they were defamatory in the circumstances of each case. In the present case, the defendant’s words were found not to be reasonably capable of a defamatory meaning – so the claimant’s action was dismissed.
Updated 20 March 2026
This summary accurately describes the decision in Sim v Stretch [1936] 2 All ER 1237 and Lord Atkin’s formulation of the defamation test. The case remains a foundational authority on the meaning of “defamatory” and is still regularly cited in this context.
Readers should note, however, that the legal landscape has developed significantly since 1936. The Defamation Act 2013 introduced important changes to English defamation law, most notably the requirement in section 1 that a statement must have caused or be likely to cause “serious harm” to the claimant’s reputation before an action in defamation can proceed. This threshold requirement sits alongside the common law test described in this article, and in practice now represents the primary hurdle a claimant must clear. The 2013 Act also abolished the presumption in favour of jury trial in defamation cases, meaning that the role of the jury as described in this article is now far less commonly applicable in practice, though the underlying common law principles remain relevant. Students should ensure they read Sim v Stretch in the context of the Defamation Act 2013 and subsequent case law applying the serious harm test, including Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd [2019] UKSC 27.
