Legal Case Summary
South Wales Miners’ Federation v Glamorgan Coal Co Ltd [1905] AC 239
Tort – Contract – Procuring Breach of Contract – Cause of Action – Interference with Legal Right – Malice – Justification
Facts
The federation was a trade union, formed to consider trade and wages, to protect the workmen and regulate relations. The wages were paid on a sliding scale agreement in accordance with the rising and falling price of coal. The federation feared the wages would fall too low with the price of coal and called for several “stop days” for the workmen, causing 100,000 men to break their contracts. Glamorgan sued for interference and procuring a breach of contract.
Issues
Whether the action of the Federation was justified in circumstances where their action was without malice or intent to harm, or whether it amounted to an unlawful interference by a third party.
Held
Procuring a breach of contract is an actionable wrong unless there is a justification for the interference, by way of a legal right. The miners would found to be in breach of their contracts by failing to give notice of abstaining from work. Even though the federation could not be found to have acted with malice or with ill-will towards the employers as their only object was to protect the wages of the coalminers, their conduct was still an unjustified interference. Their action procured a number of people to break their contracts which was manifestly unlawful and did cause serious damage to Glamorgan, who were entitled to have their contracts performed. The coalminers were acting in their own interests and there was found to be no moral ground that had caused the Federation to take unlawful action.
Updated 20 March 2026
This case summary accurately reflects the decision in South Wales Miners’ Federation v Glamorgan Coal Co Ltd [1905] AC 239 as a foundational authority on the tort of procuring breach of contract (also called inducement of breach of contract). The core legal principle — that procuring a breach of contract is actionable unless justified by a legal right, and that absence of malice does not of itself constitute justification — remains good law and continues to be cited in that context.
However, readers should be aware of significant subsequent developments. The Trade Disputes Act 1906, enacted shortly after this decision, granted trade unions and their officials statutory immunity from tortious liability for acts done in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute, directly reversing the practical effect of this case in the industrial relations context. That immunity framework has since been substantially re-worked and is now governed primarily by the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (as amended), which sets out the conditions under which industrial action and union officials attract statutory protection. The common law principles established in this case therefore operate today within, and subject to, that statutory framework.
On the general tort of inducing breach of contract, the law was authoritatively restated by the House of Lords in OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] UKHL 21, which remains the leading modern authority. Readers should consult that decision for the current legal position on this tort, including the distinction between direct and indirect inducement and the requirements of knowledge and intent.
This article is therefore useful for understanding the historical development of the law but should not be read as a self-contained statement of the current legal position without reference to the 1992 Act and OBG Ltd v Allan.
